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Dissertation Abstract 
This thesis explores how various African and European actors experienced 
projections of imperial power, and the subsequent – though not synonymous – 
processes of colonial state-formation, in what was a relatively remote area on the 
margins of empire. Situated far away from established centres of authority in Cape 
Town or Pietermaritzburg, Pondoland was largely of parochial interest to imperial 
and colonial officials for much of the nineteenth century. As the last independent 
chiefdom to be annexed by the Cape, the transformations that marked the 
diminishing of empire and the consolidation of colonial rule had relatively little 
impact upon Mpondo political structures until 1894. Of course, the country was not 
immune to wider economic shifts or the conflagrations that erupted along an ever 
expanding eastern frontier. But these broader patterns of change modified, rather 
than undermined, the existing foundations of Mpondo political authority.  
Consequently, this thesis explores how these broader historical 
developments were perceived in Pondoland. Specifically, it seeks to examine how 
various Mpondo and other actors understood these processes by highlighting the 
contentious debates about the exercise of political authority and subjecthood they 
provoked. Such conversations varied across the polity; they expressed the latent 
loyalties and long-term rivalries within the country – cleavages which themselves 
reflected its jurisdictionally heterogeneous nature and the processes of differential 
incorporation which bound its composite communities in various ways to the 
Mpondo paramountcy. In examining the political dialogue that took place during 
Pondoland’s transition from independence to annexation, this thesis foregrounds the 
reconfiguration of intra-Mpondo political relations as central in determining the 
nature of the country’s incorporation. Moreover, it explores how these intra-
Mpondo shifts were both facilitated by, and foundational to, the intersection of 
indigenous, colonial and imperial jurisdictional disputes in ways that fundamentally 
shaped the administrative and institutional character of the early colonial state. 
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Note on Terminology 
As Thembela Kepe and Lungisile Ntsebeza have recently acknowledged, there are 
various ways of spelling the site of study of this thesis: ‘Mpondoland’, ‘Phondoland’ 
and ‘Pondoland’. Whilst these differences arise from an attempt to decolonise the 
term, there are numerous difficulties and pitfalls that prevent its easy 
standardisation.1 Throughout this thesis, I have used the noun ‘Pondoland’ when 
situating the processes and historical developments under analysis in their physical 
and geographical location. I have, however, used the term ‘Mpondo’ adjectivally to 
describe them; for example, intra-Mpondo relations, Mpondo system of governance 
or Mpondo historical actors. I am aware of the potential dissonance between these 
two terms with regards to their colonial and indigenous usage. The former points to 
its historically constructed nature and is thus deployed in order to critique and 
analyse the jurisdictional limits of the term. The latter recognises the Mpondo as a 
people in contemporary time/place; I thus seek to respect that whilst using the term 
adjectivally to highlight those composite communities and their interactions that 
ultimately qualified and gave meaning to the country’s jurisdictional boundaries. 
When referring to names of specific chiefs, I have opted for the contemporary 
spelling: Mhlangaso and Mqikela rather than Umhlangaso and Umqikela. I have done 
the same when referring to place names or names of rivers: Mthatha and Mzimvubu 
instead of Umtata and Umzimvubu. When referencing specific clan names or 
lineages, I have dropped the prefix: Bala and Xesibe, instead of amaBala and 
amaXesibe. This I have done throughout the thesis, unless citing directly from 
primary material.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Thembela Kepe and Lungisile Ntsebeza, ‘Introduction’, in Thembela Kepe and Lungisile Ntsebeza 
(eds), Rural Resistance in South Africa: The Mpondo Revolts after Fifty Years, (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 
2, fn. 2.   
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Introduction: 
 
Of Tusks and Tiger Skins – Loyalty on the Margins of Empire: 
On 3 March 1902, A. K. Soga addressed a letter to the Native Affairs Department of 
the Cape Colony. An editor of the independent African newspaper Izwi Labantu 
(Voice of the People), Soga explained how he had been contacted by the Paramount 
Chief of Eastern Pondoland, Sigcau (1887-1905), regarding an ivory tusk and tiger skin 
that he had forwarded to department officials, ‘presumably for the presentation to 
HRH the Duke of Cornwall and York’.1 The items were intended as gifts, to be 
presented to the grandson of the late Queen Victoria and future King of Britain’s 
empire during his tour of South Africa in August 1901. Yet the tusk and tiger skin 
never reached their royal recipient; the Mpondo chief alleged that he was advised to 
give them to a colonial official in order to save the expense of despatching the gifts 
to England. Since he was visiting Cape Town for a few days, Soga offered to 
investigate the matter in order ‘to satisfy the Chief as to the ultimate destination of 
the parcel’. He politely concluded his letter, simply requesting that the government 
‘kindly favour me with some information on the subject’. 
His reply, however, was not so courteous. One official lambasted Soga’s 
inquiry as ‘an accusation…devoid of truth’.2 Another questioned why Sigcau had 
contacted the editor at all, claiming that he had misunderstood what was actually an 
instruction to send the gifts via a colonial official in order to avoid the postal expense. 
Anyhow, he had been repeatedly informed that the items had not been passed on to 
                                                          
1 The following is taken from (CA) NA-505 File A180: A. K. Soga to Native Affairs Office, 3 March 
1902. 
2 (CA) NA-505 A180: Native Affairs Office to A. K. Soga, 7 March 1902. 
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the Duke; they were to remain in Cape Town until he had decided what to do with 
them.3 Hardly a colonial conspiracy, their non-delivery was actually the fault of the 
chief. Perhaps it was just as well – the tusk was broken and the tiger skin was stained; 
officials noted that they had ‘sustained considerable damage 
in…transit…unfortunately rendering them unfit for presentation to Their Royal 
Highness’.4 The Native Affairs Department thus opted to send the articles back to 
Pondoland, along with the sincere regret of the Prime Minister. 
That these gifts were returned to the paramount arguably suggests the 
irrelevance of Mpondo participation in this broader imperial moment. That Sigcau’s 
offer was declined by Cape officials likewise implies the primacy of colonial authority 
over an African polity that was annexed to the colony in 1894. Whilst this formal 
acquisition had yielded a new addition to Britain’s empire, the meaning of this 
newfound imperial membership appeared to be determined by a colonial state 
whose conquest of those African kingdoms beyond the Kei River now seemed 
complete. 
This thesis explores how various African and European actors experienced 
projections of imperial power, and the subsequent – though not synonymous – 
processes of colonial state-formation, in what was a relatively remote area on the 
margins of empire. Situated far away from established centres of authority in Cape 
Town or Pietermaritzburg, Pondoland was largely of parochial interest to imperial 
and colonial officials for much of the nineteenth century. As the last independent 
                                                          
3 (CA) NA-505 A180: Chief Magistrate, Transkei to Secretary for Native Affairs, 26 March 1902. 
4 (CA) NA-505 A180: Assistant Secretary to Native Affairs Department to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 
23 April 1902.  
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chiefdom to be annexed by the Cape, the transformations that marked the 
diminishing of empire and the consolidation of colonial rule had relatively little 
impact upon Mpondo political structures until 1894. Of course, the country was not 
immune to wider economic shifts or the conflagrations that erupted along an ever 
expanding eastern frontier. But these broader patterns of change modified, rather 
than undermined, the existing foundations of Mpondo political authority.  
Consequently, this thesis explores how these broader historical 
developments were perceived in Pondoland. Specifically, it seeks to examine how 
various Mpondo and other actors understood these processes by highlighting the 
contentious debates about the exercise of political authority and subjecthood they 
provoked. Such conversations varied across the polity; they expressed the latent 
loyalties and long-term rivalries within the country – cleavages which themselves 
reflected its jurisdictionally heterogeneous nature and the processes of differential 
incorporation which bound its composite communities in various ways and degrees 
to the Mpondo paramountcy. In examining the political dialogue that took place in 
Pondoland during its transition from independence to annexation, this thesis 
foregrounds the reconfiguration of intra-Mpondo political relations as central in 
determining the nature of the country’s incorporation. Moreover, it explores how 
these intra-Mpondo shifts were both facilitated by, and foundational to, the 
intersection of indigenous, colonial and imperial jurisdictional disputes in ways that 
fundamentally shaped the administrative and institutional character of the early 
colonial state. 
4 
 
 Take, for example, the tusk and tiger skin. In many respects, their non-
delivery was likely of little significance. But the overreaction provoked by Soga’s 
inquiries suggests that accusations of their royal rejection tapped into a wider 
insecurity about the Cape’s own authority. Such worries were arguably reflective of 
the fractious ‘politics of patriotism’ that suffused South Africa and the British Empire 
at the beginning of the twentieth century.5 By the time the Duke had arrived in Natal 
on 13 August 1901, the royal party had already travelled to Australia and New 
Zealand, and would continue on to Canada by September. Undertaken as part of a 
wider tour of Britain’s self-governing dominions, royalists throughout the empire 
insisted that these visits represented the appreciation of the late Queen Victoria of 
the participation of colonial troops in the ongoing South African War (1899-1902).6 
Indeed, every member of the royal family saw the war as a just one, and as the Duke 
traversed the various lands that constituted British soil, it was arranged that he would 
personally pin a specially minted war medal on the chests of empire’s loyal soldiers.7   
 Monarchical and military ceremonies served an important iconographical 
function in the maintenance of imperial rule. They were intended as displays of 
‘glory, strength, order and progress, virtues intended to be symbolic of Britain and 
its empire’; they served as demonstrations of the power of the imperial crown and 
its ‘unprecedented reach, importance and grandeur’.8 Put simply, they were 
                                                          
5 I borrow the term from Bill Nasson, Abraham Esau’s War: A Black South African War in the Cape, 
1899-1902, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 32.  
6 Phillip Buckner, ‘The Royal Tour of 1901 and the Construction of an Imperial Identity in South 
Africa’, South African Historical Journal, 41:1 (1999), p. 324. 
7 Buckner, ‘The Royal Tour’, pp. 329-30.  
8 Anna Clarkson, ‘Pomp, Circumstance, and Wild Arabs: The 1912 Royal Visit to Sudan’, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 34:1 (2006), p. 75; David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the 
British Saw Their Empire, (London; New York; Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 101. 
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designed to impress subject populations and win their loyalty. This was especially 
crucial during the royal tour of 1901; the initial enthusiasm for British involvement in 
the war had started to wane, as the conflict against the Afrikaner Transvaal and 
Orange Free State republics began its descent into a protracted guerrilla campaign.9 
The problems presented by those bitterenders beyond the Cape had been paralleled 
by those Afrikaners who lived within it; approximately 10 000 rebels had joined the 
Boer forces during their first invasion of the colony between October 1899 and March 
1900.10 Such developments not only reflected a growing republican nationalism; they 
likewise revealed the tensions that had long shaped the socialisation of Cape 
Afrikaners into the British Empire.11 This schism was also evident amongst the 
English-speaking political community, as factions emerged to support, or vehemently 
oppose, the suspension of the colony’s constitution, proposed in light of these recent 
crises.12  
It was for these reasons that the royal visit thus took place. Unashamedly 
jingoistic in tone, it was deliberately designed to stoke the support of, and silence the 
criticism within, those increasingly sceptical audiences both at home and abroad.13 
                                                          
9 For an overview of the different phases that constituted the conflict, see André Wessels, 
‘Afrikaners at War’, and Fransjohan Pretorius, ‘The Experience of the Bitterender Boer in the 
Guerrilla Phase of the South African War’, in John Gooch (ed.), The Boer War: Direction, Experience 
and Impact, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 73-106 and pp. 166-85 respectively.  
10 Wessels, ‘Afrikaners at War’, p. 98. 
11 See Fransjohan Pretorius, ‘Afrikaner Nationalism and the Burgher on Commando’, in Greg 
Cuthbertson, Albert Grundlingh, and Mary-Lynn Suttie (eds), Writing a Wider War: Rethinking 
Gender, Race, and Identity in the South African War, 1899-1902, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2002), pp. 67-85; Mordechai Tamarkin, ‘The Cape Afrikaners and the British Empire from the 
Jameson Raid to the South African War’, in Donal Lowry (ed.), The South African War Reappraised, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 129. 
12 Andrew Thompson, ‘The Language of Loyalism in Southern Africa, c.1870-1939’, English Historical 
Review, 118:477 (2003), pp. 633-34. 
13 Andrew Porter, The Origins of the South African War: Joseph Chamberlain and the Diplomacy of 
Imperialism, 1895-99, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), p. vii. For an exploration of 
the social underpinnings of domestic jingoism, see Richard N. Price, ‘Society, Status, Jingoism: The 
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In doing so, it also intended to underscore the ‘unity of the Empire’.14 This was 
especially important given the plurality of participants that contributed to Britain’s 
military campaign. As numerous studies have explored, the war necessitated an 
appeal to, and the mobilisation of, a range of historical actors drawn from varied 
socio-economic, cultural, racial and ethnic backgrounds from across the four 
southern African colonies.15 Those involved occupied different positions on a 
spectrum of loyalty and collaboration; whilst some offered their begrudging support 
to the British in a context of limited agency, others were more enthusiastic in 
professing their affiliations to empire. 
Soga typifies this latter description; he served as a trooper and saw action on 
the front at Stormberg and Dordrecht in the Eastern Cape.16 Moreover, his 
newspaper endorsed imperial intervention in South Africa; it repeatedly reported 
Boer atrocities, alleged the tyranny of Afrikaner republicanism, and publically 
doubted the patriotism of those liberal Cape politicians who were critical of imperial 
                                                          
Social Roots of Lower Middle Class Patriotism, 1870-1900’, in Geoffrey Crossick (ed.), The Lower 
Middle Class in Britain, (London: Croom Helm, 1977), pp. 89-112. 
14 Buckner, ‘The Royal Tour’, p. 329. 
15 On Afrikaner collaboration, see Albert Grundlingh, ‘Collaboration in Boer Society’, in Peter 
Warwick S. P. Spies (eds), The South African War: the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902, (Harlow: 
Longman, 1980), pp. 258-78; Albert Grundlingh, The Dynamics of Treason: Boer Collaboration in the 
South African War of 1899-1902, (Pretoria: Protea Book House, 2006); John Boje and Fransjohan 
Pretorius, ‘Of Gold and Iron: Collaborators in the Winburg District’, South African Historical Journal, 
63:2 (2011), pp. 277-94. On African participation, see Peter Warwick, Black People and the South 
African War, 1899-1902, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Nasson, Abraham Esau’s 
War; Bernard Mbenga, ‘The Role of the Bakgatla of the Pilanesberg in the South African War’, John 
Lambert, ‘“Loyalty Its Own Reward”: the South African War Experience of Natal’s “Loyal” Africans’, 
and Manelisi Genge, ‘The Role of the EmaSwati in the South African War’, in Greg Cuthbertson, 
Albert Grundlingh, and Mary-Lynn Suttie (eds), Writing a Wider War: Rethinking Gender, Race, and 
Identity in the South African War, 1899-1902, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002), pp. 85-114, 115-
35 and 136-58 respectively; Neil Parsons, ‘Not All Quiet on the Western Frontier: Khama’s Bangwato 
and the Waterberg Commando’, South African Historical Journal, 41:1 (1999), pp. 44-55. 
16 André Odendaal, The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the Struggle for Democracy in South 
Africa, (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2012), p. 260. 
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action.17 He was, however, no jingoist.18 Instead, he viewed empire as the vehicle 
through which British liberal values – best encapsulated by the Cape’s own non-racial 
franchise - might be extended to those oppressed African communities in the 
Transvaal and Free State.19 After all, he could personally identify with the 
“progressive” potential of British imperialism. He was the son of Tiyo Soga, the first 
indigenous southern African to be ordained as a Christian minister, and a prominent 
Xhosa intellectual and British loyalist.20 Like his father, he was educated at the 
Lovedale Missionary Institution before studying at Glasgow University.21 Later, he 
joined the civil service as an employee of the Native Affairs Department, before 
becoming an acting magistrate.22 Soga thus embodied the promise implied by empire 
that “progress”, “respectability” and “improvement” were not only attainable, but 
were central to the eventual extension of equal political rights to indigenous 
populations. He therefore serves as a reminder, as Vivian Bickford-Smith rightly 
notes, ‘that the most important agents of British hegemony came from the ranks of 
the ‘rising class’ amongst the colonised themselves’.23  
In this sense, the war functioned as an exceptional moment during which a 
‘loyalist consciousness’ was fully formed amongst the Christian educated elite 
                                                          
17 Odendaal, The Founders, p. 260. 
18 Even if, as Peter Limb notes, financial strains necessitated that he treat with that rampant empire-
builder, Cecil Rhodes, in order to keep his paper afloat in 1898-99. See Peter Limb, ‘“No People Can 
Be Expected to Be Loyal Under Such Difficulties”: Ambiguities and Identities of Early African National 
Congress Leaders in South Africa”, Social Dynamics, 29:1 (2003), p. 8. 
19 Odendaal, The Founders, p. 260. 
20 Vivian Bickford-Smith, ‘African Nationalist or British Loyalist? The Complicated Case of Tiyo Soga’, 
History Workshop Journal, 71:1 (2011), p. 78. 
21 John M. Mackenzie and Nigel R. Dalziel, The Scots in South Africa: Ethnicity, Identity, Gender and 
Race, 1772-1914, (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007), p. 117. 
22 Odendaal, The Founders, p. 92. 
23 Vivian Bickford-Smith, ‘Revisiting Anglicisation in the Nineteenth-Century Cape Colony’, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 31:2 (2002), p. 85. 
8 
 
(amakholwa) within black society.24 Of course, their hopes were to be found wanting 
following the post-war peace settlement between Briton and Boer.25 Yet displays of 
African loyalism did not simply disappear; as Hilary Sapire demonstrates, outpourings 
of imperial affinity remained a resilient feature of black South African politics – both 
elite and popular - as late as the 1947 royal tour.26  
Indeed, whilst Soga would become a founding member of the South African 
Native National Congress in 1912 (renamed the African National Congress in 1923), 
he formed part of an African intelligentsia whose nationalism was underpinned, 
rather than undermined, by the never-to-be realised promises of empire. Through 
their own experiences of acculturation and Anglicisation, these amakholwa imbued 
‘the cultural and political trappings of the late Victorian/Edwardian period’; they 
upheld the importance of notions of liberal universalism, English constitutionalism, 
individual property rights, free-wage labour and equality before the law.27 Such 
beliefs were not simply conservative or naïve; they contained within them a 
‘subversive subtext’ that was designed to hold the empire morally to account in light 
of an increasingly racialised settler rapacity.28 Indeed, what appeared to be a 
‘complicitous deferral to the values of the civilised white master [was] a combination 
of strategic politeness and the determination to see through the consequences of 
                                                          
24 Nasson, Abraham Esau’s War, p. 39. 
25 Christopher Saunders, ‘African Attitudes to Britain and the Empire Before and After the South 
African War’, in Donal Lowry (ed.), The South African War Reappraised, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), p. 140. 
26 Hilary Sapire, ‘African Loyalism and Its Discontents: The Royal Tour of South Africa, 1947’, The 
Historical Journal, 54:1 (2011), pp. 215-40. 
27 Limb, ‘“No People Can Be Expected to Be Loyal”’, p. 3; Thompson, ‘Languages of Loyalism’, p. 648. 
28 Limb, ‘“No People Can Be Expected to Be Loyal”’, p. 3; Sapire, ‘African Loyalism’, p. 217. 
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such politeness in socio-political terms’.29 This persistent imperial attachment thus 
demonstrated an investment in an inclusive “British world” that could never be 
strictly defined along ethno-nationalist or racial lines - whatever the ambitions of 
leading imperial and colonial administrators.30 As Saul Dubow contends, it should 
instead be understood in terms of the invocation of symbols and institutions that 
were necessarily de-territorialised and shared between neo-Briton and non-Briton 
alike.31  
As a result, African actors were able to engage in ‘elective, hyphenated forms 
of belonging’ that, whilst ostensibly “pro-British”, did not constitute blind 
affirmations of imperial loyalty; rather, they fused together social, class, gender, 
racial, religious and regional influences to produce complex prescriptions for political 
change.32 There thus existed no simple binary between ‘loyalism…and a purportedly 
more ‘progressive’ nationalist consciousness that superseded it’.33 Equally, whilst the 
outlook of men like Soga was predicated upon notions of modern civility and 
                                                          
29 Leon De Kock, ‘Sitting for the Civilization Test: The Making(s) of a Civil Imaginary in Colonial South 
Africa’, Poetics Today, 22:2 (2001), p. 404.  
30 On the racial reconciliation between Briton and Boer and the conscious construction of a white 
‘South Africanism’ in the post-war period, see Saul Dubow, ‘Colonial Nationalism, The Milner 
Kindergarten and the Rise of ‘South Africanism’, 1902-10’, History Workshop Journal, 43 (Spring, 
1997), pp. 53-85, here p. 54. For an exploration of the debates that this provoked within white South 
African society beyond the post-war period, see John Lambert, ‘South African British? Or Dominion 
South Africans? The Evolution of an Identity in the 1910s and 1920s’, South African Historical 
Journal, 43:1 (2000), pp. 192-222. 
31 Saul Dubow, ‘How British Was the British World? The Case of South Africa’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 37:1 (2009), pp. 2-3. For a similar discussion concerning the assimilation of 
non-British white populations, see Donal Lowry, ‘The Crown, Empire Loyalism and the Assimilation 
of Non-British White Subjects in the British World: An Argument Against ‘Ethnic Determinism’’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 31:2 (2003), pp. 96-120. 
32 Dubow, ‘How British Was the British World?’, p. 2; Limb, ‘“No People Can Be Expected to Be 
Loyal”’, p. 2. An excellent exploration of the modern, moderate outlook that this fusion produced 
amongst leading African nationalist leaders can be found in Heather Hughes, First President: A Life of 
John Dube, Founding President of the ANC, (Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana Media, 2011), pp. 
xviii-xix. 
33 Hilary Sapire, ‘Ambiguities of Loyalism: the Prince of Wales in India and Africa, 1921-2 and 25’, 
History Workshop Journal, 73:1 (2012), p. 39. 
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urbanity, their interests were not necessarily antithetical to those held by rural 
“traditional” leaders – like Sigcau. After all, many were connected by long-standing 
personal or familial associations. Soga’s grandfather and father, for example, had 
served as principal councillors to the Ngqika paramountcy in the early-to-mid-
nineteenth century.34 More recently, Timothy Gibbs has examined the kin-based 
networks that linked the Transkei’s leading families and the leadership of the ANC, 
most of whom had roots in ‘a rural society that had been strained, but not broken, 
by colonial conquest’.35 In this sense, whilst Soga was no doubted moulded by the 
modernising “traditions” of nineteenth-century Europe, he could easily find common 
cause with the Mpondo paramount, despite the fact that his “tribe” was considered 
to be the most “backward” of all the peoples and polities that comprised the 
Transkeian Territories.36  
It is unlikely that Sigcau shared the same ambitions as Soga; the imperial 
connection, and the South African War itself, played themselves out very differently 
in Pondoland, not least because the country was relatively far removed from the 
theatre of conflict. Certainly, like other more distant regions its ramifications could 
be felt through the intensified demands made for the extraction of African labour, 
                                                          
34 On the Soga family’s long-term associations with the Ngqika paramountcy, see Jeff Peires, The 
House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People In the Days of Their Independence, (Johannesburg: 
Ravan Press, 1981), p. 74, 108; Bickford-Smith, ‘African Nationalist or British Loyalist?’, p. 78; 
Odendaal, The Founders, p. 25. 
35 Timothy Gibbs, Mandela’s Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites and Apartheid’s First Bantustan, (Oxford: 
James Currey, 2014), p. 13. 
36 Terrance Ranger, ‘The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa’, in Terrance Ranger and Eric 
Hobsbawm (eds), The Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 220; 
G. M. Theal, A History of South Africa From 1873 to 1884: Twelve Eventful Years With Continuation of 
the History of Gcalekaland, Tembuland, Pondoland and Betshuanaland Until the Annexation of Those 
Territories to the Cape Colony, and of Zululand until its Annexation to Natal, (London, 1919), p. 173; 
Jan Smuts, ‘Foreword’, in Monica Hunter, Reaction to Conquest: Effects of Contact with Europeans 
on the Pondo of South Africa, (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. vii.   
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taxation and goods. Such pressures underpinned a longer-term process of partial 
proletarianisation; these were also instrumentalised in the service of local political 
disputes and created new opportunities for rural production and the accumulation 
of property and stock.37 Yet as the map below demonstrates, in the Eastern Cape 
British and Boer forces were largely confined to those settler districts – such as Aliwal 
North and Barkley East - where the outbreak of rebellion had occurred (Fig. i.1). 
Whilst martial law was promulgated across the Transkei, and the requisition of food, 
wagons, animals and other supplies were unilaterally sanctioned, the war barely 
featured in the daily lives of Mpondo chiefs and commoners.38  
Officials were particularly eager to avoid stoking any active support for the 
British amongst local populations. Following the outbreak of hostilities, the Chief 
Magistrate of the Transkei, Walter Stanford, advised resident magistrates to quietly 
inform Mpondo chiefs and to avoid announcing any news to large gatherings. 
Moreover, he explained how he looked to them ‘with great confidence…to use [their] 
undoubted influence…to counsel and advise any who…may be led into any wrong or 
rash action’.39 Doing so would not only reassure Mpondo inhabitants of the strength 
of ‘the constitutional government of the colony’, but would ensure that they would
                                                          
37 In this respect the Mpondo fared better than other Transkeian communities, as the war created 
new markets for the exporting of grain. See William Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland, 
1860-1930, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 49. See also, Peter Delius, ‘Abel 
Erasmus: Power and Profit in the Eastern Transvaal’, in William Beinart, Peter Delius and Stanley 
Trapido (eds), Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 
1850-1930, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), pp. 207-8; Jeremy Krikler, Revolution from Above, 
Rebellion from Below: The Agrarian Transvaal at the Turn of the Century, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 
especially pp. 1-36. 
38 (CA) NA-505 A175: Martial Law Regulations Book for Transkei, 1901-1902. 
39 (CA) 1/BIZ-4/1/8/1: Chief Magistrate, Transkei to Resident Magistrate, Bizana, 13 October 1899.  
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Fig. i.1: Map showing position of rebel and Boer commandos in the Eastern Cape, 1901. (CA) MAPS: Enclosed Confidential Despatch. 22 Jan 
1902, M-1/2741.  
13 
 
maintain ‘their attitude of loyal quiet and submission’; indeed, it would serve as 
‘striking proof…that the people are loyal subjects of the Queen’.41 
This emphasis placed on quiescence and stability arguably reflected a longer-
term desire to ensure the successful governance of African communities beyond the 
conclusion of the conflict.42 In this context, displays of imperial support were not to 
undermine the wider project of colonial rule; loyalty was simply to equate to 
obedience and the maintenance of order. In many respects, the royal tour itself was 
designed to attend to these themes. Drawing on the ‘idioms of monarchical 
paternalism’, these events sought to embody an ideology of imperial governance 
that linked ruler and ruled through a hierarchy of power which tied particular 
localities to the very apex of empire.43 Such displays intended to appeal to traditional 
leaders in particular, through a ‘shared recognition of high social rank’ and the 
implied equivalence between African chiefs and imperial monarch on the basis of 
‘individual social prestige’.44 The invocation of tradition and hierarchy was meant to 
foster a sense of dutiful subordination to the Crown, although this nominally colour-
blind preoccupation with social class sat uneasily alongside what was also a colour-
coded system of imperial rule.45 As John Lonsdale notes, in the minds of many British 
officials, it was hoped that such ‘imperial ornamentalism’ may ‘have thrown a royal 
                                                          
41 (CA) 1/FSF-4/1/1/2: Chief Magistrate, Transkei to Resident Magistrate, Flagstaff, 2 November 
1899; (CA) 1/BIZ-4/1/8/1: Chief Magistrate, Transkei to Resident Magistrate, Bizana, 13 October 
1899.  
42 To that end, it effectively became what Donald Denoon describes as a ‘non-war’ in Pondoland. See 
Donald Denoon, ‘Participation in the ‘Boer War’: People’s War, People’s Non-War, or Non-People’s 
War?’, in B. A. Ogot (ed.), War and Society in Africa, (London: Cass, 1972), p. 113. 
43 Terrance Ranger, ‘Making Northern Rhodesia Imperial: Variations on a Royal Theme, 1924-1938’, 
African Affairs, 79:316 (1980), p. 350, 353. 
44 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, pp. 7-8.  
45 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, p. 102, 8. 
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cloak of aristocratic rank and chivalrous honour over the racial and other inequalities’ 
that otherwise characterised the colonial project.46 
Whether African chiefs brought into this imperial ideal or not is difficult to 
discern. Certainly, many wished to share in what was clearly an important moment 
for the multiple “loyalist” communities that comprised the Cape.47 Sigcau was 
arguably no different; his offer of the tusk and tiger skin signified his desire to 
associate himself with the royal tour. Such enthusiasm may have reflected, as Phillip 
Buckner argues, less an investment in the idioms of monarchical paternalism and 
more ‘a realistic assessment of the changing balance of power in South Africa and of 
the advantages of collaboration’.48 Or perhaps, it was both. After all, this was not the 
first time that the Mpondo paramount had requested a royal audience. On 25 
October 1900, Sigcau had informed Transkeian officials of his intention to visit 
England to obtain an interview with Queen Victoria, and thus requested £550 for 
travelling expenses. Whilst Stanford advised him against undertaking this ‘fool’s 
errand’, the chief was convinced ‘that he would be well received’ by the monarch.49  
Such self-assuredness was likely born from the encouragement he had 
received from a black American missionary, Conrad Rideout, from the African 
Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) – one of the many “Ethiopian” church movements 
that had spread across the Eastern Cape at the end of the nineteenth century.50 This 
                                                          
46 John Lonsdale, ‘Ornamental Constitutionalism in Africa: Kenyatta and the Two Queens’, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 34:1 (2006), p. 88. 
47 Buckner, ‘The Royal Tour’, p. 343. 
48 Buckner, ‘The Royal Tour’, p. 343. 
49 (CA) CMT-3/52: Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland East to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 25 
October 1900.   
50 (CA) CMT-3/52: Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland East to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 30 July 
1900. On the increased presence of AME churches in southern Africa, see Jim Campbell, ‘Chiefly 
Authority and the AME Church, 1896-1910’, Collected Seminar Papers. Institute of Commonwealth 
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relationship concerned Transkeian officials since the AME promoted the growth of 
independent industrial schools, and preached a political doctrine of racial pride, self-
government and African educational achievement that did not require the “civilising” 
impetus of the colonial state. Whilst such ideas unsurprisingly found currency 
amongst many “de-tribalised” nascent nationalists, they were also well-received by 
numerous traditional leaders, like Sigcau, who were eager to reclaim a political and 
economic independence diminished by colonial rule.51 Little wonder, then, that the 
journey to London was considered. Promoted by Rideout during a period of imperial 
intervention in southern Africa, the trip was intended to provide the Mpondo 
paramount with an opportunity to personally present his grievances to Queen 
Victoria herself. Doing so would therefore allow him to circumvent the channels of 
petition usually mediated by the Cape Government, whose own jurisdictional 
integrity was called into question during this moment of conflict and crisis. 
In one sense, Sigcau’s potential trip to England thus embodied an ‘African pro-
imperialism’ that Christopher Saunders suggests functioned as ‘a kind of anti-
colonialism’.52 To some extent this is true; just like their ‘progressive’ counterparts, 
various chiefs could similarly look to the Crown as a counterpoise to the racialised 
rule of the colonial state – often with some degree of success.53 But the term cannot 
                                                          
Studies, 38 (1990), pp. 40-50, here p. 45. For a discussion of the links forged between southern 
African and American missionaries and some of the prominent individuals involved, see Odendaal, 
The Founders, p. 195, 250, 251, and 304. 
51 Campbell identifies many of the political, cultural and organisational reasons that the AME both 
appealed to, and could easily work with, traditional authorities. See Campbell, ‘Chiefly Authority and 
the AME Church’, pp. 42-44; Beinart, Political Economy, p. 153. 
52 Saunders, ‘African Attitudes’, p. 145. 
53 Consider, for example, the exclusion of the High Commission Territories – Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland – from the unitary state formed in 1910. Whilst there is some debate 
regarding the extent to which their non-incorporation was the result of metropolitan policy or local 
pressures, the notion of ‘imperial trusteeship’ was invoked on both sides. See Ronald Hyam and 
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adequately convey the complexities of Sigcau’s apparent imperial enthusiasm; it 
implies that this turn to empire served solely as a form of anti-colonial resistance, 
thereby assuming the relative homogeneity of intra-Mpondo interests as a 
consequence.  
If anything, the opposite was true. If Sigcau had embraced the AME in the 
early twentieth century, he had opposed them at the end of the nineteenth. As 
William Beinart notes, the Ethiopian church movements had once been associated 
with Mhlangaso, his one-time rival for the Mpondo paramountcy.54 As this thesis will 
later explore, their contestations had resulted in a protracted civil war that, whilst 
nominally settled following the country’s annexation, had fostered divisions which 
continued to undermine Sigcau’s own authority. As such, his dealings with the AME 
may well have indicated an Mpondo frustration with colonial rule. But they were 
arguably just as likely rooted in a need to extend the paramount’s influence amongst 
those recalcitrant communities within Pondoland too.  
Equally, Sigcau’s visit to Victoria was likely intended to imply an equivalence 
with the head of Britain’s empire on the basis of shared notions of royal hierarchy.55 
But it was also arguably hoped that meeting the monarch would both underwrite a 
status that had been diminished by colonial rule whilst demonstrating a strength that 
had been undermined by civil conflict.  
                                                          
Peter Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 97-99. 
54 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 153. 
55 To that end, he was no different from other African notables who similarly undertook the journey 
to the imperial metropole. See Neil Parsons, ‘“No Longer Rare Birds in London”: Zulu, Ndebele, Gaza, 
and Swazi Envoys to England, 1882-1894’, in Gretchen Holbrook Gerzina (ed.), Black Victorians, Black 
Victoriana, (New Brunswick, N. J; Rutgers University Press, 2003), pp. 110-141.  
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The royal tour presented both a similar challenge and potential opportunity. 
Whether he refused to attend or not is unclear; archival research uncovered no 
formal offer to Sigcau to attend the celebrations in Cape Town. Indeed, it was more 
likely that officials deliberately excluded the paramount not least because of his 
refusal to sanction the demarcation of administrative boundaries around what was 
once his rival’s former chiefdom.56 Ill-favoured by the state, his apparent 
marginalisation was underlined by the invitation of other Mpondo chiefs to the royal 
demonstrations. On 7 June 1901, the Resident Magistrate of Ngqeleni requested that 
Gwadiso, chief of the Khonjwayo clan in Western Pondoland, and other leading local 
chiefs, be asked to take part in the festivities. In doing so, the official pondered the 
possible ‘beneficial effects that would be made on the minds of the natives on such 
an occasion’.57  
Sigcau’s non-invitation thus underlined the precariousness of his own 
position within Pondoland. It not only pointed to his poor personal relations with the 
Cape; it also illustrated the relative autonomy enjoyed by those Mpondo chiefs who 
had travelled to the colonial capital. In this way, the royal tour represented more 
than just a moment of imperial celebration; it also functioned as ‘an occasion for 
chiefly politics’.58 Indeed, the Cape revealed its need to instrumentalise intra-
Mpondo relations in order to consolidate its own claim to rule; inviting particular 
chiefs to join the festivities went hand in hand with the attempted marginalisation of 
an otherwise obstructive paramount. Likewise, Sigcau’s display of loyalty – embodied 
                                                          
56 See (CA) CMT-3/7: Secretary for Native Affairs to Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, 17 February 
1899; (CA) NA-685 (Part II): Resident Magistrate, Lusiksiki to Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, 21 
July 1899. These issues are further explored in chapter 6.  
57 (CA) CMT-3/143: Resident Magistrate, Ngqeleni to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 7 June 1901. 
58 Ranger, ‘Making Northern Rhodesia Imperial’, p. 365. 
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by the tusk and tiger skin – was arguably aimed at the restoration of an authority that 
had been recently diminished by the advent of colonial rule and which was 
simultaneously contingent on the factions and fissures within the Mpondo polity.  
In this sense, the royal tour highlighted the intersection of various imperial, 
colonial and indigenous jurisdictional disputes that comprised Pondoland at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Behind this exceptional event lay a more 
mundane, but arguably more important, conflict which was locally constituted, 
vociferously contested and which had clearly not been settled despite colonial 
annexation in 1894. This attempted projection of imperial power was thus inherently 
limited; here, wider debates about imperial loyalty were requalified by longer-
standing contentious conversations concerning the exercise of political authority 
within Pondoland itself.  
This thesis argues that such disagreements were born from a politics and 
process of differential incorporation that gave the Mpondo polity its jurisdictional 
heterogeneity and which underpinned the relative autonomy enjoyed by Mpondo 
chiefs and their communities. Given the relatively late formalisation of colonial rule, 
however, it also suggests that this shifting dynamic of intra-Mpondo political 
relations was at its most potent following the periodic interventions of British rule 
within the country throughout the mid-to-late nineteenth century. To that end, this 
thesis highlights the accommodation of supra-local exertions of imperial power by 
local loyalties and rivalries. Moreover, it demonstrates how this intersection of often 
unrelated agendas determined the nature of the country’s political incorporation 
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into the Cape and shaped the institutional viability and administrative character of 
the early colonial state which followed. 
 
Conceptual Framework: Multiple Jurisdictions in an Imperial World: 
The above episode demonstrates how projections of imperial power could reveal the 
multiple jurisdictional disputes contained within a single space. In highlighting these 
overlapping claims, this thesis builds on a particular set of studies which emphasise 
the multiple forms of ‘attenuated and partial sovereignties’ that constituted imperial 
space.59 Such approaches underscore jurisdictional and legal plurality as a 
‘ubiquitous feature of colonialism in and beyond the British empire’; they highlight 
its ambivalent terrain as composed of often competing, sometimes reinforcing but 
always intersecting realms of rule that, whilst ‘particularly visible in a colony’s early 
history…[were] equally important to the colonial state in full flight’.60 This latter 
qualification is especially important to this thesis, given its emphasis on the centrality 
of intra-Mpondo relations in shaping the process of political incorporation at the end 
of the nineteenth century. In doing so, it seeks to qualify the conventional narrative 
concerning ‘the rise of rationally ordered nation-states as both inevitable and 
fundamentally dictated by the West’ by situating this consolidation of colonial rule 
within its broader imperial context.61 As such, it is largely influenced by those studies 
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which are ‘self-consciously attuned to ‘empire’’ and which ‘tend to eschew parochial, 
colony-or nation-bound interpretations’ of the late-nineteenth century.62  
This approach is characteristic of the well-established ‘new imperial history’, 
which has moved the study of empire away from considerations of imperial policy-
making or the imperatives of metropolitan finance.63 These earlier concerns both 
implied the interaction between an immutable imperial “core” and idiosyncratic 
colonial “periphery”, even if they differed in their centripetal or centrifugal 
emphases.64 Instead, numerous scholars have reconceptualised the relationship 
between “metropole” and “colony”; no longer discrete or distinct concepts, they 
have been placed within ‘a single analytic frame’ in order to highlight their various 
interconnections and the mutual constitution of British and colonial identities.65 
Naturally, this approach comprises a broad body of scholarship that has been 
primarily marked by its emphasis on intra-imperial cultural exchange and its post-
colonial preoccupation with the material and discursive construction of difference. 
Doing so has allowed various scholars to better ‘account for non-elite and non-
western pasts’ as central to the making of empire; it has called greater attention to 
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the intersection of race, gender, generational, class and religious ‘subject positions’; 
and has emphasised the indivisibility between metropolitan domestic and colonial 
histories, thereby revealing the ‘microhistories of empire’s reach and impact’.66 
Such efforts underscore the ‘shared but differentiated space of empire’, 
cutting across those territorial and cultural boundaries erected by colonial actors and 
reconstituted by the study of ‘national’ histories and the scholarly tendency towards 
regional specialism.67 Instead, historians have encouraged the production of a 
swathe of multi-sited studies which have explored the reciprocal exchanges between 
various spheres of colonial and imperial power. The topics covered are unsurprisingly 
vast, but include analyses of the circulation of information,68 colonial policies,69 the 
migration of various state and non-state actors and the ‘trans-imperial development 
of particular ideas, practices and identities’.70 Moreover, they have highlighted the 
correspondence between settler communities concerning discourses of racial 
difference,71 the sentimental and material bonds forged between Britons at home 
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and abroad,72 and the importing of ‘ideology, cultural baggage and life-style’ that 
characterised a diasporic “British world” spread across empire’s expanse.73  
Taken together, these studies illustrate ‘the various ways of conceptualizing 
[sic] the British Empire’s spatialities’, encouraging scholars to deploy various 
‘metaphors of connection’ in the process.74 In doing so, the binarisms that 
traditionally structured analyses of imperialism – metropole/colony or 
nation/empire – have been called into question by highlighting the myriad processes 
of exchange that occurred both above and below the level of the nation-state.75 Such 
innovations thus reveal a variety of power relations that were simultaneously local 
and transnational, thereby complicating the territorially bounded notions of 
“coloniser” and “colonised”. Indeed, these subject positions were hardly 
homogenous or fixed; as Catherine Hall makes clear, ‘the times when the collective 
identity of the coloniser and colonised overrode all other distinctions were 
rare…different groups of colonisers engaged in different colonial projects…each with 
their own dynamics’.76  
 Recognising the heterogeneity of these concepts highlights the potential for 
division amongst “coloniser” and “colonised”, as well as the multiplicity of 
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interactions that could reach across this colonial divide. Doing so also calls attention 
to the specific power relations that comprised Britain’s empire within a particular 
space, and the ways in which seemingly indigenous, colonial and imperial interests 
could intersect to determine how this process was negotiated on the ground. 
Scholars have therefore sought to retain an acknowledgement of “empire” as 
a category of governance whilst investigating ‘why imperial governance took the 
forms it did in distinct places and at different times’.77 This approach requires paying 
attention to the political pluralities and complexities that comprised specific 
jurisdictional spaces as they were incorporated into a wider imperial ambit. Studying 
the establishment of the French protectorate over Tunisia in 1881, Mary Dewhurst 
Lewis explores what she terms the problem of ‘divided rule’.78 The conditions of 
political incorporation left the sovereignty of the Husaynid dynasty intact, 
recognising its authority over the system of taxation and military organisation, but 
also those international treaties signed with Great Britain and Italy prior to its 
conquest. As she argues, a ‘fragmentation of authority...was built into the original 
protectorate arrangement’; French officials maintained the extraterritorial claims of 
their imperial rivals, thereby providing opportunities for ordinary Tunisians to engage 
in ‘jurisdiction jumping’: the manoeuvre between French, Tunisian and foreign 
institutions for material, legal and social gains.79 This jurisdictional plurality was 
inflected in the very institutional mechanisms of colonial rule and provided a further 
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‘pivot for interimperial [sic] politics’, as European rivals attempted to broker 
influence in lands claimed by the French Empire.80  
 Of central importance to this thesis is Lewis’ acknowledgment of the role 
played by pre-existing jurisdictional arrangements in shaping the administrative and 
institutional character of the early colonial state. There are useful parallels to be 
made with Pondoland, inasmuch as the formalisation of colonial rule was not 
preceded by conflict and thus did not entail the violent re-making of Mpondo society. 
Modified rather than undermined by broader economic transformations, the 
political foundations of Mpondo chiefly authority also remained largely intact. 
Underpinned by their relative autonomy, the jurisdictional primacy of regional chiefs 
and their followers was a defining characteristic of Pondoland. 
 Another point of comparison lies in the timing of Tunisia and Pondoland’s 
colonial incorporation. As Lewis makes clear, the establishment of a French 
Protectorate occurred at the end of the nineteenth century; in part it reflected the 
heightened period of inter-imperial rivalry characteristic of the “new imperialism”, 
which witnessed the ‘rise of an international state system that was based on distinct 
sovereign states and apparent zero-sum games’.81 Pondoland’s annexation similarly 
took place rather late – in 1894; until then, it remained something of an anomaly on 
the political landscape of South Africa. Indeed, the rest of the Transkeian Territories 
had been formally incorporated by 1878, whilst the Cape had achieved responsible 
self-government in 1872 – a status matched by its sister colony of Natal in 1893. The 
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perceived inviolability of these jurisdictional boundaries was likewise tied to a 
broader inter-imperial consensus – encapsulated by the Berlin Conference (1884) - 
concerning the “scramble for Africa”, the nature of colonial occupation and the 
‘complete and total rule’ it implied.82   
As Lewis’ study reminds us, however, the ‘scramble for empire did not cease 
upon the carving up of territory, and it was measured by more than colours on a 
map’.83 Her argument complements Lauren Benton’s contention that the focus on a 
global order predicated on the agreement between territorially sovereign political 
units occludes as much as it reveals; whilst European powers sought the 
rationalisation of non-European territory, ‘empire’s spaces were politically 
fragmented; legally differentiated; and encased in irregular, porous, and sometimes 
undefined borders’.84 European pretensions to power – encapsulated by cadastral 
inventions and underpinned by a repertoire of legal and jurisdictional practices – 
were often circumscribed by ‘practical unknowns and local indeterminacies’; as she 
makes clear, ‘territory plays tricks. Mere patches of regulated land may signify vast 
holdings, while integral “sovereign” space may fracture into odd-shaped pieces’.85 In 
highlighting such jurisdictional heterogeneity, Benton clearly seeks to complicate a 
territorial conceptualisation of empire as predicated on a binary division between 
European and non-European space. In her focus on riverine networks as ‘corridors of 
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control’, for example, she raises an important point regarding the role of political 
geography both in the social construction of an ever-evolving European legal culture 
and in facilitating the messy intersection of indigenous and imperial claims to rule.86  
 Indeed, in Pondoland sustained European intervention in the country was 
first achieved through Port St. John, which sat at the mouth of the Mzimvubu River 
along the coast of the Eastern Cape. To be sure, various officials, missionaries and 
travellers had made their way to the Mpondo polity over the course of the 
nineteenth century.87 But it was the port – from which Natalian traders had 
established themselves from the 1840s – that was most coveted by the Cape. As 
chapter 2 will demonstrate, its annexation in 1878 formed part of a wider disciplinary 
strategy to regulate political relations within the country by formalising a 
jurisdictional boundary between Eastern and Western Pondoland. Yet this 
intervention precipitated a swathe of contentious conversations concerning the 
exercise of political authority and subjecthood across the entire country. Various 
Mpondo chiefs sought to counter the centralisation of power under the Western 
Paramount, Nqwiliso; moreover, they articulated their opposition in terms of their 
longer history of incorporation into the polity – a process which underscored their 
own regional autonomy. 
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By exploring Pondoland in this way, this thesis corroborates what Benton 
identifies as the dissonance between ‘pronouncements about sovereignty’ and the 
‘sovereign realities’ of what remained ‘composite polities’.88 Indeed, the country was 
situated within the ambit of empire and was surrounded by British colonial 
possessions. Nevertheless, its jurisdictional heterogeneity and political 
independence remained intact until 1894. Such an acknowledgement thus calls 
attention to what Lisa Ford has termed the ‘suspended history between empire and 
statehood’.89 In her comparative analysis of two sites of Anglophone settler 
colonialism – the US state of Georgia and the British colony of New South Wales – 
Ford seeks to juxtapose the broad territorial claims of a ‘perfect settler sovereignty’ 
alongside the ‘messy work of settlement itself’.90 As she notes, settler statehood 
‘rested on the conflation of sovereignty, territory and jurisdiction’, as well as the 
‘legal obliteration of indigenous customary law’.91 Yet such pronouncements of 
power were re-qualified by the everyday practices of legal pluralism and negotiation 
on the ground, as indigenous actors engaged in daily struggles over land, resources, 
dignity and survival.92 Her focus on the interactions between settler and indigenous 
legal orders thus charts the transformation of imperial Anglophone conceptions of 
sovereignty within two culturally specific contexts. In doing so, Ford thus retains an 
awareness of those global shifts that underwrote the wider project of settler 
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colonialism elsewhere, whilst emphasising how local jurisdictional disputes 
underwrote the particularities of certain settler states.  
 In the same way, this thesis posits the jurisdictional heterogeneity within 
Pondoland as central in shaping its political incorporation and the early evolution of 
the colonial state. Such plurality can be attributed to the politically decentralised 
nature of the Mpondo polity, and the process of differential incorporation that bound 
its numerous communities in various ways and degrees to the Mpondo paramountcy. 
Like those studies mentioned above, this thesis is ‘self-consciously attuned to empire’ 
in order to highlight the multiplicity of actors and interests on either side of the 
colonial divide, and the ways in which they could intersect in the making of the 
colonial state. Doing so allows for proper consideration to be paid to the changing 
configuration of political relations within Pondoland as a means of qualifying 
otherwise ‘parochial, colony-, or nation-bound interpretations’ of this process.93 In 
order to fully elucidate this objective, it is therefore necessary to situate this study 
alongside previous analyses of Mpondo society and within the broader context of 
South African historiography.  
 
Mpondo Society and South African Historiography: 
In 1936, the former – and future – Prime Minister of South Africa, Jan Smuts, wrote 
of the Mpondo: ‘[they] are somewhat backward in comparison with other native 
tribes in the Union…[and] have retained their ancient tribal domains’; ‘the Pondo’, 
he noted, ‘is unusually conservative and tenacious of his old culture’.94 Of course, the 
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polity had not remained unaffected by the transformations wrought by the country’s 
rapid industrialisation from the late nineteenth century. Whilst labour migrancy had 
come late to Pondoland, from the 1890s large numbers of Mpondo migrants had 
begun to seek employment at the gold mines on the Rand.95 For Smuts, such 
opportunities had provided a ‘new mental horizon’ that was hard to resist: 
‘Johannesburg, with its glittering prizes…in wages…[and] its opportunities of larger 
more adventurous experiences…[has] become a sort of Mecca for the native…and 
the Pondo has felt the force of this disturbance’.96 In comparison to other Transkeian 
chiefdoms, Pondoland had sent out a smaller proportion of its male population to 
the compounds.97 Yet given Smuts’ growing concern at the pace of African 
urbanisation, and his turn to institutional segregation as its necessary solution, 
Pondoland unsurprisingly piqued his interest. As he noted, there ‘the disintegration 
of native life is by no means so alarming as in other parts of South Africa’.98 The 
relative retention of its ‘old culture’ thus meant that the country would provide ‘good 
material for a study…of native life under the stresses and strains of…European 
intrusion…both in its fixities and its transformations’.99 
Smuts’ comments formed the introduction to anthropologist Monica 
Hunter’s extensive ethnographic study of Mpondo society, Reaction to Conquest: 
Effects of Contact with Europeans on the Pondo of South Africa, first published in 
1936. Despite its title, Hunter made clear that Pondoland was one of the few formerly 
independent African kingdoms of the Eastern Cape that had not been subordinated 
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through military force.100 Indeed, she emphasised many Mpondo particularities. ‘Less 
influenced than any other region’, the country was ‘far removed from the border on 
which Bantu and European first met’; ‘the Pondo were not involved in the border 
wars’ that had facilitated the expansion of the Cape’s eastern frontier’; and as ‘the 
last tribe…to come under British administration’, the chiefs ‘were left with more 
power than any other in the Cape province’.101 The isolation of Pondoland from these 
broader processes was in part to be explained by geographical and environmental 
factors, which had hindered the development of transport and trade links with the 
rest of the colony.102 But it was also encapsulated by other differences too: the 
country was less crowded and more fertile than other rural reserves; colonial 
taxation was introduced relatively late in 1896; there were fewer mission stations, 
trading stores and schools; and the rates of Mpondo employment, whether on the 
mines or on European-owned farms, were lower than in neighbouring chiefdoms.103   
 Such isolation did not, however, imply societal stasis. Whist her first stated 
objective was ‘to describe life as it is in Pondoland today’, Hunter’s synchronic 
analysis of the socio-economic and political foundations of Mpondo society was 
historically-orientated.104 As she argued, ‘the past determines the present and in a 
society which is rapidly changing it is impossible to explain the working of existing 
institutions without constant reference to the past’.105 Indeed, as Sean Morrow and 
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Christopher Saunders have recently discussed, in the 1930s Hunter maintained that 
anthropology was the only way in which the history of African societies could be 
understood.106 In part this reflected her frustration at the limitations of the 
documentary material available to her. Imperial Blue Books were viewed as 
particularly suspect; but so too were the written accounts of George McCall Theal, 
whose arguments alleged the recent migrations of African populations to the 
otherwise “vacant lands” of Eastern Cape and largely celebrated their subsequent 
colonisation.107  
But Hunter’s emphasis on the historical value of ethnographic inquiry was 
also emblematic of the dramatic changes taking place within the emerging field of 
African history. Propelled by the struggle for independence across the continent from 
the late 1950s, scholars sought the critical reconstruction of the African past through 
the utilisation of oral evidence alongside a variety of archaeological, climatological, 
ecological and ethnographic analyses.108 Largely pioneered by social anthropologists 
until 1960, it was historians ‘who [had] neglected African historical agency’, choosing 
instead, in South Africa at least, to focus primarily on the activities of white 
communities.109 Scholars like Hunter thus occupied a field on the verge of a huge 
methodological shift, which, in dispensing with outdated Eurocentric 
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preoccupations, sought to demonstrate that ‘African societies were as worthy of 
study as white-ruled ones’.110  
 Across multiple studies, Hunter therefore emphasised the long-term changes 
in family and kinship structures as particularly important to the historian. Writing in 
1969, for example, she explained that ‘the forms of marriage and kinship directly 
affect[ed] the power of certain lineages, the growth of kingdoms and the spread of 
languages’.111 Such developments reflected the growth and decline of particular 
clans and founding families, as well as the establishment of the institution of the 
chieftainship, whose authority was in turn reliant on the monopolisation of 
technological changes and heritable property.112 Changes in family and kinship 
structures thus impacted upon an array of social relationships and determined the 
political saliency of particular claims to rule within African societies.113 In Reaction to 
Conquest, particular attention was therefore paid to the workings of Pondoland’s 
polygamous society and the patrilocal nature of marriage, the formation of 
exogamous patrilineal clans and the patterns of behaviour that structured relations 
between family members.114 These ethnographic explorations likewise underscored, 
amongst other things, the importance of the homestead, the distribution of wealth 
and the gendered division of labour, production and property ownership.115  
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Charting these transformations over time was key. In order to achieve this, 
Hunter situated her study of Mpondo life across a range of different contexts in which 
interaction with Europeans varied greatly. In part designed to compensate for the 
paucity of information concerning the Mpondo prior to European contact, it was also 
meant to highlight those aspects which had consequently been most affected. 
Furthermore, it served as the means through which the ‘forces…for social cohesion’ 
and the ‘law and customs by which [Mpondo] society [was] regulated’ could be 
better identified. In doing so, her research represented an attempt to bridge the 
contentious disciplinary division between social anthropologists and historians 
evident in South Africa from the mid-1920s.116 Indeed, the latter often accused the 
former of neglecting the importance of change, choosing instead to see ‘cultures as 
timeless entities’ whose ‘true essence’ could be reconstructed prior to any inter-
cultural exchange.117 This critique was seen to typify the Malinowskian school of 
functional anthropology, which, with its emphasis on “culture contact”, tended to 
model this dynamic in terms of a static interaction between two or more essentially 
distinct and discrete “cultures”.118  
Hunter, by contrast, sought to assert the mutual transformation of African 
and European.119 She emphasised the increased European demand for labour, the 
restrictions on land occupation implied by the 1913 Native Lands Act, the impact of 
this legislation upon employment in urban centres and upon white farms and the 
subsequent overcrowding of rural reserves.120 She acknowledged the colonial state’s 
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curtailing of chiefly powers, the refashioning of ‘old customs’, the role of traders in 
undermining indigenous arts and crafts and the ‘revolution’ in social relations this 
had precipitated.121  In short, she summarised three ‘forces of change’: an economic 
transformation which had altered the internal dynamics of the Mpondo economy; 
the extension of political control within African societies that accompanied the 
state’s regulation of economic resources; and the concomitant Christianisation of 
small portions of the polity alongside longer-held religious beliefs.122 In doing so, her 
research thus formed part of a wider effort amongst anthropologists to highlight the 
‘composite nature’ of South African society; ‘one with a single political and economic 
structure’.123 
Yet as Andrew Bank has argued, Hunter’s own conceptualisation of “culture 
contact” was shaped in part by the ‘complex and intricate social relationships’ she 
had cultivated whilst conducting her fieldwork in Pondoland itself.124 Her first field 
trip, undertaken for seven months in 1931, was spent at a trading store at Ntibane – 
situated in Western Pondoland and thirty-five kilometres from Mthatha. There, her 
hostess was Mary Agnes Buchanan Soga, daughter of William Anderson Soga and the 
niece of Sigcau’s one-time acquaintance, A.K. Soga.125 Hunter recalls the variety of 
encounters she experienced at Ntibane; she spoke with residents and heard about 
the latest gossips – pregnancies, divorces, beatings, and bewitchments; she also 
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attended weddings, initiation ceremonies, beer drinks and dances.126 Moreover, she 
made numerous visits to chiefs, learnt about older customs, spoke to men as they 
returned from the Rand and noted how they spent their earnings.127 
Bank has argued that the Soga name was central to Hunter’s choosing 
Ntibane as a site of study to begin with.128 Indeed, these gleanings, derived from her 
experiences at the trading station, would have been mediated through Mary Soga, 
who undoubtedly served as an important interlocutor in matters of cultural 
etiquette.129 Her second research trip was no different; Hunter noted the 
contribution of Michael Geza, an educated Christian who came from a pagan family 
whose ancestors had been doctors to the imiZizi chiefs in the Bizana district of 
Eastern Pondoland for nine generations.130 This is important, since Hunter’s study of 
“culture contact” in Pondoland was largely facilitated by, and mediated through, 
historical actors who embodied the very transformations she sought to explore. In 
this sense, the very production of Reaction to Conquest was born from a process of 
acculturation which, rooted in the longer-term interaction between African and 
European, arguably threw the ‘conservative’ nature of Mpondo society into sharper 
relief.131  
There thus existed a tension between an acknowledgement of Pondoland’s 
economic and political incorporation into South African society on the one hand, and 
the limited social transformation that took place within Mpondo society on the 
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other.132 Resolving this dilemma thus required a comprehensive engagement with 
the internal dynamics of indigenous societies as formative in shaping this broader 
process. Yet this end was arguably ill-served by the early historiographical disputes 
that emerged between liberal and radical approaches to the South African past. 
Broadly speaking, the former claimed that the integrative imperatives of economic 
expansion – best facilitated by a benign imperialism – had been distorted by an 
apartheid state whose origins were to be found in a ‘paranoiac’ form of Afrikaner 
frontier racism.133 The latter, by contrast, sought to chart the historical development 
of a specifically South African ‘colonial-capitalist state’; one that resituated the 
conquest of African societies within a mutually reinforcing process of South African 
industrialisation.134  
Despite their differences, however, both underscored the centrality of the 
state in orchestrating historical change. Liberal accounts implied the axiomatic 
inevitability of modernity, and ‘the role of government in either effecting its progress 
or retardation’; radical studies posited the state as ‘the administrative, bureaucratic 
armature of capital’, which, with little agency of its own, facilitated the deliberate 
underdevelopment of rural economies and the partial preservation of pre-colonial 
authorities in order to force Africans into wage labour.135 Of course, various scholars 
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drew from both of these historiographical traditions; the division between them was 
far more permeable than this statement of opposing paradigmatic positions 
suggests.136 Nevertheless, the unevenness of economic expansion, and the 
incompleteness of social transformation – most evident across South Africa’s rural 
reserves – were arguably posited as processes that were external and unidirectional 
in nature.  
Whether the demands of capital were seen to maintain or undermine pre-
capitalist formations or not, such perspectives were unable to account for the sheer 
variety of African responses to economic and political incorporation. Moreover, they 
failed to acknowledge the resilience of indigenous social structures in actively 
shaping this encounter. Consequently, numerous social historians eschewed the 
tendency towards theoretical determinism; instead, concepts such as 
‘underdevelopment’ and ‘peasantisation’ became grounded in empirical evidence in 
order to better highlight the agency of otherwise subordinate African actors.137 As 
Beinart has argued, ‘an analysis of capitalist markets can contextualise the processes 
of change but not explain the shape of rural communities, the political conflicts 
within them and their response to absorption into the capitalist world’.138  
Exploring Pondoland, Beinart thus qualified the penetration of merchant and 
industrial capital into Mpondo society and the formalisation of colonial rule in 1894. 
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There was no collapse in chiefly rule or peasant production; nor was there wholesale 
Mpondo proleterianisation. Rather, he noted a continuity in long-established forms 
of socio-economic organisation rooted in the dual processes of political 
decentralisation and economic atomisation that had characterised the polity from 
the mid-nineteenth century. These patterns – prompted by the wide dispersal of the 
population following a period of closed settlement – had ensured the increasing 
independence of individual homesteads over their own pastoral production. As such, 
chiefly authority became largely dependent on the re-accumulation and re-
distribution of cattle. The former was essential in maintaining the differential 
privilege of Mpondo chiefs and in attracting followers; the latter was central in 
maintaining their loyalty.139 
 This system of political authority, and the patterns of production and 
exchange upon which it depended, were modified rather than undermined by 
political and economic incorporation. As Beinart demonstrates, the development of 
extensive trading relationships with the Cape and Natal from the 1860s saw the 
purchase of new commodities and agricultural technologies that accelerated the 
socio-economic atomisation of Mpondo society. Individual homesteads relied less on 
the chiefs for their means of subsistence; moreover, their increased income was 
reinvested in stock, land and the cultivation of crops that were directed towards 
colonial markets.140 Even the decimation of stocks following the outbreak of 
rinderpest in 1897 highlighted the independence of the homestead. Not only did it 
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stimulate greater reinvestment in, and cultivation of, the land.141 It also stoked a 
desire to re-accumulate cattle – ‘the crux of Mpondo economic independence’ – that 
produced in Pondoland a specific form of labour migrancy that largely revolved 
around a system of cattle advances (joyini inkomo).142 This payment reflected the 
centrality of the household as the basic unit of production; it ensured that young 
men’s earnings could be reinvested to augment the resources of the homestead 
whilst guaranteeing a control over migrants by necessitating their return home to 
work at the end of their contracts.143 In the wake of rinderpest, the cattle earned by 
migrants thus provided an opportunity to re-stock; rather than undermining 
homestead cultivation, labour migrancy facilitated its expansion by providing a 
means to agricultural recovery.144  
Colonial officials paid little attention to the specific interests of rural 
households. Yet the desire to maintain their economic independence was also crucial 
in determining the administrative structures of the colonial state itself. Indeed, the 
system of cattle advances ‘was bound into, and reinforced, existing patterns of 
differentiation’ within Mpondo society.145 Wealthier families – usually of chiefly rank 
and authority - were better able to restock and avoid labour migrancy than others; 
moreover, the commercialisation of cattle exchanges with traders or other Mpondo 
homesteads could yield high returns for those able to sell.146 Consequently, this 
system benefited those chiefs and headmen, who, in the post-annexation period had 
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also become central to the maintenance of rural stability through the allocation of, 
and control of access to, land and other communal resources. This issue will be 
explored in chapter 6. For now, however, it is enough to highlight the wider 
application of Beinart’s argument: that the development of migrant labour was not 
born simply from the interests of industrial capital or solely facilitated by the colonial 
state. Instead, he demonstrates the role played by rural societies themselves in 
underwriting this system, at least in the early period of industrialisation.147  
 
State-Formation in the South African Context: 
Such indigenous innovation must, however, be properly contextualised. African 
actors were undoubtedly able to shape both the terms of their subordination and the 
patterns of early state-formation. Yet the potency of these long-established social 
and political practices was equally indicative of a wider transformation in the 
character of late-nineteenth century colonialism itself. This shift was rooted in, and 
reflective of, the gradual abandonment of a policy of “racial amalgamation” in favour 
of one predicated on the increasing segregation of white and black. The former – in 
part the product of a metropolitan ‘missionary mind’ upon the conduct of colonial 
policymaking - was best encapsulated by an earlier tradition of Cape Liberalism.148 Its 
proponents emphasised the universality of humanity, the equality of European and 
African before the law, and the latter’s capacity to “improve” through education and 
the workings of free-trade and market-orientated production.149 Such assimilationist 
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ideals supposed the complementarity of settler and indigenous interests and often 
asserted the protection of the latter to the apparent detriment of the former.150 Yet 
they also served to loosen the ties that bound commoner to chief; their absorption 
into the colonial economy was intended to foster independence from traditional 
authorities whilst inculcating Western political and personal manners that were more 
consistent with settler society.  
Doing so thus provided officials with a strategy to govern that was predicated 
on the securing of a steady labour-supply, the subordination of Xhosa communities, 
the dismantling of African social and cultural life and the degrading of local political 
structures.151 These interventions caused huge internal destabilisation and often 
provoked further conflict. Typified by the tragedy of the 1853 Xhosa Cattle-Killing, 
the transformative potential of colonial incorporation was further undermined by the 
outbreak of numerous anti-colonial rebellions across the Eastern Cape between 1877 
and 1881.152 Such resistance paralleled similar events throughout the empire, 
encouraging metropolitan intellectuals and colonial officials to question both the 
capability of non-European populations to acculturate, and the civilising imperatives 
of imperialism itself.153 Underlining an almost irrevocable cultural distance between 
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white and black, this scepticism became reflected in colonial policy. Assimilation was 
replaced by administrative exigency; political stability became the pre-condition of 
societal change.154 Far from deploring indigenous institutions, officials came to 
recognise their resiliency and realise their value in providing a source of continuity in 
easing the transition towards colonial rule. 
Across the Cape and Natal, officials thus turned towards a system of “native” 
administration that sought to replicate the power and personalism of chiefly rule. 
The Transkei, for example, was placed under the charge of two Chief Magistrates, in 
East Griqualand and Tembuland. These jurisdictional zones were divided into districts 
under resident magistrates who were responsible for the daily tasks of executive and 
judicial administration.155 These were further demarcated into a number of locations 
under government-employed headmen upon whom magistrates relied to maintain 
order and control. As Samuel Martin notes, this form of centralised government ‘ran 
quite counter to the liberal doctrine of the separation of powers’ embodied by the 
colony’s own representative institutions.156 Really, that was the very point. Since the 
risk of political instability functioned to confirm an intrinsic difference between white 
and black, the most effective means of consolidating British authority therefore lay 
in the establishment of a custodial system of rule that mitigated against its most 
dramatic effects.   
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Legally and politically separate from, but ultimately subordinate to the colony 
proper, the Transkeian administration demonstrates the ability of the colonial state 
– in Africa and elsewhere – to speak multiple languages of power in different 
institutional and geographical contexts.157 Such duality arguably underpinned a 
system of “native” governance that was rationalised as a “civilising” mission but 
which was in fact dependent on sustaining the pre-modernity of its African subjects 
in order to maintain the boundaries that distinguished coloniser from colonised.158 
Indeed, colonists assumed an African absence of individual rights, or a modern sense 
of selfhood founded on the protection of property and person and the concepts of 
contract and constitutionality.159 Instead, they ‘lived in a different legal universe’ that 
was regulated by indigenous institutions centred upon customary law.160 For 
Mahmood Mamdani, these seemingly antithetical forms of rule emerged as a 
complementary way of governing “native” populations; they were fused together 
‘under a single hegemonic authority’ - the “bifurcated state” – which mediated and 
maintained a distinction between “citizen” and “subject”.161 The former occupied an 
urban, racialised realm predicated on the hierarchical provision of political rights; the 
latter lived within rural communities that were ethnically defined and placed under 
the ‘decentralised despotism’ of traditional authorities.162 This system of rule 
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depended upon a view of “tribal” society as essentially bounded, culturally cohesive 
and internally centralised. It required officials to undertake numerous ethnographic 
exercises that reconceptualised customary law not as resource of the people but as 
an instrument of government.163 As such, the state looked upon local chiefs as the 
‘culturally legitimate allies’ through whom this could be achieved, provided of 
course, that their ‘customary jurisprudence [was] not…subversive of colonial 
authority’.164 
These developments were not solely confined to the Cape; in many respects, 
the nascent administration in the Transkei echoed the longer-established 
“Shepstonian” system advocated by the neighbouring colony of Natal.165 Despite the 
differences between their “native” policies, the Transkei bore more resemblance to 
the latter than the former. There too, the state engaged in the conscious 
employment of African chiefs and customary law, albeit in ways informed by a more 
restricted conception of governance than that allowed by the lingering legacy of Cape 
Liberalism.166 Nevertheless, both ultimately aimed to control the movement of 
Africans into, whilst limiting their meaningful interaction with, European society. 
Whether born from the demands of industrial capital or settler colonialism, officials 
thus supported the increasing institutional and legal segregation of white and black 
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whilst attempting to redefine the economic and political functions of their African 
charges.167 
Yet the desire to secure a steady supply of wage-labourers and the alienation 
of local land also required the reification of “traditional” authorities in ways that 
fundamentally shaped the processes of colonial state-formation. Of course, in the 
long-run the demands of capital did indeed act as a solvent upon pre-colonial political 
and pre-capitalist social formations.168 In the post-1910 period, the system of 
“native” administration was likewise characterised by an increasing centralisation 
and bureaucratisation.169 Yet these later developments ultimately emerged from an 
earlier period in which ‘the rhythms and relationships of pre-colonial society’ were 
central to their making.170 This was true not just for the Mpondo but of various 
indigenous communities – the Pedi, Sotho, Tswana and Zulu, for example – that 
inhabited what would become South Africa’s rural reserves. As Norman Etherington 
argues, the administrative boundaries and ‘horse-shoe shaped configuration of [the 
country’s] Bantustans’ were not simply lands that chiefs and their followers were 
‘reluctantly pushed into’; rather, these were tracts of territory that they ‘managed to 
defend against invading colonists’.171  
Understood in this way, the changing character of late-nineteenth century 
colonialism – and the turn towards “traditional” authorities this entailed – arguably 
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foregrounded indigenous notions of jurisdiction, governance and political authority 
as central to its functioning. Establishing this broader transformation is crucial, since 
it necessarily calls attention to the idiosyncrasies of these developments within 
specific contexts. Indeed, it is this conceptual consideration that ultimately 
underlines the central argument of this thesis: that the shifting constitution of intra-
Mpondo political relations were crucial in shaping the country’s incorporation and 
the early evolution of the colonial state.   
 
Conceptualising Colonial State-Formation in Pondoland: 
This acknowledgement has, however, arguably been diminished by an 
understandable, but nevertheless problematic, preoccupation with the political 
environment of twentieth-century South Africa. Such studies are clearly important; 
they highlight the particular pressures that defined rural communities during 
apartheid and which have shaped their governance in the post-apartheid era.172 Yet 
they pay little attention to the specific dynamics of Mpondo society in the mid-to-
late nineteenth century. This is not to say that every study of mid-twentieth century 
Pondoland should necessarily explore the very different dynamics that characterised 
its transition from independence to annexation. Rather, it is to argue that the more 
familiar processes of colonial and apartheid state-formation should not be projected 
backwards when considering the historical trajectory of the Mpondo polity. 
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Fred T. Hendricks, for example, rightfully suggests the need to ‘periodise 
power relations in Pondoland by weighing the authority of chiefs against that of 
[resident] magistrates’ in order to chart the transformation of the region into a 
labour reserve subject to the demands of capital.173 Yet this objective implicitly 
precludes a nuanced exploration of precisely the dynamic he identifies; largely 
concerned with twentieth century dynamics, he refutes attempts by social historians 
to ‘recover the histories of peasants and migrants and to reassert them as 
independent actors in conflict with the state’.174 To do so, he insists, obscures ‘the 
fundamentally determining role of colonial capitalism’, and loses ‘sight of the 
repressive nature of the state in a racial system of domination’.175 Central to its 
functioning was the co-option of the chieftaincy and the system of communal tenure 
upon which their personal and political position largely depended.176 Various chiefs 
were absorbed into the administrative and institutional structures of the state and 
were forced into increasingly collaborationist positions following the ratification of 
the Bantu Authorities Act (1951). This process marked the apotheosis of apartheid; 
chiefs were to be the beneficiaries of a ‘decentralised despotism’ that fused in their 
hands a swathe of judicial, executive and customary powers over their rural 
subjects.177 The result was a chieftaincy divorced from its material base and 
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dependent on government patronage – ‘an institution superficially resembling its old 
self but robbed of the internal dynamics vital to its autonomy’.178  
 This focus on the increasing de-legitimisation of chieftainship in twentieth-
century Pondoland was perhaps most explicitly demonstrated during the Mpondo 
Revolts (1960-63) – a topic which has recently formed the basis of the admittedly 
limited amount of research on Mpondo society.179 Whilst it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to explore this episode in any depth, it is necessary to discuss how 
explorations of the recent past carry huge implications for our understanding of 
earlier historical developments.180  
Fred Hendricks and Jeff Peires have, for example, sought to account for the 
diverging experiences of popular discontent against those state-sanctioned 
betterment and rehabilitation schemes in both Western and Eastern Pondoland.181 
Whilst the former witnessed relative acquiescence, the latter experienced violent 
disturbance.182 Numerous factors are rightly identified. Political instability had long 
characterised the East to a far greater extent that the West; the paramountcy was 
succeeded three times in thirty-one years and was currently occupied by Botha 
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Sigcau, following his controversial appointment by the government in 1939.183 By 
contrast, the Western incumbent, Victor Poto Ndamase, ruled between 1918 and 
1974. A well-educated Christian convert, he was a keen advocate for agricultural 
improvement; he reinvested his chiefly stipend in the cultivation of huge plots of land 
and founded the Nyandeni Farmers Association in 1924.184 Infusing his chieftainship 
with an ‘ethos of modernisation and development’, he thus lent a legitimacy to those 
widely detested “conservation” schemes that elsewhere precipitated violent protest. 
Poto’s personal and political fortunes were intimately bound to the policies 
of the South African government; he derived his authority in part from the 1927 
Native Administration Act and bolstered his position still further through his support 
for the Bantu Authorities Act.185 Nevertheless, in accounting for his ability to better 
mediate the imperatives of the state with the popular demands of the chieftaincy, 
Hendricks and Peires’ study usefully highlights the continual re-invention of 
“tradition”, rather than its imposition.186 Moreover, their emphasis on the diverging 
experiences of both Eastern and Western Pondoland rightfully emphasise that, 
however “traditional” leaders were incorporated into the rural administration, this 
process was neither uniform nor unidirectional.187 
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Of interest to this thesis, however, is their identification of the importance of 
the partition of Pondoland in 1878 in determining these later historical 
developments. As they note, its ‘very division…provides an indispensable background 
to understanding the unfolding revolt in the east and why it did not happen in the 
west’.188 Here, they rightly point to the selling of Port St. John – much coveted by the 
Cape – by the then Western paramount, Nqwiliso, to the colonial authorities in return 
for official recognition of his independence from the East.189 This so-called ‘shabby 
deal’ thus began a long-term cooperation with state officials that in part accounts for 
Poto’s later collaboration. To be sure, Nqwiliso and his two successors were 
incredibly amenable to colonial rule; his son, Bokleni (1899-1917), mobilised a small 
corps of twenty two men – “Bokleni’s Scouts” – in the service of the British Army 
during the South African War.190 Moreover, it was the West that first witnessed the 
introduction of the Council system of local administration in 1911. Under Poto, the 
country also secured its founding membership to the United Transkeian Territories 
General Council (UTTGC) in 1931.191 
Yet this history of continuous Western collaboration was as much a 
convenient fiction designed to secure the favour of apartheid officials than it was a 
proper reflection of the purchase of, or stability provided by, the partition of 
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Pondoland. After all, Poto was particularly keen to underscore the long-held loyalty 
of his paramountcy in order to secure a stipend that matched his Eastern 
counterpart.192 As chapter 2 will demonstrate, this nominal boundary between East 
and West provoked a series of contentious conversations amongst Mpondo chiefs 
about the exercise of authority and subjecthood that reflected the polity’s 
jurisdictional heterogeneity. This political dialogue is incredibly important since it 
highlights how various Mpondo actors both understood and negotiated the 
encounters between colonial state and Mpondo paramountcy. 
Certain studies have, however, attempted to expand their analyses of state-
formation beyond the formal relationships between chief and state by incorporating 
the responses of “ordinary” African actors as central to this dynamic. Positing the 
process of state-formation as a ‘cross-cultural encounter’, they have sought to re-
qualify essentially one-sided stories of economic and political domination by asking 
how African commoners ‘constructed meaning in the face of such power’.193 Indeed, 
they explore how the colonised ‘dynamically incorporated the colonial state and its 
officials into their own, existing worldviews’, in order to better illuminate ‘the 
ongoing contest over the nature and substance of colonial rule’.194  
With regards to the Mpondo Revolts, Clifton Crais, Sean Redding and 
Katherine Fidler have emphasised how state practices were translated into ‘local 
idioms of power’ and ‘local lexicons of social order and control’ as part of an 
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indigenous critique of colonial and apartheid rule.195 Both Crais and Redding highlight 
how witchcraft and theodic beliefs fused with poor material conditions to underline 
the malevolent powers of the state, which often appropriated aspects of pre-colonial 
rule in order to legitimise its authority.196 Exploring the iKongo movement in 
Pondoland, Filder likewise notes how older social practices fused with elements of 
the modern nation-state in a process of ‘rural cosmopolitanism’ that saw insurgents 
proffer their own alternative form of government.197 Uniting all three is a 
conceptualisation of state-formation as born from the increasing imbrication of 
African and European cosmologies and cultural practices.198 By extension, acts of 
African resistance are viewed as more than simple rejections of state policies and are 
not reduced solely to expressions of an anti-colonial nationalism; rather, they form 
‘part of a wider and on-going conversation among the colonised about power and 
authority’ that underwrites the autonomy of subaltern actors whilst acknowledging 
the asymmetrical nature of the colonial encounter itself.199 
Various historians have, however, rightly criticised this approach. Jeff Peires 
has questioned the empirical basis and methodology behind the concept of state-
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formation as cross-cultural encounter.200 Similarly, Leslie Bank has argued that Crais’ 
emphasis on the role of witchcraft as a central tenet of political consciousness runs 
the risk of overstating its saliency and uniformity amongst the mass of South Africa’s 
people, thereby ‘consigning’ certain elements of African culture to the 
‘atemporal’.201 Underpinning their arguments is an acknowledgement that the types 
of encounters explored above - whether the Mpondo Revolt, or other acts of 
resistance – are themselves episodic and thus, to a large extent, exceptional.202 
Trying to extrapolate an African political imagination from such singular events is 
thus rightfully identified as potentially problematic. But by extension, so too is its 
necessary corollary: an increasingly intrusive state able to pervade the everyday lives 
of ordinary Africans. 
Crais, for example, posits apartheid as ‘the tragic triumph of colonial 
authoritarian high modernism’; drawing on James C. Scott, he argues that African 
subjects were rendered ‘legible’ to the apartheid state through a range of 
increasingly interventionist, bureaucratic and coercive practices that constituted an 
extensive act of social engineering.203 Demarcating jurisdictional boundaries, the 
creation of new political and administrative units, codifying, classifying and counting 
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local populations: all underpinned the impersonal and instrumental power of the 
apartheid state.204 Whilst these spatial and political practices were most explicitly 
encapsulated by the policies of re-tribalisation, ‘the roots of [such] 
authoritarianism…lay deep in the soil of conquest, even if officials barely knew what 
their mission was and the state was too weak to enforce’ them.205 Indeed, Crais seeks 
to underline the essential modernity of the early colonial state, drawing attention to 
its ethnographic innovations and ‘rationalities of rule’ that typified a European post-
Enlightenment ‘will to know’.206 For him, it was this increasing bureaucratisation of 
colonial power that ultimately enabled an otherwise fledgling administration to 
intervene in the daily lives of the colonised.207 
Yet even Crais admits that ‘what is much less understood is how [this] ‘will to 
know’…unfolded on the ground’ – a view echoed by various historians.208 Keith 
Breckenridge has suggested that arguments regarding the modernity of the early 
colonial state ‘may have led us to misunderstand’ some of its key features; far from 
demonstrating an ‘insatiable appetite for information’ about the colonised, the 
Native Affairs Department often exhibited an ‘enthusiasm for administrative drift’.209 
Exploring South Africa’s immigration Department in the 1920s, Andrew MacDonald 
similarly speaks of a ‘bureaucratic entropy’ and the porous nature of the country’s 
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international borders.210 Even at its zenith, the apartheid state was characterised by 
an administrative fragility. As Beinart rightly notes, the attempt at re-tribalisation – 
encapsulated by the ‘homeland’ policy of Bantustan independence - was protracted 
in its implementation, ‘began unravelling as a political entity almost as soon as it was 
fully established’, and, never achieved the ‘full spatial consolidation’ it implied.211 
From the mid-twentieth century there was undoubtedly a new emphasis placed on 
the twin processes of spatial relocation and ethnic state-formation that belied a view 
of African society as essentially bounded and culturally cohesive. Such ‘supra-tribal 
groupings [were] destined to raise the hidden ambitions of ‘nationhood’ in the newly 
created homeland states’.212 But the inculcation of an ‘ethnic nationalism’ often 
foundered at the local level ‘by a powerful and divisive sub-ethnic discourse of 
clanship’.213 In practice, nominally homogenising ethnic identities were actually 
multi-dimensional; they ‘collapsed together’ otherwise multi-ethnic, multi-lingual 
groupings and provided opportunities for ordinary people ‘to adopt terms of their 
own definition as the basis for collective assertion’.214 
Such studies thus qualify the objectives and agendas of state officials by 
situating their practices within particular institutional and temporal contexts. This 
not only underwrites the specificity of South African state-formation, it also allows 
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for a nuanced understanding of the changing dynamics of African polities as central 
to the processes of state-formation.215 Doing so allows for a de-mystification of “the 
state” as a reified or unified construct; hardly static, it can instead be posited as both 
actively constituting, and born from, a field of interactions and relationships that 
straddled the colonial divide.216 Demonstrating this intersection implies the continual 
adaptation and re-making of African and European structures of rule. Moreover, it 
builds on those studies which have questioned the unidirectional “invention” and 
constructed nature of “traditional” identities or territorially bounded, self-conscious 
collectives.217 
This is especially important with regards to Pondoland, since most recent 
studies tend to explore the processes of conquest and state-formation on a regional, 
Transkeian basis.218 To be sure, the praxis of magisterial governance followed those 
same administrative patterns established elsewhere beyond the Kei by 1878. But the 
conditions were arguably different, not least because Pondoland remained 
independent until 1894.  
Indeed, the structures of Mpondo political authority remained intact, and 
with it, so did the regional autonomy and jurisdictional heterogeneity that had long 
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characterised the polity. It was in this context, then, that the process of colonial state-
formation - and the political and spatial transformations it involved – thus occurred. 
The enforcement of such policies may well have begun to interfere in the daily lives 
of African subjects in the 1870s; although, as Sean Redding suggests, this was better 
facilitated by the advent of ‘a more pseudoscientific brand of administration’ from 
the 1920s.219 But even in November 1926, W. D. Cingo, a leading Mpondo councillor 
and educationist, warned officials of what he termed ‘Pondo diplomacy’: ‘how very 
courteous, cautious and sceptical is the Pondo towards any new measure’ proposed 
by the missionary or magistrate. ‘Though utterly against it, the formal reply is…the 
stranger goes home satisfied and from the casual remarks from the mass meetings 
he feels he has carried the day. Days, weeks, months and even years pass by and he 
begins to realise that the meeting was a hopeless failure’.220 
Far from pervading the daily lives, or “colonising the consciousness” of, 
African subjects, Cingo’s statement arguably confirms Frederick Cooper’s 
conceptualisation of colonial power as essentially ‘arterial’: ‘concentrated spatially 
and socially, not very nourishing beyond such domains, and in need of a pump to 
push it from moment to moment and place to place’.221 Such a view was confirmed 
by the Resident Magistrate of Bizana. Writing on 2 December 1898, Major Sprigg 
sought to contest the boundary separating his district and neighbouring Flagstaff, 
arguing that the proposed demarcation would ensure that his ‘people will never have 
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intercourse with their Magistrate at all’; ‘my experience’, he explained, ‘has taught 
me that….to a very great extent the power of the Magistrate increases and the power 
of the Chief decreases in inverse proportion to the distance of the people from the 
Office’.222 Such remarks suggest that the exercise of colonial authority depended, in 
the first instance, on its visibility and proximity to the newly colonised. Beyond the 
confines of the resident magistracy, such power was likely to dissipate with distance. 
In this sense, the institutionalisation of colonial rule was, just like the timing and 
nature of Pondoland’s incorporation, a similarly protracted process: the first hut-tax 
payments were delayed until 1896; the drawing of magisterial boundaries did not 
begin until 1897; and the formal allocation of land titles to European residents was 
only begun sporadically between 1899 and 1901.  
Acknowledging the practical constraints imposed upon Transkeian officials 
thus underlines Cooper’s call to ‘analyze [sic] in specific situations how power is 
constituted, aggregated, contested and limited’.223 In positing his own influence as 
mutually exclusive to that of ‘the Chief’, Sprigg arguably pointed to the local and 
regional autonomy enjoyed by various Mpondo and sub-chiefs that comprised 
Pondoland’s political geography. Yet the exercise of colonial rule was not simply 
mediated by a series of one-on-one encounters with particular Mpondo notables; 
rather, it fed into, and was re-qualified by, a much wider network of intra-Mpondo 
relations that reached across the region. Hardly uniform or static, they encapsulated 
the latent loyalties and long-term rivalries that comprised the polity; reflecting its 
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jurisdictionally heterogeneous nature, they were also highly responsive to any likely 
change in the balance of power in Pondoland. 
In making this argument, this thesis concurs with Catherine Boone’s 
contention that the institutional and administrative features of the state were 
shaped by the ‘political struggles and bargaining that goes on within African society 
between rulers, their rural allies and their provincial rivals’.224 Her argument 
highlights the relationship between political autonomy and the configuration of rural 
authority, the role of internal disputes in shaping the encounter between rural 
society and state and the manner in which the latter is deeply grounded in the 
former.225 Like Boone, this thesis similarly emphasises the importance of such 
endogenous characteristics. However, as this introduction has made clear, it also 
seeks to situate these internal dynamics within a wider imperial context. Doing so 
not only allows for an exploration of the changing configuration of intra-Mpondo 
relations as central in shaping the country’s incorporation. It also highlights how 
these local shifts were both facilitated by, and foundational to, the intersection of 
indigenous, colonial and imperial jurisdictional disputes in ways that fundamentally 
shaped the early formation of the colonial state.  
 
Methodology: 
This approach does, however, raise a number of methodological issues. Whilst 
exploring how power and authority was constituted from the mid-nineteenth 
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century, this thesis focuses on the period between 1870 and 1913, concentrating 
largely on the transformation of intra-Mpondo relations from 1878. As such, ‘it is only 
just pre-colonial’; it is concerned less with Pondoland’s ‘deep past’ and more with 
the ways in which longer-established forms of differential incorporation helped to 
shape the colonial period that followed.226 This is not to instrumentalise an earlier 
history in order to highlight a dynamism attributed solely to colonialism.227 Rather, it 
is to call into question the binary between the “pre-colonial” and “colonial” periods 
by exploring how pre-existing systems of governance became slowly imbricated in 
the administrative and institutional mechanisms of the state itself.  
This objective is, of course, determined by the type of primary material 
available. Like most studies of pre-colonial polities, this thesis relies heavily on 
European documentation that rarely deals with historical events prior to the point of 
“colonial contact”.228 Indeed, my research largely draws upon a huge selection of 
daily correspondence between various colonial officials stationed across Pondoland. 
The bulk of this material is located in the South African state archives – primarily in 
Cape Town but also in Pietermaritzburg – which covers the period in question. Earlier 
attempts to demarcate the boundaries of the polity - through treaty and territorial 
acquisition prior to 1870 - had little bearing upon the exercise of Mpondo political 
authority. These events will be briefly explored in chapter 1 and are partially built 
upon the personal papers and private correspondence of numerous administrators, 
                                                          
226 Reid, ‘Past and Presentism’, p. 138. 
227 Reid, ‘Past and Presentism’, p. 149. 
228 Reid, ‘Past and Presentism’, p. 138. 
61 
 
missionaries, traders and travellers who visited the country from the early-to-mid-
nineteenth century.  
The remaining five chapters – which form the substantive body of the thesis 
– are built upon an extensive array of colonial correspondence from the 1870s. 
Supplemented by numerous government reports published for the Cape and Natal 
legislatures, the sheer volume of material reflects the increasing colonial presence in 
Pondoland from this moment. Diplomatic agents placed with neighbouring 
chiefdoms increased their interactions with Mpondo chiefs following the Griffiths-
Ayliff-Grant Commission (1872), which sought to fix jurisdictional boundaries 
between the Transkei’s composite communities. The establishment of a British 
Resident in Pondoland followed the annexation of Port St. John in 1878; a Resident 
Commissioner was appointed for Eastern Pondoland between 1888 and 1894; and 
seven resident magistrates assumed administrative responsibilities across East and 
West in a post-annexation Pondoland. Each communicated with the Chief 
Magistrates of East Griqualand and the Transkei, as well as the Secretary for Native 
Affairs based in Cape Town.  
These catalogues are vast and comprise thousands of letters, circulars, 
minutes of meetings and memoranda. To some degree, the sheer amount of material 
is indicative of the late-nineteenth century turn towards “traditional” authorities, 
their potential instrumentalisation and the increased interest in the workings of 
indigenous societies discussed above. But it also reflects a colonial anxiety that was 
specific to Pondoland – a yet-to-be-colonised polity that remained on the fringes of 
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an otherwise volatile Transkei. With this in mind, it is understandable that officials 
were concerned to know more about the political machinations of Mpondo actors.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the bulk of such information was first garnered during 
moments of attempted intervention in Mpondo society. The partition of Pondoland 
in 1878 provides one such example; the desire to introduce a jurisdictional boundary 
between East and West first required a Commission of Inquiry headed by the Chief 
Magistrates of East Griqualand and Tembuland. These officials were tasked with 
uncovering the extent of political division in Pondoland, the relative autonomy of 
regional chiefs and the saliency of specific loyalties and rivalries in facilitating the 
introduction of imperial rule. In doing so, their efforts underlined the need to learn 
more about the political condition of Pondoland in order to ensure the efficacy of 
any new strategy to govern the country. The immediate post-annexation period 
provided similar opportunities; the Cape engaged in two high-profile judicial disputes 
– against English concessionaries and the paramount respectively – in order to 
consolidate colonial authority against any local and supra-local counter-claims to 
rule. Officials used these occasions to explore the personal and institutional reach of 
the paramountcy and the jurisdictional limits of the royal house. They investigated 
the decision-making processes that sanctioned the alienation of land and circulation 
of wealth; and they established how long-held affinities and animosities could be 
potentially manipulated to help consolidate colonial authority.  
 The government reports and legal proceedings that were subsequently 
produced were exceptionally rich; they served as important ethnographic enquiries 
into the internal dynamics of the Mpondo polity and necessarily foregrounded local 
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conceptions of governance, jurisdiction and political authority as issues of central 
importance to colonial officials. Such sources must, of course, be treated with a 
degree of epistemological scepticism. It is now widely accepted that the compilation 
of colonial knowledge functioned as a crucial technology of rule; reflective of the 
power relations of the colonial encounter itself, these documents were predicated 
on the ‘privileging of particular social categories’ and, by extension, deliberately 
laden with particular ‘archival silences’.229 The information garnered during these 
episodes, for example, came mostly from senior male chiefs or leading councillors. 
The prominence afforded to such accounts over different gender and generational 
perspectives undoubtedly reflected a colonial commitment to preserving a pre-
colonial patriarchy as the best means to ensure the stability of colonial rule. Yet this 
clearly renders the source material potentially problematic. Whilst issues of Mpondo 
governance and jurisdiction appear important, it is only when officials were looking 
– at particular moments and for specific ends – that they became aware. Moreover, 
the information they acquired largely came from Mpondo notables who, for personal 
and political exigency, were willing to provide them with a better understanding of a 
polity they knew relatively little about.  
 Such observations raise crucial questions over the specific contexts wherein 
which these archival records were produced and the extent to which they allow the 
historian to properly view these events from an Mpondo perspective. After all, 
leading protagonists often found themselves caught in moments of political flux in 
Pondoland; as the prospect of incorporation loomed closer, many were forced to 
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make short-term decisions about the changing balance of power in order to better 
negotiate the increasing antipathy between paramountcy and state. Whether stood 
on trial or sat in the resident magistrate’s office, it was thus in the interests of 
Mpondo protagonists to emphasise their personal authority and political autonomy. 
In this context, such testimonies could be easily over-stated; they proffered a 
presentation of chiefly power that was often self-serving and which was likely to 
confirm colonial conceptions of “native” society as inherently “tribal”, essentially 
bounded and internally centralised.   
 Yet the sheer plurality of statements contained within this material arguably 
points to a fragmentation of political authority that belies assumptions about the 
unqualified power of Mpondo chiefs. As various protagonists sought to underline 
their own autonomy, they often invoked their particular histories of migration into, 
or long-term inhabitation of, various parts of the polity. In doing so, they implicitly 
illustrated the processes of differential incorporation that underscored the 
jurisdictional heterogeneity of the Mpondo kingdom. Moreover, they also shed 
important light on the levels of seniority that distinguished particular groups from 
one another. By revealing the institutional structures of the polity itself, these 
statements also say much about the loyalties and rivalries that existed between the 
country’s composite communities. Whether affiliated to the royal house, openly 
hostile or largely indifferent/independent - they demonstrate the variegated 
relations that linked the numerous sub-groups to the paramountcy and the ways in 
which these shifted in response to attempted interventions in Mpondo society.   
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 Such insights thus reveal a political dynamism that – whilst explicitly 
articulated during particular moments – cannot adequately be deduced from singular 
episodes of political instability alone. To that end, this thesis also draws on a large 
body of material that covers a broad range of otherwise administrative mundane 
issues such as stock-thefts, petty border raids, land disputes and the (non)payment 
of tribute. These minor incidences are largely located in the records of magistrates 
from neighbouring colonial districts; they note intra-official disputes over specific 
policies and contain the complaints and observations of local traders and farmers. 
Alongside the British Resident in Pondoland and particular Wesleyan missionaries 
from 1886, it was these actors who were in most frequent contact with Mpondo 
chiefs and commoners; they paid licence fees to till and trade in the country, were 
often employed as interpreters at the Great Place and thus acted as important 
interlocutors between the government and paramountcy. As such, they proffer 
important personal insights into the characters of Mpondo protagonists and the daily 
frustrations that confronted chiefly claims to rule particular spaces.  
A close reading of this material also allows for an inclusion of what Norman 
Etherington has termed ‘significant anecdotes’: accounts by those otherwise written 
out of the colonial archive through an extensive reading of the material available.230 
These enable an exploration of the day-to-day unfolding of colonial rule as it slowly 
confronted Mpondo actors. Beyond the contestations between Mpondo and colonial 
protagonists, comprehensive cross-referencing between these sources also reveals 
the disputes such encounters precipitated within local communities, whether 
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between commoner and chief, or the different chiefly constituencies that comprised 
the country. Indeed, the interweaving of this material serves to highlight how, and in 
what context, various actors sought to object either to the interventions of colonial 
officials or the innovations of particular Mpondo notables undertaken as a response. 
More often than not, such responses were articulated in terms of the impact such 
transformations wrought on established patterns of rule. In this way, it is possible to 
glean how Mpondo actors understood their membership to the polity and the ways 
in which the differential processes of incorporation could be used to safeguard an 
autonomy typically enjoyed by the country’s composite communities. 
Two omissions are, however, worthy of note. The records of the Pondoland 
General Council – established in Western Pondoland in 1911 – would potentially have 
provided an insight into the types of issues, claims and complaints raised by local 
populations following the establishment of colonial rule in 1894. This local 
administrative body reflected the greater amenability of the western paramountcy 
to colonial intervention and would have served as a useful contrast to the rejection 
of the attempted centralised of authority under Nqwiliso in 1878. I was unable to find 
these records. Snippets of the council minutes exist in the Cape archives, and whilst 
a full record exists in the library of the National Council of Provinces in the South 
African Parliament, they have since gone missing. Two histories of the Mpondo 
polity, written by leading councillor W. D. Cingo (1925) and Paramount Victor Poto 
(1927) were also not consulted. Written in Xhosa, owing to time-constraints I was 
unable to get them translated. These sources are clearly important; rather than 
demonstrating ‘how writers in the colonial era constructed histories of precolonial 
societies’, they instead demonstrate ‘how people in those societies constructed 
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histories for themselves’.231 Such elite perspectives are, of course, as potentially 
problematic as the archival sources utilised throughout this thesis. Yet by drawing on 
this broad range of material, I intend to demonstrate how the authority of the 
Mpondo paramountcy was re-qualified and contested by the various communities 
that comprised the polity.   
Whilst foregrounding the changing configuration of these political relations, 
this thesis nevertheless recognises that articulations of authority and subjecthood 
formed part of a more complex consciousness composed of various economic, social, 
cultural and political aspects.232 Such distinctions often contributed to the cultivation 
of important markers of pre-colonial social or ethnic difference. Certainly, numerous 
studies have highlighted how these were often born through, or amplified by, 
conquest and political domination; they have shown how the struggle over socio-
economic resources underscored the resilience, but also threatened the survival of, 
the socio-cultural institutions of those communities absorbed into larger polities.233  
Such upheavals regularly visited the Mpondo kingdom until the mid-1840s. 
But from the mid-nineteenth century, the polity began to expand; as its peoples 
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dispersed, authority became reconfigured through the twin processes of economic 
atomisation and political decentralisation.234 Consequently, intense struggles over 
local resources were arguably less pronounced – at least until the 1870s. Moreover, 
political allegiance, rather than political imposition, largely served to underpin the 
authority of the royal house. It is for this reason that the political saliency of intra-
Mpondo relations is thus emphasised. This necessarily partial focus avoids a 
problematic reification of a pre-colonial Mpondo “identity” – a blunt concept often 
used to conceptualise ‘all affinities and affiliations, all forms of belonging, all 
experiences of commonality, connectedness and cohesion’ with little analytical 
accuracy.235 Instead, this thesis explores how, to whom and in what context Mpondo 
actors articulated their various political “identifications” with the Mpondo 
paramountcy. This approach ‘invites us to specify the agents that do the identifying’; 
it underlines the situational means and relational manner by which Mpondo actors 
often invoked and understood their membership to the Mpondo polity.236 As such, it 
reveals how authority and subjecthood had long been constituted whilst 
demonstrating how such configurations of political power could be used to negotiate 
the protracted process of colonial incorporation and state-formation. 
 
Chapter Outlines: 
The first chapter of this thesis is largely contextual and seeks to situate Pondoland 
within the broader transformations that shaped the Eastern Cape in the early-to-mid 
                                                          
234 Beinart, ‘Production and the Material Basis’. 
235 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History, (Berkley, Calif;, London: 
University of California Press, 2005), p. 60. 
236 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, p. 71.  
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nineteenth century. Specifically, it explores how contemporary officials and 
subsequent scholars have accounted for the expansion of the Cape’s eastern frontier 
and the extent to which both invoke a potentially problematic conceptualisation of 
the frontier as rooted in a process of ‘geographical progression’. This approach 
assumes that the patterns of colonial rule were fixed by the end of the nineteenth 
century; it is necessarily incapable of exploring how the steady expansion of the 
colonial frontier impacted upon, and was mutually re-qualified by, long-established 
structures of governance in a polity that was annexed as a late as 1894. The chapter 
then explores the internal dynamism that characterised the Mpondo polity as it 
transitioned from a period of closed settlement to one defined by expansion and 
dispersal. Doing so calls attention to important changes in its socio-economic 
organisation, as well as the politically decentralised and jurisdictionally 
heterogeneous nature of the kingdom. Finally, it considers these changes alongside 
early attempts by colonial officials to demarcate the territorial boundaries of the 
polity between 1844 and 1877. 
 Chapter 2 explores the attempted partition and partial annexation of 
Pondoland, promulgated by imperial proclamation in 1878. Undertaken to better 
regulate intra-Mpondo relations and governance, it considers how multiple Mpondo 
actors responded to what was an attempt to introduce new political boundaries 
within the polity. Doing so highlights how imperial intervention precipitated a swathe 
of contentious conversations about the exercise of authority and subjecthood in 
Pondoland. Hardly abstract, these concepts were actualised in the everyday affinities 
and animosities that existed between the country’s composite communities – 
cleavages which reflected its jurisdictionally heterogeneous and politically 
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decentralised nature. Examining the political dialogue that took place reveals how 
numerous chiefly groups were differentially incorporated into the polity; bound in 
various ways and degrees to the Eastern royal house, these institutional relations 
were fostered by the constraints imposed, as well as the opportunities provided by, 
the political geography of Pondoland. Consequently, the chapter thus demonstrates 
how this imperial intervention was re-qualified by indigenous notions of political 
space and sovereignty, as multiple Mpondo actors sought to maintain an autonomy 
enjoyed since the mid-nineteenth century. 
 Chapter 3 considers how further colonial encroachment fragmented 
Pondoland into a multi-jurisdictional space comprised of imperial, colonial, Western 
and Eastern Mpondo arenas of rule. Despite their pretensions to power, colonial 
officials remained confined to certain regions whilst paradoxically centralising 
specific areas in which the royal house could better assert its authority. Such 
developments bolstered the hostility between the two and increased the likelihood 
for greater instability; it threatened the jurisdictional heterogeneity and regional 
autonomy enjoyed by various chiefs, thereby re-animating those conversations 
concerning the exercise of authority and subjecthood precipitated by imperial 
intervention. Consequently, many turned to other European and extra-local actors – 
particularly from Natal – who similarly sought to advance their own claims to the 
country. This patchwork of jurisdictional disputes thus fostered an ambiguity over 
who precisely governed Pondoland, as various actors switched between, 
simultaneously treated with, or avoided altogether the multiple authorities that now 
comprised the country. Despite their antipathy, both the royal house and Cape 
government both seemed to share in the struggle to command the loyalties of those 
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they sought to rule. This chapter therefore demonstrates how these otherwise 
inimical institutions were rendered similarly circumscribed and interdependent in 
the moments preceding annexation. 
Chapters 4 and 5 both demonstrate how the act of annexation did little to 
settle the question of who governed Pondoland. Beyond the formalisation of colonial 
rule, this important political juncture also inaugurated the country’s entry into 
empire. Consequently, the various jurisdictional disputes that had shaped the 
protracted process of political incorporation were imbued with an added imperial 
impetus. Two high-profile court cases heard in the Cape Supreme Court illustrate this 
point. The first concerned Thomas and James Cook, English concessionaries eager to 
challenge the colonial government’s decision to annul the commercial treaties they 
had negotiated in a then independent Pondoland. The second involved the Mpondo 
paramount, Sigcau, who protested against his arrest on charges of sedition and 
disloyalty. Taken together, both chapters highlight how those on either side of the 
colonial divide shared in a mutual recourse to a notion of imperial membership that 
functioned as a powerful construct in the re-negotiation of colonial rule. Both of 
these judicial encounters underlined the state’s inability to monopolise the meaning 
of what precisely constituted British rule in a colonial context. Moreover, they served 
to exacerbate the fissures that comprised the Mpondo polity in the aftermath of civil 
conflict; various Mpondo actors sought to instrumentalise these broader disputes in 
the advancement of often contradictory interests. Whilst these were largely 
unconnected to the trials themselves, they were nevertheless formative in 
determining their outcomes. As such, both served as important moments in the 
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intersection of African and European jurisdictional disputes which ultimately allowed 
the newly colonised to shape the early evolution of the colonial state itself.  
 Chapter 6 extends this argument by demonstrating how intra-Mpondo 
political relations shaped the processes of state-formation in the early colonial 
period. Specifically, it explores how local loyalties and rivalries – and the jurisdictional 
disputes these encapsulated – helped to determine both the institutional viability 
and administrative character of colonial rule in Pondoland. It highlights how the 
continuing jurisdictional heterogeneity of the Mpondo polity influenced the 
demarcation of magisterial districts and locations, as well as the ability of resident 
magistrates and headmen to “broadcast” their authority within them. As officials 
went about the business of practically establishing their authority across the country, 
their actions were necessarily interpreted according to long-existing understandings 
concerning the exercise of authority and subjecthood. Arguably in flux since imperial 
intervention in 1878, these notions had recently been re-contested following the 
outbreak of civil war and the formal act of annexation. Underscoring a chiefly desire 
to maintain their long-held autonomy, they also continued to animate Mpondo 
actors well beyond the promulgation of the 1913 Natives Land Act. Nevertheless, this 
chapter focuses on the pre-1913 period. It was during these early years of colonial 
rule when ‘hard boundaries and clear notions of proprietorship’ came to be formally 
articulated.237 As such, its passing serves as a useful moment from which to assess 
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the impact of longer-existing jurisdictional disputes on the early evolution of the 
colonial state. 
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Chapter 1: The Mpondo Polity in Nineteenth-Century southern Africa: 
Introduction: 
As a former Chief Conservator of Forests in the Transkei, Caesar Henkel could easily 
appreciate ‘the indescribable beauties…and surroundings’ that comprised the land 
beyond the Kei River in the Eastern Cape.238 But for this German-born botanist and 
cartographer, it was the St. John’s River which constituted ‘the grandest and most 
romantic scenery’ of the region. Between ‘stately mountains and luxuriantly wooded 
hills’ lay an ‘expanse of blue green water nearly 500 yards wide’ that reflected ‘long 
silent vistas of forest…tumbled masses of rock covered with…ferns and creeping 
flowers…[and] majestic old trees’. In some places, he suggested, ‘it [was] difficult to 
tell where the reality end[ed] and the reflection in the water began’.  
Such sentiments echoed those of land-surveyor H. C. Schunke thirteen years 
earlier; he recalled the ‘grand and wild slopes of the ridges…[and the] dark primeval 
forests’ that surrounded the river, and which extended down to the coast ‘to form…a 
gateway through which the St. John River pours seawards’.239 Beyond its visual 
virtues, the river basin was also of geographical and economic significance. As 
Schunke noted, it served as the biggest outlet of water carried to the Indian Ocean 
along the entire coastline between the Kei and Mtamvuna rivers – an area otherwise 
characterised by ‘a distressing uniformity…[where] not a bay…is to be found along its 
                                                          
238 The following is taken from Caesar C. Henkel, History, Resources and Productions of the Country 
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75 
 
whole length…to [provide] safe harbour’.240 By contrast, the ‘magnificent firth at the 
mouth of the St. John’s River’ was likely to ‘become a large and important port’.241 
Port St. John – and the waterways of the Mzimvubu River from which it sprang 
– had long served as a crucial node in the commercial networks of Natalian traders 
from the 1840s.242 Such economic activity was impressive given the ‘exceedingly 
rugged and broken’ terrain that characterised the rest of the Transkeian coastline – 
itself closeted by a mountainous region characterised by deep valleys and ‘steep 
precipitous declivities’.243 Despite the establishment of a permanent trading station 
at the port from 1861, for Schunke, such tough terrain mitigated against the 
beneficial spread of British practices; there remained parts ‘where the natives are 
still found in their original raw state, uninfluenced by civilisation’. In particular, the 
official identified the land inhabited by the Khonjywayo clan in Western Pondoland 
and the central coastal region of Eastern Pondoland as worthy of note. ‘There’, he 
suggested, ‘the ethnologist may still have an opportunity of studying native customs 
and ways of thinking’.244 
Schunke’s description of Port St. John necessarily called attention to the 
Mpondo. Framed between the Mthatha River to the south and the Mtamvuna River 
to north, the Mzimvubu River functioned as a natural boundary that divided the 
kingdom in two following the placement of a royal son, Ndamase, by the former 
paramount Faku (1820-1867), on its western banks in the mid-1840s. The Mpondo 
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had, however, occupied land to its east for at least two centuries before Faku’s reign, 
having moved southwards from the Thukela River (in present-day Kwazulu-Natal) 
from as early as 1550.245 As Monica Wilson notes, Faku’s great-grandfather, Tahle, 
and five of his predecessors were buried in what is now Eastern Pondoland, whilst 
Ncindise – nine generations before Faku – was buried between the Mzimkhulu and 
Mtamvuma rivers, just beyond the country’s current jurisdictional boundary (see Fig. 
1.1).246 
Unlike those other African chiefdoms that comprised the Transkeian 
Territories, the Mpondo kingdom remained politically independent until its 
annexation in 1894. Despite nine frontier wars waged against the Xhosa between 
1779 and 1877, the country still remained beyond the Cape at the time of Schunke’s 
writing in 1890.247 The emphasis he placed on the marginality of the Mpondo from 
colonial civilisation arguably betrayed a treatment of the Transkei as a ‘narrative text’ 
- one ‘read from left to right as a progressing frontier in both time and space’.248 
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By extension, the concomitant reduction of the country’s inhabitants to the 
status of ethnographic subjects likewise reflected a long-established perception of 
indigenous populations beyond the colonial frontier as irredeemably “backwards” 
and essentially different. Such a perspective was deliberately disinterested in the 
socio-economic and political organisation of the kingdom. How the steady expansion 
of the colonial frontier impacted upon, and was re-qualified by, long-established 
structures of governance in Pondoland was similarly ignored. This chapter explores 
these very issues by calling attention to the shifting internal dynamics of Mpondo 
Fig 1.1: ‘Mpondo Genealogy’, in Monica Wilson, ‘The Nguni People’, p. 94. 
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society between 1820 and 1877. In doing so, it seeks to better integrate the polity 
into accounts of the transformations that shaped the Eastern Cape in the same 
period – processes that Schunke assumed it was isolated from. 
 
An Expanding Eastern Frontier: A Place for Pondoland? 
The officials’ acknowledgement of the independence – and ignorance – of the 
Mpondo arguably revealed a conceptualisation of the colonial border as an 
impermeable barrier between ‘an ethnically circumscribed Civilised world [and] an 
unpredictable African interior’.249 Various scholars have since challenged this view by 
exploring the ‘complex interactions and webs of dependency’ that developed 
between multiple actors from settler and African societies.250 Martin Legassick, for 
example, sought to overturn a dichotomous ‘frontier tradition’ by exploring the 
dynamics of ‘the frontier’ itself, highlighting the historical longevity of a variety of 
socio-economic and cross-cultural encounters.251 Christopher Saunders similarly 
argued against a ‘simple, dichotomized [sic] white-black frontier with two monolithic, 
antagonistic blocs facing each other…both blacks and…whites were divided among 
different political units, and different groups competed for power within [them]’.252 
In doing so, he highlighted the fragmentation of political authority across what was 
often a permissive border. 
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Numerous historians have pointed to the ambiguities which surrounded the 
‘opening’ of the frontier from the early-to-mid-nineteenth century and the 
opportunities this afforded to various actors on either side of the colonial 
boundary.253 Colin Bundy, for example, details the responses of (ostensibly male) 
producers to market opportunities created by the mineral discoveries of the 1860s; 
providing an alternative to wage labour, many were able to compete with white 
farmers in the selling of agricultural outputs.254 Such activity was rationalised by a 
policy of “racial amalgamation” – one that advocated the beneficial influence 
wrought by African incorporation into settler society and the loosening of the ties 
that bound commoner to chief. Governor Sir George Grey (1854-1861) was a 
particular proponent; he ‘envisioned the creation of a small class of land-owning 
Africans…and a much larger class of wage-earners’.255 Designed to undermine the 
authority of traditional leaders, the absorption of many Africans into the colonial 
economy suggests the permeability of those boundaries - political, social, cultural, 
economic and racial – that otherwise regulated white-black relations. Epitomising the 
much-contested tradition of Cape liberalism, those that benefited from such 
integration were likely literate Christian converts; ‘they believed…in the progress 
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mid-nineteenth century colonialism promised, perhaps most evidently evidenced in 
the [1853] non-racial franchise’. Quite simply, ‘they believed in the British Empire’.256 
Nevertheless, many historians understandably maintain the ‘confrontational 
character’ of nineteenth-century frontier relations, and the longer history of ‘white 
supremacy’ and ‘black resistance’.257 Tracing the roots of twentieth-century South 
Africa’s institutionalised racial hierarchy, ideas of the ‘open’ frontier precede 
explorations of its eventual ‘closing’, whilst the rise of an African peasantry is 
followed by an eventual fall.258 These studies rightly question the progressivism of 
market-driven notions of racial amalgamation. Economic individuation supposed the 
complementarity of settler and indigenous interests yet was ultimately predicated 
on the assumed cultural superiority of the former over the latter.259 As the 
introduction discussed, assimilationist ideals often belied a strategy to govern that 
was predicated on the subordination of Xhosa communities and the degrading of 
local political structures.260 These interventions caused huge internal destabilisation, 
often provoked further conflict and exacerbated already fraught frontier relations – 
evidenced by the breakdown of the cross-border treaty system established in 
1836.261 Such instability thus fuelled a cycle of distrust that placed traditional leaders 
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at ‘the centre of a politics of conspiracy and manipulation’ – one that warranted the 
further extension of the frontier and the greater subordination of indigenous 
institutions.262  
Of course, such developments were hardly unidirectional. Historians have 
rightly pointed to the limits of imperial power and the subversive potential of colonial 
collaboration, whilst others have reconceptualised state-formation as a site of ‘cross-
cultural’ encounter.263 These studies clearly challenge the dichotomous perspective 
proffered by Schunke. Yet his reading of the Transkei as a ‘narrative text’ – one that 
posits the frontier as a ‘moving zone of interaction’ through a process of 
‘geographical progression’ – arguably remains intact.264 Indeed, implicit in these 
accounts is a periodisation that often places emphasis on a particular turning point - 
the war of 1850-53, the mineral discoveries of the 1860s and 1880s, the delimitation 
of the Transkeian Territories from 1872, or the Glen Grey Act (1894). These propelled 
the frontier further forwards and facilitated the rise of the more recognisable system 
of institutionalised segregation of the twentieth century. Understood in this way, the 
frontier becomes ‘a thing of the past’; ‘it is considered a phase in the creation of a 
modern state with a capitalist economy and no longer a relevant term once the 
modern polity came to be’.265 This view of the advancing frontier not only replicates 
the point of view of the coloniser.266 More seriously, it implies a ‘lack of hyrbidization 
[sic] and ongoing encounter beyond the political acquisition of territory…[and] 
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presupposes that the land was not inscribed with meanings before the passage of 
the new order’.267 
This is particularly problematic for the study of a place like Pondoland, which, 
as Schunke made clear, was relatively – though not entirely - isolated from these 
developments. It is this that arguably explains why the polity is generally integrated 
into regional studies that explore the patterns of Transkeian conquest and state-
formation as something of an afterthought. Given its belated incorporation into the 
Cape, the practices that underscored the establishment of magisterial rule across the 
region are largely taken for granted. But Pondoland did not simply “fit” into this pre-
existing pattern of colonial rule. To assume otherwise would be to replicate the view 
of men like Schunke, who were happy to ‘consign precolonial polities to the realm of 
anthropology’, thereby ignoring the internal dynamism of Mpondo society and ‘the 
brutal power calculations that African leaders’ often had to make.268 Pondoland may 
have been the last to have been annexed, but its timing was not simply dictated by 
its distance from the colonial frontier nor by the interests of colonial officials. The 
internal dynamics of Mpondo society, and the shifting patterns of intra-Mpondo 
governance, were equally central in shaping what became a protracted process of 
political incorporation. 
The task remains, then, to see the links and connections between 
simultaneous events within Pondoland and the broader patterns of historical 
change.269 Such a view is well-established, particularly amongst those engaged in the 
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reconceptualisation of the now-contested mfecane.270 Once posited as a ‘purely 
indigenous process’, the violence that accompanied the rise and expansion of the 
Zulu kingdom are no longer viewed as ‘a special epoch of African-initiated violence 
which spread by chain reaction’ across the region.271 This perspective – first called 
into question by Julian Cobbing – highlighted the interrelation of what had previously 
remained the segregated histories of European and African from the mid-eighteenth 
to mid-nineteenth century.272 Such integration underlined a longer history of inter-
African and inter-racial interaction that preceded formal colonisation by calling 
attention to the various cultural and commercial hybridities that accompanied 
multiple migratory and expansionary processes.273 Given its location, Pondoland was 
particularly affected by the westward movements of those who sought to avoid the 
conflagrations of the region; it precipitated shifts in its socio-economic and political 
organisation which were likewise important in shaping the country’s interaction with 
colonial and extra-colonial actors from the mid-nineteenth century.  
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The Socio-Economic and Political Organisation of the Mpondo Polity: 
Established along the eastern banks of the Mzimvubu River, the Mpondo were 
surrounded by various Nguni-speaking groups: the Xesibe to the north-east, the 
Mpondomise to the north-west - with whom they could claim common ancestry - as 
well as the Thembu to the West and the Bomvana to the South.274 By the early-
nineteenth century, the Mpondo had likely achieved ‘some degree of dominance’ in 
the region; although, it was during the reign of Faku that ‘the chiefdom emerged as 
the largest and most powerful south of the Zulu themselves’.275 
 Beinart divides Faku’s leadership into two phases. The first extended up until 
the 1840s; it was characterised as a period of closed settlement and increasing 
centralisation, as the polity sought to contend with, absorb and defend themselves 
against, the various waves of invaders that fled south as a result of Zulu 
expansionism. The second marked an important shift in the configuration of Mpondo 
political authority, as various chiefly communities began to disperse and to re-settle 
upon land they had formerly claimed.276 This periodisation has been challenged by 
Timothy Stapleton, who claims that Beinart ‘over-exaggerates’ the impact of Zulu 
aggressions upon the Mpondo, thereby casting them as ‘harried victims’ rather than 
as ‘a fast-growing and sometimes predatory power’.277 His criticism is, however, 
misplaced. The very transition from closed settlement to political decentralisation 
arguably suggests the operation of what Paul Landau terms ‘a complex and adaptable 
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politics’ – one that pays proper attention to the specific reproduction of power in 
particular contexts.278 
 Certainly, the early decades of the nineteenth century represented a period 
of immense upheaval, and encouraged continual border raids and stock-thefts across 
the region. An attack by Zulu impis in 1828 destroyed numerous Mpondo settlements 
on the eastern side of the Mzimvubu; swathes of cattle were lost whilst Faku and 
approximately 10, 000 followers were forced to retreat to the western banks of the 
river.279 Such instability necessitated the forging of strategic alliances with 
neighbouring chiefs; in 1832, Faku entered into an alliance with the Baca chief 
Ncaphayi in order to bolster the success of counter-offensive cattle-raids.280 This 
period also marked the moment in which numerous immigrant groups – the Cwera, 
Nci, Cele and imiZizi – were absorbed into the polity following their movement 
southwards across the Mtamvuna river.281 Whilst many continued to recognise their 
own hereditary leaders, all acknowledged the primacy of the Mpondo paramount. 
No chief, explained one Tembu commoner, would argue: ‘‘I cannot say that I am a 
chief if there is another man in my country who is regarded as chief’…Among the 
amaMpondo there are many chiefs. However, there is a senior chief who has all the 
others as dependents’.282  
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Far from implying the passivity of the Mpondo, such regional instability was 
thus as productive as it was destructive; it ‘aided inter-group relations…to better 
facilitate defence against an attack by neighbouring groups’.283 Indeed, this building 
of an increasingly heterogeneous polity allowed Faku to quickly ‘reconstitute his 
followers into a formidable military force’.284 As Beinart notes, the abolition of male 
circumcision suggested a change in Mpondo military organisation whilst 
demonstrating the centralisation of authority under the paramount.285 This 
centralisation of power enabled him to command communally organised labour in 
the intensification of hunting, raiding, trading and agricultural activities.286 In a time 
of instability, such adaptation was particularly attractive to outsiders; the number of 
followers continued to increase, thereby bolstering the personal authority of the 
paramount and other Mpondo elites whilst increasing the productive capacity of the 
polity itself.287  
These activities were, however, largely ‘geared towards the re-accumulation 
of stock’, which was ‘essential for a reversion to a pattern of subsistence and social 
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87 
 
reproduction more familiar…to [Mpondo] society’.288 Indeed, the changes that 
characterised this period of closed settlement occlude the fact that the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the Mpondo polity were usually defined less in political terms and 
more by economic and material function.289 This was particularly the case from the 
mid-1840s, when numerous people re-crossed the Mzimvubu and re-established 
themselves on their former lands. This scattering of the country’s heterogeneous 
inhabitants made the decentralising of political control essential; yet as Beinart 
notes, ‘Faku played an important role in controlling expansion and siting new centres 
of settlement’.290 Major Mpondo groups were placed in an inner ring around Faku’s 
Great Place; those immigrant groups recently incorporated into the polity formed a 
defensive outer-ring along the periphery of the chiefdom.291  
Royal family members were also strategically established in distant regions in 
order to attract followers and cattle to the royal house; at the same, their placing at 
various sites served to diffuse any potential competition for power between royal 
sons.292 Faku had, for example, placed Ndamase, his eldest son of his first wife, on 
the Western banks of the Mzimvubu at the time of dispersal.293 A powerful chief and 
commander of Mpondo military forces, he was challenged by Mqikela, the eldest son 
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of the Great House and Faku’s named successor. Instructed to govern the minor 
Mpondo and immigrant chiefdoms that lived there, Ndamase achieved great 
independence; he defeated and subjugated his neighbours whilst vastly expanding 
Mpondo territory. As Jeff Peires notes, ‘it would be fair to say that the Kingdom of 
Western Pondoland was more the creation of Ndamase than the gift of Faku’.294 
The placing out of royal family members, and the acknowledgement of the 
autonomy of recently incorporated immigrant groups, arguably demonstrated an 
appreciation for how power was practically deployed in Pondoland.295 Indeed, the 
wide dispersal of its composite communities sheds some light on the country’s 
jurisdictionally heterogeneous and politically decentralised nature. Like other pre-
colonial African societies, notions of political sovereignty were non-territorial in 
nature. The landscape, sparsely populated and comprised of numerous nodes of 
political power, meant that the political saliency of the chieftaincy concerned rule 
over people rather than territory.296 
Nevertheless, Mpondo inhabitants were themselves settled in dispersed 
homesteads, whose independence over their own pastoral production was born 
from the process of economic atomisation that had accompanied the expansion of 
the polity.297 As such, the political authority of Mpondo chiefs became largely 
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dependent on the re-accumulation and re-distribution of cattle. Indeed, chiefs 
sought to monopolise its circulation in order to maintain their own personal and 
political pre-eminence whilst preventing its excessive accumulation by 
commoners.298 A loan system – conducted between and amongst all levels of 
Mpondo society – cemented permanent relationships between chiefs and their 
subjects. Stock was often demanded as payment for a judicial fine or tribute and its 
exchange often guaranteed the extraction of male labour.299 Indeed, the circulation 
of cattle highlighted the patriarchal structures that underpinned Mpondo society. 
Men were responsible for their herding, milking and treatment, whilst women were 
forbidden from handling them - ‘a reflection on male control over the goods central 
to bridewealth and reproduction of the family unit’.300 As an important form of 
lobola, its circulation bound together families, lineages and individuals whilst the 
system of exogamous marriage ensured the further dispersal of cattle payments 
throughout the chiefdom.301 To that end, the circulation of cattle and the process of 
marriage ‘highlighted and reaffirmed the established structures of power and the 
shape of the community itself’, thereby symbolising its social and reproductive 
potential.302 
Cattle thus held far more than economic value.303 Imbued with supernatural 
significance, the slaughter of stock served as an important sacrifice to restore the 
spiritual and physical health of the community during times of drought or disease.304 
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These moments further legitimated the authority of the chief, who functioned as the 
embodiment of the communal. The spiritual foundations of chiefly rule were 
incredibly important; they communicated with ancestors in order to boost the 
fertility of the land and livestock and to bring rain; protected the community from 
malevolent forces; and ‘could access potentially destructive witchcraft 
powers…which they could use to build up their own wealth and power or to harm 
their enemies and rivals’.305 Supernatural and political power thus went hand in 
hand; they justified a chiefly command over issues of ‘judgement, punishment, war, 
managing natural resources…propriety and every other virile social institution.306  
 
Colonial Encroachments, 1840-1877: 
Charting the transition from closed settlement to dispersal highlights the political 
dynamism of the Mpondo polity; the incorporation of various immigrant chiefdoms 
and the strategic placing of the country’s composite communities likewise 
underscores the political entrepreneurship of the Mpondo paramount in navigating 
the challenges that characterised the 1820s to the mid-1840s. Writing on 5 
September 1877, however, the Secretary for Native Affairs failed to appreciate the 
socio-economic and political transformations that shaped the Mpondo polity: ‘the 
wealth [of the Mpondo] is owed to government protection…in the former days they 
were destroyed, plundered and scattered by the Zulus’. ‘Taking refuge in the 
Umzimkulu…the first missionaries found them miserable, wandering clothed in husks 
of Indian corn’; ‘under the shadow of Government intervention, the Pondos are now 
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what they are…they are forgetting what they were and through whom they now 
are…[they] owe their very existence as a people to the protection and friendship of 
the British Government’.307 
 The ‘protection’ to which the official referred was the treaty signed between 
Faku and the Governor of the Cape, Sir Peregrine Maitland (1844-1847) in 1844. This 
agreement served multiple purposes. It established the amity between the Mpondo 
kingdom and British Government and pledged the defence of the former by the latter 
against ‘all claims and pretensions on the part of British subjects’; it obliged the 
paramount to surrender all those who had committed crimes against the Cape; it 
underlined the sovereignty and safe passage of all subjects of the Crown it; and, it 
necessitated that the paramount be ready at all times to provide military assistance 
to the colonial government.308 
The regional instability that precipitated the signing of the treaty is well-
known. Following Faku’s re-crossing of the Mzimvubu in the mid-1840s, the Mpondo 
paramount found his lands threatened not by Zulu impis but by those voortrekkers 
who had migrated out of the Cape in 1836 and had established the Republic of 
Natalia in 1839.309 In 1838, they sought to claim land southwest of the Mzimkhulu in 
light of the paramount’s westward retreat, and two years later declared their 
ownership of the territory between the Tugela and the Mzimvubu itself.310 The need 
for colonial protection coalesced with a British desire to annex Natalia.311 Faku was 
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thus re-cast as a potential ally in the regulation of border relations to his north, whilst 
providing rear-guard support in event of conflagrations along the Cape’s eastern 
frontier.312 In return, the paramount’s authority over the hinterland region between 
the Mthatha and Mtamvuna rivers was to be formally recognised, ‘with a bonus piece 
of land further north at the base of the Drakensberg mountains’.313 
The effective governance of such a vast region was impossible, especially 
since the treaty stipulated that Faku should respect the rights of all petty chiefs that 
resided within it.314 As Cragg notes, it ‘spoke of the Mpondo nation and assumed a 
measure of control which simply did not exist…whatever [Faku’s] historical and 
theoretical claims, his territorial rights would in practice be closely related to the 
actual extent of his jurisdiction’.315 Clearly, the treaty implied a centralisation of 
authority that was thoroughly at odds with the jurisdictionally heterogeneous and 
politically decentralised nature of the Mpondo polity. British and colonial 
administrators, however, paid little attention to the pragmatics of rule; they ignored 
how its mountainous terrain, caves and proximity to the Natal and Lesotho borders 
‘made it the haunt of stock raiders’, and was thus beyond the jurisdictional reach of 
the royal house. For them, the land was simply ‘vacant’ and thus inscribed with little 
order or meaning (Fig 1.2).316 
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Indeed, the very name of the territory – ‘Nomansland’ – revealed a European 
‘mentality of disorder’ that justified the rationalisation of the region.317 Whilst it was 
to serve as an important buffer zone – one particularly designed to prevent the 
Orange Free State from accessing the coast – ironically, the very stability officials 
sought to achieve was in fact undermined by the practical limitations placed upon 
Faku’s authority.318 1847 saw the Cwangule, a tributary of the Mpondo polity, attack 
Shawbury mission station – an incident which nearly sparked a civil war between the 
paramount and his son, Ndamase; and another recently incorporated chiefdom, the 
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Fig 1.2: ‘Position of tribes in 1828 when Chaka subjugated Pondos. 
Xesibes and Pondomisi driven out. Pondos left crushed and starving’, 
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imiZizi, attempted to retaliate against the Xesibe in 1858, only to find two other 
Mpondo groups arraigned against them.319  
Such persistent instability arguably reflected the autonomy enjoyed by the 
various regional chiefs and the difficulties that faced Faku as a result. Certainly, 
officials in both the Cape and the now-annexed Natal sought to take advantage of 
this jurisdictional confusion. Theophilus Shepstone, agent to the “native” tribes from 
1846, proposed the annexation of the region as a ‘District of Natal’, whilst a 
concession of land from around the Mzimkhulu River was wilfully ceded in 1850.320 
This was further extended to the Mtamvuna River in December 1865 to include what 
would become Alfred County, though not without the resistance of certain border 
chiefs.321 Moreover, from 1861 British, Walter Currie proposed the settlement of 
Adam Kok’s Griquas in the north-west of the region in what would become East 
Griqualand in 1862. These colonial encroachments effectively ‘ended Faku’s nominal 
paramountcy over lands he did not occupy and people he could not control’.322 
 
Conclusion: 
Of course, the boundaries implied by these increasing delimitations of Mpondo 
territory were not inviolable. The continual outbreak of stock-thefts and violence 
between certain Mpondo and Griqua in the East, and Mpondo and Mpondomise to 
the West, necessitated that the Cape better fix the jurisdictional borders dividing the 
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numerous communities of the Transkeian Territories.323 When war broke out 
between the Tembu and Gcaleka in 1872, its need was further underlined, prompting 
the establishment of the Griffiths-Ayliff-Grant Commission.  
This initiative was both administrative and extra-territorial; various local 
communities, under their chiefs, sought to be “taken over” as British subjects. The 
Mpondomise were formally incorporated in October 1873, followed by the Griquas 
in 1875 and the Baca in 1876. The Xesibe chief, Jojo, eager to attain independence 
from the Mpondo, likewise applied to the British authorities in 1874. Nevertheless, 
he was ordered to recognise the political boundaries established by the Commission; 
viewed as a tributary of the royal house, they were forced to acknowledge the 
paramountcy through a payment of twenty head of cattle.324 As chapter 2 will 
demonstrate, this decision was ultimately reversed in 1878 – a controversial decision 
that fed into a wider re-examination of the exercise of authority and subjecthood 
across Pondoland.  
The increasing encroachment of the British and colonial authorities thus 
represented a marked difference from the huge swathe of territory granted to Faku 
in 1844. This recognition of the Mpondo paramount’s authority was reflective of the 
exigencies of the region’s geo-politics; it paid little attention to the jurisdictionally 
heterogeneous and politically decentralised structures that underpinned the 
exercise of authority and subjecthood in Pondoland from the mid-1840s. Indeed, an 
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acknowledgement of these processes can only be attained by charting the internal 
changes in the socio-economic and political organisation of Mpondo society. How 
these characteristics requalified subsequent episodes of intervention forms the focus 
of the next chapter. Unlike those events explored in this chapter, the intervention 
undertaken by imperial administrators in 1878 sought to introduce new political 
boundaries within the polity itself. In doing so, they precipitated a huge swathe of 
contentious conversations concerning the exercise of authority and subjecthood 
which, as the rest of the thesis will demonstrate, created huge opportunities for 
multiple Mpondo actors to shape what was to become a protracted process of 
political incorporation.
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Chapter 2: Imperial intervention, Authority and Subjecthood in 
Pondoland, 1878-1883: 
 
Introduction: 
On 9 July 1878, Charles Canham penned a letter to the recently appointed British 
Resident in Pondoland, Reverend Oxley-Oxland.325 Canham, himself a European 
employed as an interpreter by the Mpondo royal house, called upon the Reverend 
for ‘prompt and immediate action’ in settling a series of disputes between the 
paramount chief, Mqikela, and the British Government. A failure to resolve them, he 
argued, would see ‘the prestige of the British name…sink into ignominy…and 
Umqikela will laugh into his sleeve at having evaded a course he is likely to continue 
unless compelled to alter it by some forcible means than pen and ink.’ Canham 
warned Oxley-Oxland that whilst he ‘may be morally certain as to [the] prevailing 
sentiment…among the people…the signs of the times indicates “something 
brewing”.’ Supporting his claim, he noted the ‘restless anxiety of the natives to 
procure arms and ammunition’ and the arrival of suspected murderers and wanted 
rebels from colonial territory; he identified a ‘most pernicious influence’ spread by 
prominent traders and merchants ‘who, to serve their own selfish ends advise the 
chief to resist the demands made upon him’. Only a show of force could give weight 
to the government’s proposals against a paramount who considered himself 
‘sufficiently powerful enough to stop the march of the British lion’. Imploring the 
British Resident to take action, he simply asked: ‘was it not high time this illusion was 
dispelled?’ 
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Pondoland featured as something of an anomaly on the landscape of late 
nineteenth-century South Africa. Stood alone as the last remaining independent 
kingdom beyond the Kei River, for the Cape, the polity’s non-incorporation was 
problematic. Whilst colonial rule had been introduced to the rest of the Transkei, it 
was by no means secure; resident magistrates and diplomatic agents exercised their 
authority through traditional leaders, who still retained much of their power.326 In 
this context, the Mpondo royal house remained a potentially destabilising force in an 
area that was under the de facto authority of the government but which was 
nevertheless prone to outbreaks of political revolt. 
Indeed, for various reasons Mqikela stood accused of undermining the 
governance of the Transkei. Officials complained that the paramount had refused to 
sanction the proposed building of a telegraph line for fear that the state would seek 
to claim the land around it.327 Worse still, the British Resident had discovered that a 
certain trader, Pemberton White, had been tampering with confidential colonial mail 
and passing its contents to Mpondo chiefs.328 Such suspicion served, quite literally, 
to corrupt the communications between the Government and Great Place. 
Monitoring Mqikela’s contacts caused even greater concern; the arrival of a 
deputation sent by the Zulu paramount, Cetywayo, was met with particular unease. 
Undertaken prior to the outbreak of the Anglo-Zulu War (1879), officials were 
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convinced that the ‘Zulus [had] come on a mission’; they alleged that other agents 
had visited…other frontier communities to cultivate an alliance to fight the colonial 
government.329 Further enquiries confirmed the involvement of Mpondo chiefs in 
the most recent rebellions in the region – in Gcalekaland (1877) and East Griqualand 
(1878).  Moreover, it was alleged that Mqikela had threatened to punish those who 
supported the Cape during these conflicts and had since sent messengers imploring 
them ‘to join him to make war against the British’.330  
Little wonder, then, that Canham was so worried by the prospect of Mpondo 
independence. Rebels, murderers and troublesome traders: numerous actors were 
heavily invested in keeping the country beyond the reach of the Cape.331 Certainly, 
official scope for action remained limited; the colony had no legal right to extend its 
jurisdiction over Pondoland without imperial approval. To do so in the midst of such 
regional instability would entail political upheaval and huge financial cost.332 It also 
risked further conflict, since the country now served as an important market for 
those arms confiscated from neighbouring chiefdoms under the Peace Preservation 
Act (1878).333  Taken together, these pressures had the potential to undermine the 
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Cape’s claim to administrative competence, embodied by its acceptance of 
responsible government in 1872.334  
Yet on the 4 September 1878, a solution was seemingly provided by the Cape 
Governor and High Commissioner for Southern Africa, Sir Bartle Frere, who issued an 
imperial proclamation announcing Mqikela’s deposition as Mpondo paramount. 
Specifically, the edict stated that those chiefs formerly subordinate to the royal 
house ‘who have behaved loyally to Her Majesty’s Government, and who now desire 
to come under direct relations with that Government, will be allowed to deal directly 
with the British…as the sole paramount authority in Pondoland’.335 The first was the 
Xesibe chief, Jojo, who occupied territory which had long been claimed by the Great 
Place. As chapter 1 discussed, Jojo had once before sought independence from the 
Mpondo in 1874. Instructed to recognise the political boundaries established by the 
Griffiths-Ayliff-Grant Commission (1872), the Xesibe were, however, forced to 
acknowledge the paramountcy through a payment of twenty head of cattle.336 Yet in 
this current climate of controversy, Jojo’s second petition was unsurprisingly 
successful. Confirmed at a meeting with colonial officials on 8 July, the Xesibe 
received their first resident magistrate, Walter H. Read, on 28 October 1878, and 
were annexed by the Cape on 24 September 1886.337 
                                                          
334 This transfer of power also meant that the colonial executive was now responsible for devising its 
own frontier defence policy. See J. S. Kotze, ‘Counter-Insurgency in the Cape Colony, 1872-1882’, 
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, 31:2 (2003), p. 38. 
335 Proclamation by Sir Bartle Frere, 4 September 1878 in A. 105 – ’80: Return of Papers on Pondo 
Affairs, (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1880), pp. 133-34.  
336 (CA) CMK-1/48: Minutes of meeting held at Mfundisweni, 30 August 1882. Statement by Assistant 
Chief Magistrate East Griqualand. 
337 See (CA) CMK-5/5: Minutes of meeting held between Captain Blyth, Major Elliot, Jojo and Fundise 
at the court room of the Chief Magistrate East Griqualand, 8 July 1878; G. M. Theal, Twelve Eventful 
Years, p. 168. 
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The second instance concerned Nqwiliso, the most senior Mpondo chief west 
of the Mzimvubu River. As noted previously, it was Nqwiliso’s father, Ndamase, who 
had been placed there by Faku in the mid-1840s in order to avoid a potential civil 
conflict with Mqikela. Yet upon his death in 1876, Mqikela attempted to reclaim the 
region for the Eastern royal house. Claiming that Ndamase’s authority had only been 
acquired on a personal basis, he argued that Western Mpondo autonomy had since 
expired and was thus uninheritable.338  
Eager to counter such a charge, Nqwiliso naturally sought to underwrite his 
new-found sovereignty. His opportunity arrived on 17 July 1878, when government 
officials offered to recognise his independence in return for the sale of Port St. John 
and the sole rights to the navigation of the Mzimvubu River.339 Twice refused by 
Mqikela in 1874 and 1878, the acquisition of the port was confirmed by a payment 
of £1000 to the newly acknowledged Western Paramount. Nqwiliso’s position had 
thus become hitched to the extension of British rule in Pondoland. Indeed, on 31 
August the chief sat on the western bank of the Mzimvubu and watched the 24th 
Regiment hoist the British flag over the St. John’s estuary.340 This ceremony 
represented a watershed moment in the history of European intervention in Mpondo 
affairs. Confirmed by Frere’s imperial edict, it marked the deliberate jurisdictional 
curtailment of the Eastern paramountcy by effectively signalling the political 
partition of the country.  
                                                          
338 George Callaway, Pioneers in Pondoland, (Lovedale: Lovedale Press, 1938), p. 40. 
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This chapter seeks to examine the impact of the proclamation within 
Pondoland and to explore its reception by the numerous chieftaincies that comprised 
the country. It does so not least because Frere’s intervention clearly sought to 
regulate both intra-Mpondo relations and governance in order to better ensure the 
stability of the colonial border. Through partition and partial annexation, the 
proclamation arguably intended to circumscribe the paramountcy through the 
introduction of new political boundaries. In this sense, it functioned as an extra-
jurisdictional initiative which, undertaken on behalf of the Cape, formed part of the 
disciplinary apparatus employed by the colony in its wider conquest of the 
Transkei.341 Additionally, the edict aimed to appeal to those disaffected with Mqikela, 
encouraging them to seek protection from, and treat with, the British Government 
rather than the royal house. As such, it doubled as an extra-territorial intervention 
by privileging a foreign form of subjecthood designed to undermine the authority of 
the paramount.342  
With this in mind, this chapter asks the following questions: How did colonial 
and imperial administrators conceptualise the system of governance in Pondoland? 
How did local communities understand the new political boundaries implied by 
Frere’s proclamation? In what moments and for what reasons did Mpondo chiefs and 
commoners come to utilise them? And how did they react to the centralisation of 
power in the West under Nqwiliso? In what ways did the Xesibe justify their decision 
                                                          
341 This will be explored in the second section of this chapter, but for a comprehensive overview of 
the processes of Transkeian state-formation undertaken by the Cape, see Crais, Politics, pp. 68-95. 
342 For an excellent example of the acquisition of extraterritorial subjecthood, see Ziad Fahmy, 
‘Jurisdictional Borderlands: Extraterritoriality and “Legal Chameleons” in Precolonial Alexandria, 
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to be taken over as British subjects? And how did the Great Place attempt to re-assert 
their claims over land and subjects that they considered to be Mpondo? 
In asking these questions, this chapter posits Frere’s proclamation as an 
important moment in the reconfiguration of authority and subjecthood within 
Pondoland. This perspective has arguably been overlooked in the historiographical 
treatment of this encounter, where it has been primarily understood in terms of the 
breakdown of political relations between the Mpondo royal house and the Cape 
Government. Whether owing to the absence of an influential missionary mediator, 
the desire to claim the last independent portion of coastline between the Cape and 
Natal, or a metropolitan attempt to realise a confederation of southern African states 
under the Crown: the ally of the Treaty of 1844 simply becomes the enemy of 
1878.343 According to this narrative, the annexations of Port St. John and Xesibeland 
feature only as important milestones in the eventual subordination of the soon-to-
be colonised by the would-be colonisers. Little attempt is made to differentiate 
between the agendas of those European and Mpondo protagonists involved in 
shaping this moment of interaction/intervention. 
Where this latter issue has been addressed, emphasis has been given to the 
importance of the political antagonism between paramountcy and state. William 
Beinart identifies the conflicting interests of European traders and colonial officials. 
The former sought to protect their commercial activities by stoking Mpondo 
resistance to the annexations proclaimed in 1878; the latter were eager to control 
                                                          
343 For examples of the following arguments, see Cragg, ‘The Relations of the AmaPondo’; Saunders, 
‘Annexation’, p. iii, 384; Beinart, Political Economy, p. 31; Dorothy L. Keet, ‘The Annexation of 
Pondoland’, BA. Hons., University of Cape Town, 1964, p. 10.  
104 
 
the influx of illicit goods entering the Transkei whilst gaining additional revenue 
through the levying of custom duties at the port. Indeed, he highlights the ‘serious 
financial repercussions’ of the proclamation. After all, the chief lost the £15 levy for 
each ship that called at the port, the annual £100 payment stipulated by the 1844 
treaty, the licence fees paid by traders and a concession worth £150 to develop 
alleged mineral deposits in Xesibeland.344 For Beinart, it was this reduction in 
personal income that brought the royal house into conflict with the colonial state; 
the chief was rendered increasingly vulnerable, especially given his already limited 
capacity to command a surplus from the country’s production and trade.345 Frere’s 
imperial edict is therefore said to have ‘had little immediate impact on the 
paramount’s political position within Pondoland’, since it simply served to 
complement the processes of economic atomisation and political decentralisation 
well underway from the late nineteenth century.346  
Viewed in this way, Mqikela’s authority was just as Canham had described it 
– an ‘illusion’.347 Such sentiments were echoed by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, who simply asked the High Commissioner to consider ‘which colony or 
province the St. John’s River Territory…should be placed’.348 His comments likely 
assumed the unproblematic incorporation of Mpondo territory. Yet as the 
encounters with Jojo and Nqwiliso demonstrate, this extension of imperial rule 
equally depended on the cultivation of successful alliances with willing local 
participants. As Daniel Branch notes, this practice was ‘a particular skill of British 
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347 See (CA) CMK-5/5: Charles Canham to Rev. Oxley-Oxland, 9 July 1878, cited above. 
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imperialists’; the instrumentalisation of indigenous allies was a ubiquitous feature of 
‘indirect rule’, in all its permutations, throughout the empire.349 Indeed, appealing to 
the immediate wants of the Western Paramount and Xesibe chief reflected the 
tendency to exploit ‘pre-existing social and political cleavages by empowering 
particular factions contesting power and authority’ within indigenous societies.350  
Such overtures were perhaps made easier given the composite nature of the 
Mpondo polity - comprised of numerous chiefdoms, clans and sub-groups that were 
differentially incorporated by, or connected to, the Eastern royal house. European 
commentators noted this heterogeneity with interest.351 Frank Brownlee, former 
Resident Magistrate of Mount Ayliff, argued that Mqikela was ‘the chief of a tribe 
composed largely of alien clans ready at any moment to transfer their allegiance to 
someone else, with his authority actually ignored by a very large section of the tribe’. 
Consequently, he envisaged that the country’s ‘division into two, or even a dozen 
sections independent of each other would not cause much difficulty’.352  
These comments undoubtedly betray an assumed ability to instrumentalise 
Mpondo politics towards colonial ends through the offer of British support and 
subjecthood. Yet the success of this extra-territorial endeavour was neither 
guaranteed nor reflective of a cohesive or uniform strategy concerning the 
incorporation of African chiefdoms. As Par Kristoffer Cassel argues, ‘far from being a 
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system, in the sense of a planned and orderly arrangement, extraterritoriality is 
better regarded as a practice, which evolved and took shape within a legally 
pluralistic environment’.353 Such a perspective suggests that the cultivation of local 
alliances by supralocal actors necessarily occurred within a context that was 
politically pre-defined by long-existing notions of authority and subjecthood within 
Pondoland. Hardly abstract, these concepts were actualised in the everyday affinities 
and enmities that existed between the country’s composite communities. 
Understood in this way, Frere’s proclamation cannot simply be seen as a 
unidirectional intervention within Mpondo society; its success or otherwise must be 
viewed as intimately tied to the configuration of intra-Mpondo relations themselves. 
As Ronald Robinson makes clear, the sourcing of suitable supporters ‘was as much 
and often more a function of Afro-Asian politics than of European politics and 
economics’.354  
Indeed, in this chapter I suggest that Frere’s imperial edict served as a 
moment of opportunity for multiple Mpondo chiefs in the pursuit of often conflicting 
interests. In doing so, the chapter builds on the argument advanced in the 
introduction, that the extension of imperial sovereignty over newly incorporated 
territory was always a necessarily contested process; more often than not, it served 
to highlight either pre-existing or counter claims to govern the same space by various 
indigenous, colonial or extra-colonial historical actors. Moments of imperial pomp, 
such as royal tours or flag-raising ceremonies, represented idealistic performances 
                                                          
353 Par Kristoffer Cassel, Grounds of Judgement: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-
Century China and Japan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 6. Emphasis cited. 
354 Ronald Robinson, ‘Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of 
Collaboration’, in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, (London: 
Longman, 1972), pp. 138-39. 
107 
 
of power that reveal little about the mechanics of rule and its negotiation in specific 
contexts. Proclamations implied the rationalisation of political space by demarcating 
the boundaries of imperial jurisdiction. Yet, as Lisa Ford reminds us, ‘what they 
clearly did not do is extend any meaningful jurisdiction over indigenous people’ 
themselves.355  
Frere’s proclamation is a case in point. Issued on 4 September 1878, Port St. 
John was not annexed to the Cape until 22 July 1884; until then, it remained an 
imperial enclave in an otherwise independent, if newly partitioned, Mpondo polity. 
Likewise, Xesibeland was immediately placed under the supervision of colonial 
officials, and its land and subjects designated as British. Yet colonial rule was not 
confirmed by the Cape Parliament for another eight years, when the region, along 
with a small piece of adjacent land known as the Rode Valley, was annexed to the 
Mount Ayliff district of East Griqualand. What was intended in 1878 was therefore 
only nominally formalised in 1886.  
In acknowledging this protracted process of political incorporation, this 
chapter submits that the 1878 proclamation failed in its immediate objectives to 
depose Mqikela, bolster Nqwiliso as a useful local ally and to consolidate the Xesibe 
as British subjects. Instead, I argue that this intervention precipitated a series of 
contentious debates about the exercise of authority and subjecthood within 
Pondoland. Such conversations varied across the polity; they expressed the latent 
loyalties and long-term rivalries within the country – cleavages which reflected its 
jurisdictionally heterogeneous and politically decentralised nature. Examining the 
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political dialogue that took place in a post-proclamation Pondoland thus foregrounds 
the importance of intra-Mpondo relations in re-qualifying instances of European 
interference in the country. Moreover, it avoids what John Lonsdale has termed ‘the 
all too easy assumption that conquest was an historical moment rather than 
movement’.356 As he notes, the successful subjugation of African societies was hardly 
reducible to a singular event. It involved a ‘forcible process of political accumulation’ 
that was in part shaped by the factional composition of those polities themselves.357 
This chapter thus seeks to make the same point.  
In order to do so, the chapter will be split into three sections. Given the 
intention to undermine the structures of Mpondo governance, the first section will 
explore how officials conceptualised the operation of power and authority in a pre-
proclamation Pondoland. The second section will focus on the partition; it will 
highlight how various Mpondo chieftaincies responded to the newly emboldened 
position of Nqwiliso and will situate their contestations within the longer-term 
affinities and animosities that existed both between them and the royal house. The 
final section will focus on the annexation of Xesibeland. Specifically, it will examine 
how leading Mpondo and Xesibe chiefs proffered conflicting views on the historical 
relationship between the two, and how these different perspectives underpinned 
attempts to advance autochthonous claims to land in the north of the country. Taken 
together, these sections will highlight both the variety and vehemence of those 
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conversations which, prompted by Frere’s proclamation, coalesced around a re-
examination of Mpondo authority and subjecthood.   
 
Contriving a Political Boundary: 
As the introduction illustrated, the partition of Pondoland was born from a 
convergence of chiefly and colonial interests that centred upon the acquisition of 
Port St. John and the creation of two distinct kingdoms.358 In many respects this 
arrangement simply served to formalise a system of governance established by Faku 
in the mid-1840s. Moreover, this new jurisdictional space was already delimited by 
the Mzimvubu River – a natural frontier which functioned as the ideal border that 
colonial administrators so preferred.359 However, the partition of Pondoland 
reflected more than the happy confluence of historical and geographical 
circumstance. After all, this division of territory was promulgated during a turbulent 
time in Mpondo-colonial affairs; Mqikela faced a litany of charges that implicated his 
paramountcy in the deliberate destabilising of colonial rule in the Transkei. The most 
serious of these concerned the role played by particular Mpondo chiefs in assisting 
and offering sanctuary to known rebels from Gcalekaland and East Griqualand. Such 
seditious activity highlighted a clear division of disloyalty across the country that 
underpinned the need to partition Pondoland. 
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Following the outbreak of rebellion, Transkeian administrators were quick to 
highlight the difference between the Western and Eastern paramounts. It was 
Nqwiliso, who, ‘as [a] friend and faithful ally of the Government’, had attempted to 
arrest the Gcaleka chief, Kreli. Meeting with the Chief Magistrate of Tembuland, the 
chief asked for a division of colonial troops in order ‘to assist the Government by 
sending men across the Umtata and taking part in operations against the rebels’ by 
preventing them from entering into his territory.360 Whilst his offer was rejected, the 
chief nevertheless arranged the successful confiscation of over 1000 head of rebel 
cattle that had accompanied Gcaleka dissidents across the Mpondo border, handing 
them over to the imperial military authorities.361 His actions were unambiguously 
perceived as designed to ‘save the Pondos from trouble and loss’ whilst serving as an 
important gesture in maintaining those friendly relations with Cape officials 
cultivated by his father.362  
 The contrast with Mqikela was stark. After the outbreak of rebellion in East 
Griqualand, the Secretary for Native Affairs wrote to the paramount to warn him that 
‘any chief sheltering…rebels against the Queen renders themselves an enemy of the 
Queen’.363 When questioned about their alleged hiding in his country, however, 
Mqikela simply dismissed them as ‘wanderers without a place of abode’; whilst he 
made it clear that he had not sanctioned their escape into his country, he 
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nevertheless suggested that others were also hiding in Nqwiliso’s territory and 
refused to consider their potential surrender.364  
Such obfuscation masked a deeper level of complicity of senior Mpondo 
chiefs in the conflict. Officials were well aware that Adam Muis, a principal ringleader 
of the rebellion, had fled into Eastern Pondoland – a fact confirmed by Mqikela, who 
wrote to the Chief Magistrate of East Griqualand, Captain Blyth, to inform him that 
he had ordered Muis out of the country. Muis had, however, written a letter to Blyth 
from the kraal of Mhlangaso, “Prime Minister” of Pondoland, boasting that the 
‘Pondos [were] willing and ready to assist in making war on the Government’.365 To 
be sure, the paramount had sent a councillor, Tikizane, to escort Muis across the 
border along with a deputation of men from Mfundisweni mission station.366 Yet 
when they crossed into colonial territory, they were met by a hundred armed rebels 
and then proceeded to the farm of a Mr J. H. Acutt, which they plundered before 
taking the residents hostage.367 Tikizane returned to Mqikela, concerned that ‘their 
behaviour appeared to him to be that of an enemy more than a friend of [the] 
Government’.368 But in doing so, he left the Mpondo dissidents under the charge of 
Josiah Jenkins, a nephew of the paramount, who remained with Muis until a force 
led by Blyth attacked the rebel camp.369 After a five-minute siege, ninety four Pondos 
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surrendered. Holding a white flag, they abandoned their posts and were 
subsequently disarmed, arrested and sent back to Pondoland.370  
The difference between a pliant West and obstructive East was striking and 
served to confirm a colonial suspicion that many at Mqikela’s Great Place were 
sympathetic to the cause of colonial revolt.371 Naturally, officials were eager to 
determine the culpability of Mqikela himself. At a meeting held at Kokstad, Blyth and 
Major Elliot pressed a senior councillor, Ketshe, to state whether the paramount was 
personally involved – a request he refused.372 Yet the support proffered by the 
Mfundisweni mission school, and the personal dealings of Mhlangaso and Josiah 
Jenkins, were enough to convince them of Mqikela’s dwindling influence and his 
inability to keep these pernicious influences in check.373 As such, the implication of 
senior chiefs in the outbreaks of recent rebellions thus raised colonial concerns over 
the exercise of political authority in Pondoland. This unease was demonstrated on 21 
May 1878, when the Secretary for Native Affairs established a Commission of Inquiry 
to be headed by Blyth and Elliot. Writing to the commissioners, he listed a series of 
questions that were to be put to various Mpondo chiefs, stressing the importance of 
the ‘reliable character of the information’ upon which the government ‘may safely 
base a policy on’: 
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1. What are the existing political divisions of Pondoland and what are the relationships of the 
several chiefs to Umqikela both as regards their position and their wishes for any change? 
2. What is the actual amount of authority or influence which Umqikela, as paramount chief, 
now exercises over the Pondo chiefs? 
3. Who are the chiefs who have actual authority over the mouth of the St. John's River?  
4. What is the disposition of the various chiefs as regards the English or Colonial Government 
and their inclination to be in more direct and intimate relations with us?374 
 
That policy was, of course, the 1878 proclamation. As can be seen, the list of inquiries 
cited above undoubtedly reflected the principal ambitions of Frere’s imperial edict 
outlined in the introduction to this chapter. Chief among them was the annexation 
of Port St. John; so too was an awareness of the need to cultivate politically profitable 
alliances with particular chiefs in order to facilitate it. Yet concomitant to these 
interests were more fundamental questions about the proper workings of power in 
Pondoland. As such, Blyth and Elliot were tasked with teasing out both the pre-
existing political divisions and nature of the relationships that bound the polity’s 
various chiefdoms to the royal house. With a focus on both the personality and the 
institution of the paramountcy, they further sought to determine precisely how much 
authority was wielded by Mqikela himself. Given these questions, it is clear that the 
desire to purchase the port was motivated by more than commercial considerations. 
Indeed, this moment of imperial intervention was equally predicated upon an 
increasing interest in the structures of Mpondo governance.  
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In this respect, the inquiry was largely typical of the types of initiatives 
undertaken by colonial officials across the Transkei. The Griffiths-Ayliff-Grant 
Commission (1872), the Griqualand East Commission (1876), the Tembuland 
Commission (1883) and, most famously, the Commission on Native Law and Custom 
(1883); numerous historians have rightly noted how the late nineteenth century 
witnessed a flurry of reports and investigations into the daily workings of “native” life 
and “tribal” society.375 Administrators expended much bureaucratic energy in 
codifying those practices deemed central to the regulation of African social, 
productive, gender and generational relations.376 These ethnographic exercises 
likewise raised questions regarding local systems of land tenure, topography and the 
boundaries that separated the numerous polities that comprised the Transkei. In 
turn, this expansion of colonial knowledge encouraged the enumeration of local 
populations and spurred the production of increasingly detailed maps and surveys of 
African territory in order to rationalise what was presumed to be a disorderly political 
landscape composed of multiple and overlapping sovereignties.377 As Paul Nugent 
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notes, these cartographic constructions purported to represent African spatial 
realities.378 Instead, they demonstrated a colonial reorganisation of space predicated 
on the drawing of fixed administrative boundaries between formerly independent 
chiefdoms and their separation and sub-division into politically centralised and 
culturally cohesive communities.379 Such innovations revealed a territorial 
conception of the “tribe” as a bounded and internally coherent unit – a perspective 
which pervaded the re-production of information about numerous African societies 
and which reflected colonial concerns over the control of newly incorporated 
subjects.  
Such apprehensions clearly informed the preparations made by officials prior 
to Frere’s proclamation. On the eve of annexation, the Cape authorities considered 
an invasion of Pondoland, requesting the mobilisation of colonial troops from 
Natal.380 Meeting at Ixopo in mid-August 1878, they hoped that the marching of a 
force through the country would be enough to prevent a resort to arms by Mpondo 
chiefs.381 Under the charge of Field Marshall Sir Henry Evelyn Wood, it was proposed 
that two columns be sent to Mfundisweni whilst a third would march on Mqikela’s 
kraal. In the event that he resisted or fled, an additional company was to be sent by 
sea to occupy the port by force. Clear instructions were to be issued to local 
communities: “natives” were told to remain in their kraals; local headmen were 
instructed to report unarmed to the Commanding Officer as the columns entered 
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their respective districts; and a warning was issued that any group of twelve men or 
more, who approached the troops and were considered to be armed, would be 
shot.382  
It was in the context of such potential instability that the notion of a 
partitioned Pondoland thus gained political saliency. The creation of a stable border 
and the concentration of power in a self-contained West was undoubtedly looked 
upon as the most effective means of curtailing the seditious activities of the East. This 
territorial conception of the “tribe” likewise encouraged the annexation of the 
Xesibe, as officials sought to identify them as a clearly distinguishable – and easily 
separable – chiefdom in its own right. As noted above, these considerations were in 
part rooted in a recognition of the heterogeneity of the Mpondo polity and the extent 
to which pre-existing political divisions were likely to determine the chiefly reaction 
to the colonial cause. Reflecting an acknowledgement of the variegated relationships 
that connected these multiple constituencies to the royal house, these inquiries 
represented a nuanced investigation into the constitution of power in Pondoland. The 
re-presentation of this information, however, failed to reflect this dynamism. As can 
be seen below (Fig. 2.1), the political plurality of Pondoland was collapsed into a 
singular list that registered those sub-groups and chiefs most likely to assist Mqikela 
in the outbreak of war and the numerical strength of each. A static conception of the 
“tribe” was clearly discernible, as the myriad groups that comprised the country were 
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presented as a series of individually distinguishable units that paid little attention to 
their internal configuration or the nature of their connection to the Great Place: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Clifton Crais makes clear, such abstractions were ultimately designed to 
render African communities more cognisable to colonial officials; in the nineteenth 
century, they represented a model of tribal society upon which the state could act 
surgically in order to undermine chiefly authority.383 His claims are largely based upon 
James C. Scott’s concept of ‘legibility’: the arrangement of subject populations in 
ways designed to simplify ‘the classic state functions of taxation, conscription and the 
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Figure 2.1: ‘List of the fighting men of the Amapondo north of the St. John’s River, who 
could answer the war cry at once, if called upon by the Great Chief’. (KCL) Papers of Field 
Marshall Sir Henry Evelyn Wood, ‘Memorandum on an advance into Pondoland, 4 
August 1878’, MS. WOO., Series KCM-89/9, File 25.  
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prevention of rebellion’.384 Central to this project was the utilisation of what Scott 
terms ‘state simplifications’: tools contrived to reduce the complexity of subject 
societies to specific categories of colonial knowledge in order to enable the colonial 
administrator to “see” those aspects of “tribal” life that interested him most.385  
In this instance, officials sought to gauge the precise configuration of political 
authority in Pondoland. Lurking behind these figures was thus a presumed correlation 
between the fighting strength of each clan and their propensity to support the 
paramount. As such, the otherwise fluid bonds of political community were 
repackaged as an empirical category of colonial knowledge intended to measure the 
extent of loyalty across the country. Yet as this chapter will later demonstrate, the 
numerical muscle of the Cwera (1000), for example, did not translate into an 
automatic endorsement of the royal house; Mpondo political subjecthood was far 
more dynamic than this series of “facts” suggested. As Scott rightly notes, this 
information was necessarily impersonal; these “tribal” aggregations could never fully 
account for the particular circumstances of the various individuals that comprised 
them.386 Yet however divorced this numerical information was from the realities of 
Mpondo political life, it was nevertheless viewed by officials as crucial to colonial 
conquest. After all, ‘to count was to know and to know was to rule’.387 
Clearly, the collation of such knowledge was often undertaken in the 
moments preceding any likely intervention within Mpondo society itself. Another 
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example occurred in 1890, following the outbreak of conflict between Nqwiliso and 
the Khonjywayo chief, Gwadiso. Given its potential to precipitate wider instability, 
the issue of Mpondo governance once again piqued the interests of colonial 
administrators. This time, the inquiries took the form of a map, hand-drawn on 23 
November 1889 by L.G.H Tainton, a Native Location Inspector in King William’s Town 
(Fig. 2.2).388 Accompanying this cartographic construction was a letter addressed to 
the Cape Prime Minister, Gordon Sprigg, in which Tainton explained how he sought 
to provide ‘a better knowledge of the physical condition of [a] country which the 
colony may become interested in’.389 His comments perhaps reveal the paucity of 
technical information held by colonial officials regarding Western Pondoland.390 As 
Tainton himself acknowledged, his map was largely the product of local information 
provided to him by William Strachan, a farmer and speculator located on the East 
bank of the Mthatha River (Fig. 2.2: A). Strachan was well acquainted with various 
Mpondo chiefs, having first arrived in the country in 1854.391 A trusted individual, he 
enjoyed the confidence of the British Resident and Nqwiliso alike in mediating 
matters of government interest.392   
                                                          
388 There is no biographical information about Tainton provided in the material found at Cory 
Library, Rhodes University. However, his employment as a Native Location Inspector in King 
William’s Town is confirmed by the testimony he provided at the South African Native Affairs 
Commission on 6 November 1903. See Redding, Sorcery and Sovereignty, p. 161.  
389 (CL) ‘Notes for attachment to Tainton’s map showing the occupation of Pondoland by the various 
tribes’, in L.G.H Tainton to Sprigg, 1 January 1890, 1890, MS. 10. 155. 
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31: Chief Magistrate, Tembuland to Secretary for Native Affairs, 1 February 1886.  
391 Basil Holt, Where Rainbirds Call: A Record of the Transkei, (London: Hale, 1973), p. 84. 
392 (CL) ‘Notes for attachment to Tainton’s map showing the occupation of Pondoland by the various 
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Figure 2.2: Tainton map of Western Pondoland, 1889. (CL) ‘Rough plan showing the different native clans in Pondoland West, their 
respective position and approximate strength of each regiment’, drawn by L.G.H Tainton, 23 November 1889, MAP: S (64)a. 
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Using Strachan’s insights, Tainton described the physical terrain of the 
country; he noted how the land surrounding the Jolo clan functioned as a ‘cover for 
the nation’, and how various Mpondo communities would drive their stock into the 
woodland if pursued by an enemy (Fig. 2.2: B). Such was its impenetrability that once 
inside, conflict was virtually impossible; ‘inter-tribal fights rarely result[ed] in the loss 
of life or stock’. It was perhaps this abundance of forest land that accounted for the 
location of Nqwiliso’s son, Bokleni (Fig. 2.2: C); his close proximity to a key natural 
resource arguably underpinned the political and socio-economic pre-eminence of 
the royal house. More importantly, Tainton also suggested the potential for conflict 
in the south-east. He highlighted the mixed settlement of various Fingo, Bomvana, 
Gqanda and Tshomane populations (Fig. 2.2: D) and their occupation of land along 
the Tembu border, which allowed numerous thieves ‘to dodge about between the 
two countries as circumstances suit them’. 
To some extent, Tainton’s correspondence revealed a nuanced inquiry into 
the practical exercise of power in Western Pondoland. His identification of its 
numerous topographical features arguably aimed to demonstrate how political 
authority was in part conditioned by the challenges posed by political geography.393 
Yet this was an also an investigation designed to inform Transkeian administrators of 
the likely challenges they would face should they decide to annex the region. To that 
end, Tainton represented his information in cartographic form, thereby providing a 
synoptic view of Western Pondoland in order to better facilitate the process of 
colonial conquest.394 Of course, his efforts compared poorly to those increasingly 
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technical trigonometrical and cadastral surveys which aimed at the greater 
mensuration of African territory. In many respects, it resembled the much earlier 
surveys undertaken by military authorities at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, where the depiction of key rivers and topography stood in stark contrast to 
the ill-defined spaces of still-occupied lands.395 
Nevertheless, the map certainly sought to subject the country to the ‘Cape’s 
own spatial rules’.396 Indeed, permeating Tainton’s cartographic construction was a 
bounded notion of the “tribe” as central to the stable governance of the region. His 
pointing to the politically fractious condition along the country’s south-eastern 
border, for example, undoubtedly served to highlight the jurisdictional ambiguities 
that accompanied the intermingling of various “tribal” groups. As such, he implicitly 
underlined the need for a fixed administrative boundary to rationalise this otherwise 
disorderly landscape. Of even greater concern was the unfolding conflict between 
the Khonjwayo (Fig. 2.2: E) and the royal house. Tainton noted how Gwadiso’s 
people, ‘the bravest section of the Pondo tribe’, had recently been harassed by the 
Western Paramount and ‘alienated from his allegiance…which must, sooner or later, 
react upon him’.397 
It was in the context of potential violence that Tainton’s map was therefore 
proffered; the cartographic representation of Strachan’s local insights was designed 
to meet an increasing colonial concern over the stability of Western Pondoland. It 
was for this reason that the map depicted the country’s composite clans as separately 
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located communities; in suggesting their sole occupation of specific tracts of land, 
these soon-to-be subject populations were “closeted” as internally coherent and 
entirely unconnected entities.398 This perspective was bolstered by the typically 
standardised manner in which these principal groups were identified; noting the 
name of the senior chief whilst registering the numerical strength of each again 
implied a homogeneity that ignored their internal composition or intra-Mpondo 
relations. To be sure, this portrayal was partially accurate; the historically wide 
dispersal of these various groups owed itself to longer-term patterns of low-density 
settlement and the decentralisation which characterised the polity from the mid-
nineteenth century. Yet Tainton’s correspondence made no mention of these issues. 
Instead, his map arguably echoed the bounded logic of territorial division that had 
elsewhere informed the demarcation of African land into numerous Native 
Locations.399 Consequently, it represented more an ambition for future governance 
than it did an informed understanding of the local state of affairs.  
These broad inquiries arguably belied a narrow interest in the consolidation 
of colonial rule. Wood’s memorandum sought the enumeration of various Mpondo 
populations in order to better gauge the likelihood of armed rebellion. Likewise, 
Tainton’s map aimed at the reconstruction of the region through cartographic 
depiction as a means of preparing for its potential incorporation into the Cape. 
Underpinned by a European “will to know”, these initiatives demonstrated the 
essential modernity of the early colonial state. ‘Rooted in the revolutionary changes 
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of the Enlightenment’, the reliance on maps and statistical data illustrated the 
importance of information to the process of Transkeian state-formation.400 The 
production of such reified knowledge imbued policymakers with the confidence to 
rationally re-order Pondoland as a necessary pre-requisite to its formal conquest. In 
doing so, these undertakings arguably reflected the increasing bureaucratisation of 
colonial power itself, providing the basis upon which officials sought to regulate the 
governance of newly colonised communities. As Crais maintains, it was precisely 
these efforts to render subject societies more cognisable that enabled an otherwise 
fledgling administration to conquer the numerous polities that comprised the 
Transkei.401 In this sense, these initiatives thus functioned as important technologies 
of rule that were just as central to the subjugation of African populations as the 
exercise British military might.402  
Whether or not the state was able to effect the change it sought to achieve 
was, however, a separate issue. Whilst Crais rightfully draws attention to the logic of 
domination that pervaded these technologies of rule, he himself states that ‘what is 
much less understood is how [this] ‘will to know’…unfolded on the ground’.403 This 
was a question largely ignored by colonial officials themselves; their initiatives 
purposefully paid little attention to the actual workings of Mpondo socio-political life. 
Instead, they served as the idealised representations towards which it was to be 
transformed. Underpinned by a bounded conception of the “tribe”, Mpondo subjects 
and space alike were reduced to simplistic stereotypes that presumed an 
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uncomplicated reality more amenable to empirical identification and, by extension, 
colonial control. Such abstractions implied the disruptive remaking of African 
communities in order to satisfy the demands of Transkeian state-formation. Yet what 
were effectively fictitious facts on paper did not automatically translate into change 
on the ground.404 Indeed, the implementation of these formalised schemes of 
intervention was often inherently unstable, not least because they were predicated 
on presumptions that were largely divorced from, yet entirely dependent upon, the 
operation of power and political authority within Mpondo society itself.   
Tainton’s map demonstrates this point. Undertaken in light of the outbreak 
of Mpondo-Khonjwayo hostilities, it aimed to facilitate the territorial division of 
Western Pondoland in order to avoid further instability. To that end, he turned to 
William Strachan, upon whose local knowledge the map was largely based. Yet 
Strachan’s insights were, ironically, born from the very tensions the state sought to 
resolve. His residence in the country owed itself to the Khonjwayo chief, Gwadiso, 
who had granted him a huge tract of land measuring approximately 1040 hectares in 
present-day Hluleka, as a gift for saving the clan from Mpondo attack in 1860.405 In 
order to avoid a likely slaughter, Strachan was alleged to have paid Nqwiliso one 
hundred head of cattle in order to induce him to lay down his arms.406 In addition, he 
had been allocated a number of farms along the Mthatha River by the paramount 
himself, which were intended to serve as a protective barrier against the 
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neighbouring Tembu.407 Known affectionately as “The Peacemaker”, Strachan 
occupied an important diplomatic role in mediating the tensions that existed within 
Western Pondoland. In numerous ways he thus sought to quell the potential for 
violence, as he continuously pointed out to the paramount that further strife would 
likely lead to annexation.408  
Given that his personal fortunes were intimately tied to the relationships that 
he had cultivated with both Nqwiliso and Gwadiso, it is clear that Strachan sought to 
prevent, rather than facilitate, the process of colonial conquest. Nevertheless, his 
personal knowledge provided the basis for a map which intended to serve as a 
blueprint for the future governance of the country. But whilst Tainton’s undertaking 
envisaged the better regulation of intra-Mpondo political relations, Strachan’s 
insights in fact highlighted the longer-standing rivalry that existed between the 
Khonjwayo and the royal house. This fractious dynamic could hardly be settled 
through state-sponsored initiatives alone; indeed, colonial interventions had long 
been instrumentalised by their mutual antipathy.  
In December 1873, for example, the then Western Paramount, Ndamase, was 
alleged to have called on Gwadiso to assist in the theft of over 170 head of cattle 
from the Thembu chief, Ngangelizwe. Such action involved the deliberate violation 
of the Thembu-Mpondo border, recently established in 1872.409 Yet when 
questioned, Ndamase denied any knowledge of the incident. Instead, he blamed the 
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Khonjwayo and actively encouraged the Thembu to retaliate.410 More recently, 
Gwadiso had conspired to undermine Nqwiliso’s efforts to assist the Cape in the 
capture of the Gcaleka chief, Kreli. Whilst the paramount had promised to prevent 
any rebels from entering his country, it transpired that Kreli had been hiding in a kloof 
near the Khonjwayo chief’s kraal for over a month.411 Gwadiso informed Strachan, 
who in turn communicated the news to the government. Unsurprisingly, officials 
ordered the Khonjwayo to attack the rebels; instead, they engaged ‘in a long parlay 
with Kreli and his followers’ and staged a ‘mock capture’ of the chief, which ‘resulted 
in brisk firing on both sides’ whilst the rebels made their escape.412 When colonial 
troops arrived the next day, they reported that ‘Nqwiliso [was] naturally very angry’ 
whilst Gwadiso – in a ‘state of fear’ – refused to meet with the paramount.413 
Such elaborate accusations serve as a useful reminder that official schemes 
of intervention were implemented within a context that was politically pre-defined 
by the affinities and animosities that existed between Mpondo clans. As shown 
above, the state often tried to “make sense” of these complex relationships, 
rationalising African life and land in order to better facilitate the process of colonial 
conquest. Predicated on a bounded notion of the “tribe”, these initiatives usually 
paid little attention to what Michael Herzfeld has termed ‘the practicalities of 
interaction between official rationality and daily existence’.414 As the examples above 
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demonstrate, it was the enmity that existed between the Khonjwayo and Western 
Mpondo that determined the political saliency of these interventions; different 
colonial borders were either instrumentalised or ignored by both in the pursuit of 
political and personal exigencies. 
Crucially, this dynamic did not operate in isolation; it was tied to a much wider 
network of intra-Mpondo relations that reached across the region. Hardly uniform or 
static, these connections were responsive to any likely change in the balance of 
power in Pondoland. Frere’s imperial edict provided one such occasion; it sought to 
circumscribe the political influence of the Eastern paramountcy through the drawing 
of new jurisdictional boundaries. Yet as will be seen, its promulgation instead 
precipitated a contentious conversation about the exercise of authority that 
ultimately re-qualified its impact in contradictory and unexpected ways.  
 
The Politics of Belonging in a Partitioned Pondoland: 
Emphasising the centrality of intra-Mpondo relations in determining the saliency of 
political boundaries provides an important means of highlighting African 
engagement with those interventions usually deemed “invented” or imposed.415 
Whilst these initiatives aimed at the standardised shrinking and centralisation of 
chiefly jurisdictions, this attempted “creation of tribalism" was no uniform 
experience.416 Rather, it was one simultaneously rooted in, and reflective of, the 
factional composition of the Mpondo polity itself. Acknowledging this heterogeneity 
arguably necessitates contextualising these processes amongst the pre-existing 
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power relations that comprised the region. Doing so thus requires, as David Newman 
notes, that the historian identify precisely which groups sought the construction of 
particular political boundaries and who “lost out” as a result of this “enclosing”.417   
Clearly, the obvious “loser” was Mqikela himself, who refused to recognise 
the transaction between Nqwiliso and Frere. Following the annexation of Port St. 
John, he allegedly wrote to Oxley-Oxland and offered to pay 1000 head of cattle in 
order that the British might rescind its claims over the Mzimvubu River – an offer that 
was firmly rejected.418 Even in 1882, the paramount attempted to deny Nqwiliso’s 
right to sell any portion of land that lay within the boundary estbalished by the 1844 
treaty. On these grounds he considered the territory as ‘his rightful property’ and 
argued that for the ‘Cape…to take personal possession of [the] land…[was] a great 
injustice…in his eyes and in the eyes of his people’.419 Whilst such formal reproaches 
were unsuccessful, Mqikela nevertheless persisted. On 30 December 1884, Philip 
Charles and Nqekelo, senior councillors under Nqwiliso, complained that he had 
granted land in Western Pondoland to Pemberton White, a friend of the Great 
Place.420 The councillors argued that ‘no trader has a right to suppose he has 
land…unless he has a written document to that effect from Nqwiliso’, who in turn 
wished to inform the government that Mqikela had no rights over his country. 
Nqekelo was particularly scathing: ‘White is a thief…Who does not know that the land 
on the West side of the Umzimvubu belongs to Nqwiliso? If [they] know that the 
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land…does not belong to [him] why do they not demand the thousand pounds paid 
by the Government?421 
 However contested this transaction was, these examples suggest an 
increased hardening of the jurisdictional boundaries of Western Pondoland. 
Obviously, the clear “winner” in all of this was Nqwiliso, whose sense of sovereignty 
was naturally emboldened. Whilst he owed his position to his recognition by colonial 
officials, the chief often exerted his authority over them. In July 1879, he strongly 
refused the appointment of a British Resident for the West; he accused the 
government of ‘forcing a resident upon us without consult[ation]’, noting that their 
introduction usually served as a punishment for those who had committed an 
offence against the Cape.422 Given his willingness to sell Port St. John, as well as the 
assistance rendered during the recent rebellions, Nqwiliso perhaps reasonably 
assumed that his acts of loyalty had doubled as an investment in his own 
independence.  
Certainly, his reluctance was born from his objection to the actions of 
Hamilton Hope, Resident Magistrate in neighbouring Qumbu, who had intervened to 
resolve several disputes along the Mpondo-Mpondomise border.423 This north-
western region had long been contested since the establishment of an administrative 
boundary in 1861, through which the Western Mpondo alleged the loss of over 30 
000 acres of land (Fig. 2.2: F).424 For Nqwiliso, however, these conflicts assumed 
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greater significance since the partition implied the centralisation of his authority 
within the country. To be sure, one official noted how the paramount saw Hope’s 
actions as ‘an interference in the powers he now possessed…in the government of 
his people and in the management of matters in dispute between his own people 
and those of the adjoining tribes’. Consequently, the Chief Magistrate of Tembuland 
was instructed to inform Nqwiliso that the introduction of a British Resident was 
intended not ‘to supersede [his] authority as Chief but to support it by acting as [his] 
friend and adviser’.425 
This overriding of official intervention demonstrated the willingness of the 
Cape to appease an ally deemed central to the mollification of an otherwise volatile 
Transkei.426 Yet this support was not unconditional. For all his bravado, Nqwiliso’s 
position ultimately depended on his ability to assert control over his newly 
designated subject populations. Given the politically decentralised nature of the 
Mpondo polity, however, this objective was easier to envisage than it was to realise. 
Indeed, an examination of the disputes Hope sought to resolve reveals the role of a 
particular chief, Valelo, in the controversies that occurred along the colonial border. 
A grandson of Faku and relative of the royal house, Valelo occupied land somewhere 
below the Qumbu boundary, west of the Tina and north of the Tsitsa rivers, in what 
would become Libode district (Fig. 2.2: G).427 His location at the fringes of the polity 
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was typical of the tendency to settle royal family members in areas where the 
presence of the paramountcy was less visible. As Beinart notes, the placement was 
designed to attract followers – and by extension, cattle and military resources – to 
the Great Place.428 Whilst Valelo’s authority obviously derived from his relation to 
the royal house, his autonomy was thus locally embedded through his control over 
people, property and political community.    
Such independence undoubtedly underpinned the long-term rivalry between 
Valelo and the Cwera chief, Siyoyo. Several sources attest to their violent encounters, 
as both engaged in mutual stock thefts and cattle raids.429 On 10 December 1883, 
however, their quarrels spilled over the colonial border as 300 of Siyoyo’s followers, 
who had entered Valelo’s territory on a raid, were fired upon and pushed into the 
Mount Frere district. Several men were killed. Remonstrated by the local community, 
both parties replied that ‘there was no reason they should not come onto 
government ground as they had no quarrel with the government’.430 Their disputes 
thus had the potential to incite British subjects to take up arms. Indeed, on 11 
December, Siyoyo’s men entered Qumbu, firing on local residents that they 
mistakenly took for Valelo’s people.431 Learning of the incident, Blyth wrote directly 
to Nqwiliso ‘to beg against…armed bodies of Pondos crossing into British Territory’ 
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September 1913.  
428 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 12. 
429 For a few detailed examples, see the summary of correspondence in G. 53 – ‘88: Résumé of 
Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Pondoland, Part II, 1888, (Cape Town: Government 
Printer), pp. 11-15. 
430 (CA) CMT-1/23: Resident Magistrate, Mount Frere to Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, 12 
December 1883. 
431 (CA) CMT-1/23: Resident Magistrate, Qumbu to Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, 13 December 
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and to warn him that ‘if such action is persistent, we will have to adopt force to expel 
the armed parties’.432 
These examples reflect the truism that the “state’s” authority was weakest at 
its territorial margins; the desire for stability, shared by Nqwiliso and the Cape alike, 
was never evenly imposed within its jurisdictional confines but was continuously re-
qualified in various context-specific ways.433 Whilst the demarcation of the colonial 
boundary was designed to better regulate intra-Mpondo relations, in this instance it 
was the long-standing enmity between Valelo and the Cwera which determined its 
political saliency. This rivalry was hardly superficial. Predicated on the attempted 
accumulation of important socio-economic resources, such conflict served to 
highlight both how and why power was locally constituted and contested. 
Clearly, the partition intended to consolidate Nqwiliso’s rule by hardening 
Pondoland’s jurisdictional boundaries. Yet this centralisation of political authority 
could do little to quell the potential for cross-border violence in those otherwise 
autonomous areas of the country. Moreover, in certain regions the division of 
territory in fact increased the likelihood of conflict. On 5 February 1879, Siyoyo sent 
messengers to Mqikela claiming that Nqwiliso was preparing to attack the Cwera. 
The dispute was born from the paramount’s insistence that he had been authorised 
by Oxley-Oxland to resolve the fighting between the Cwera, Kwalo and Cwungule, 
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who had ‘been carrying on a bitter internecine war during the last four years’.434 As 
can be seen, these groups occupied land along the new East/West boundary (Fig. 2.2: 
H). Siyoyo, however, refuted this political division: ‘The country I live in is not mine. I 
am only its keeper. Umqikela is the owner…[he] is the proper person to…reprove me 
if I do wrong…If [he] has given away what you say he has, let [him] tell me’.435 
It was this failure to acknowledge Nqwiliso’s claims that provoked the threat 
of future attack, as one messenger warned the Cwera that soon ‘the country will be 
full of bullets’.436 Siyoyo’s reluctance to concede the recent changes in political 
administration again demonstrates how the saliency of such interventions was 
dependent on the longer-term operation of power and authority within Pondoland. 
In this context, his complaint represented more than his resentment at Nqwiliso’s 
interference in his personal affairs. Rather, it illustrated his refusal to recognise the 
creation of a new locus of authority west of the Mzimvubu River. Indeed, despite his 
rivalry with Valelo, both appeared to share a common indifference towards the 
Western paramountcy. Like Valelo, Siyoyo’s ties had been historically forged with the 
East. However, the Cwera were bound to the Eastern paramountcy not by blood, but 
as a result of the protection they sought from Faku in the 1820s.437 In return, the 
Cwera were required to recognise his authority through the provision of military 
support to the Great Place in the outbreak of war. As Siyoyo explained, ‘the Cwera 
                                                          
434 (CA) CMT-1/58: British Resident to Chief Magistrate, Tembuland, 6 February 1879. Enclosure, 
‘Notes of an Interview’, 5 February 1879; (CA) CMT-1/58: British Resident to Under Secretary of 
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have always gone out with Umqikela’s army…[but] in the war between Ndamasi’s 
army and the Pondomise we never went out – not once’.438 
This distinction implied the seniority of the Eastern Paramount, who, 
unsurprisingly corroborated Siyoyo’s claims. Speaking with the British Resident, 
Mqikela provided the official with a history of Cwera-Mpondo relations, recalling how 
Faku had settled Siyoyo’s father, Mbeki, between the Mthatha and Bashee rivers 
following their forced removal as a result of Zulu raids.439 Once the boundaries of the 
Mpondo kingdom had been secured, the Cwera were then recalled back to their 
lands on the banks of the Mzimvubu, which were now placed under Ndamase. But as 
Mqikela asked, ‘whoever heard of Umbeki avowing Ndamase as his Chief?’ Indeed, 
he was adamant that those re-settled groups owed no allegiance to the Western 
royal house since the Mzimvubu had ‘never been recognised as a boundary and until 
very recently not a single Pondo had heard of such a thing’. Unsurprisingly, his 
argument aimed to undermine the authority of Nqwiliso, who likewise claimed that 
Siyoyo occupied land that had belonged to his father, who, had re-settled the Cwera 
himself.440 
Given its contentious location along the partition, it is unsurprising that the 
Cwera’s country served as a site of conflict between Eastern and Western claims to 
rule. For Oxley-Oxland, it appeared obvious that ‘Siyoyo prefer[red] to remain under 
Umqikela [rather] than be placed in subordination to Nqwiliso’.441 Naturally, Mqikela 
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happily obliged, as he attempted to reassert his authority over his now divided 
kingdom. But despite this temporary convergence of interests, the Cwera-Mpondo 
relationship was neither necessarily harmonious nor static. After all, along with the 
Xesibe, the Cwera had been one of the first to call on the colonial government to be 
taken over as government subjects – a request that was eventually declined.442 On 
23 December 1878, the Cape’s refusal was reaffirmed as Major Elliot wrote to Siyoyo 
to personally implore him to ‘to be obedient to the commands of Nqwiliso [and] to 
claim his protection and support’.443 Whilst he had then turned to Mqikela for 
assistance, in 1879 he reversed his position following further disputes involving the 
Kwalo and Cwungule. This time, however, rumours began to circulate that Mqikela 
planned to support their respective chiefs in a joint raid to “eat up” Cwera land and 
stock. Unsurprisingly, the British Resident was far from sympathetic: ‘it is notorious 
that Siyoyo should have applied to the government…he is a man of two colours. One 
day he is white. One day he is black. One day he goes to the Government, the next 
he goes back to Umqikela. Who can say then whose man is Siyoyo?”444   
Quite simply, the answer was neither. Whilst Siyoyo highlighted the provision 
of military resources as recognition of the primacy of the Eastern paramountcy, it did 
not imply his total subordination to it. After all, the threats made regarding the theft 
of Cwera land and stock point to the socio-economic independence typically enjoyed 
by regional sub-chiefs in the late nineteenth-century.445 Given their differential 
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incorporation as ‘vassals’ of the Great Place, these distinctions underline Tom Spears’ 
call to disaggregate pre-colonial ethnic relations into their economic, social, cultural 
and political aspects.446 Colonial officials paid little attention to the subtleties of these 
variegated associations; they viewed the country’s composite clans as essentially 
bounded and culturally cohesive communities whose governance would be better 
facilitated by the drawing of fixed administrative boundaries and the consolidation 
of political authority within them. In questioning precisely ‘whose man’ Siyoyo really 
was, the British Resident thus articulated this wider belief by assuming the efficacy 
of the partition in determining the loyalties of those who resided in either East or 
West Pondoland. 
This zero-sum perspective was typical of those who assumed that the 
formalisation of new political centres could speak for entire polities.447 Yet Siyoyo’s 
actions arguably illustrate the extent to which this new jurisdictional divide could be 
instrumentalised to maintain an older autonomy. By continuously switching 
allegiances between Mqikela and Nqwiliso, the Cwera chief hoped to avoid the 
attempts of either to claim his country for themselves. These alliances were 
inherently unstable given the shifting balance of political power within Pondoland. 
Precipitated by Frere’s proclamation, this imperial edict thus forced Siyoyo to 
articulate a series of short-term affiliations that were designed to temper the 
responses of either paramount whilst maximising his independence from both. 
Hardly pre-meditated, his actions reflected the ‘brutal power calculations that 
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African leaders’ were forced to make in order to maintain their personal and political 
pre-eminence – not least amongst their own followers.448 As such, they highlighted 
the subtle manner in which sovereignty had once been ‘shared’, and political 
authority previously constituted, in this now contested region.449  
It was in those areas where the Western paramountcy had always struggled 
to impose its primacy, however, that the impact of the proclamation was most 
volatile. This was particularly evident amongst the Khonjwayo. This branch of the 
Nyawuza royal clan had always recognised the seniority of the Great House, but they 
had long objected to their attempted subordination to the West following Ndamase’s 
crossing of the Mzimvubu. This resistance was long-held, beginning with a refusal to 
pay death duties (isizi) to Nqwiliso following the death of Gwadiso’s uncle, 
Mcunukelwa.450 Such defiance was only likely to intensify following the partition and 
annexation of Port St. John. Indeed, on 25 June 1883, Gwadiso and fifty followers 
visited Oxley-Oxland in his new capacity as Resident Magistrate.451 Whilst the 
objective of the meeting was simply to ‘express [their] friendly disposition towards 
the Cape’, the official noted how the chief discussed ‘numerous political issues’ and 
even ‘identified his brother as the confidential messenger between them in the 
future’.452 Such clandestine behaviour, coupled with the knowledge of ‘Gwadiso’s 
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present and past relations with Ndamase and Nqwiliso’, thus convinced Oxley-Oxland 
that it was the Khonjwayo’s ‘wish to approach the Government from this side with a 
view…to be accepted as British subjects’.453 
Such overtures only fuelled the enmity that existed between the Khonjwayo 
and Nqwiliso. On 28 September 1887, Major Elliot reported that the paramount was 
preparing to attack Gwadiso and to ‘drive him into British Territory’ owing to his 
‘friendly feelings towards the Government’.454 It was not until the 12 March 1888, 
however, that officials noted ‘a force estimated at from four to five thousand men’ 
being prepared by Nqwiliso. One colonial report cites several conflicts during which 
officials estimated that ‘ten thousand horned cattle and one hundred horses, besides 
sheep and goats’ had been driven over the border, as well as 4000 ‘destitute 
persons’, many of whom ‘were dying…from exposure .455 Moreover, Gwadiso himself 
complained against the way in which Nqwiliso’s people ‘had acted towards his wives 
and children, stripping them of their clothes…sending them away naked, and burning 
their huts’.456  
This example highlights the violence that visited various communities as they 
sought to negotiate the fallout from Frere’s proclamation. Born from a desire to 
evade Nqwiliso’s authority, colonial officials naturally remonstrated the paramount 
and ordered him to restore the Khonjwayo to their territory; eventually Nqwiliso was 
                                                          
453 (CA) CMT-3/57: Resident Magistrate, Port St. John to Secretary for Native Affairs, 25 June 1883. 
My emphasis.  
454 G. 53 – ’88: Résumé of Correspondence Respect the Affairs of Pondoland, Part II, (Government 
Printer, 1888), p. 1.  
455 G. 53 – ’88: Résumé of Correspondence, pp. 7-9. The report also cites numerous smaller 
skirmishes in which forty-two head of cattle were stolen from Khonjwayo homesteads by marauding 
British subjects and taken back over the colonial border. See p.  1, 4, 5. 
456 G. 53 – ’88: Résumé of Correspondence, p. 6. 
140 
 
persuaded to allow all but Gwadiso and twenty principal men to return to their 
former sites.457 Yet on 25 May 1888, Major Elliot reported that Gwadiso had fled to 
the East.458 His action corroborated the rumours noted by Reverend Peter 
Hargreaves, missionary at Mfundisweni, who recounted how ‘Gwadiso and his 
brothers [had] got through to this side’ after a ‘sharp encounter’ with Nqwiliso’s men. 
According to Hargreaves, the chief claimed that ‘he had come through because he 
did not wish to see his country die’.459 Indeed, his intention was to ‘report…his 
misfortunes [to the Eastern Paramount]’ so that ‘some action [would] be taken’ 
against Nqwiliso.460 
For the missionary, this journey across the partition served to illustrate that 
‘Gwadiso belong[ed] to Quakeni [the Great House]’.461 Whilst his claim was overly 
deterministic, it nevertheless encapsulates the chief’s ability to utilise his older 
recognition of the East in order to challenge the power afforded to the West. That he 
did so after first travelling to, and treating with the British Resident, demonstrates an 
instrumentalisation of the new jurisdictional spaces created by Frere’s proclamation. 
Moreover, it also suggests that, like Siyoyo, Gwadiso was forced to forge temporary 
affiliations in moments of duress with otherwise inimical authorities in order to 
maintain an autonomy disrupted by imperial intervention. Yet whilst this shared 
ambition demonstrates how power was everywhere broadly decentralised, the 
autonomy sought by each was qualitatively different. Indeed, it was rooted in the 
                                                          
457 See G. 53 – ’88: Résumé of Correspondence, pp. 9-10. Nqwiliso had also requested a fine of 1000 
head of cattle, but following negotiations with Major Elliot this was reduced to one hundred.  
458 G. 53 – ’88: Résumé of Correspondence, p. 10. 
459 (UCT) Stanford Papers, Rev. Peter Hargreaves to Stanford, 1 June 1888, File BC293-B84-52 
460 (UCT) Stanford Papers, Rev. Peter Hargreaves to Stanford, 23 May 1888, File BC293-B84-54. 
461 (UCT) Stanford Papers, Rev. Peter Hargreaves to Stanford, 23 May 1888, File BC293-B84-54. 
141 
 
specific relationships that bound the Khonjwayo and Cwera to the royal house and 
was reflected by their geographical location. For the former, size and seniority and a 
long-existing desire for self-sufficiency had found its territorial expression through 
their settlement on land furthest from the paramountcy, thereby ensuring its 
recognition without any real obligation. Conversely, the latter’s incorporation as 
‘vassals’ entailed their strategic placement by Faku on the periphery of his kingdom 
for defensive purposes.462 
In both instances, the location of settlement thus reinforced the various 
institutional arrangements that linked the paramountcy to its numerous 
peripheries.463 The formal power relations and the communal divisions and 
solidarities that existed between the Khonjwayo, Cwera and royal house, were 
largely fostered by the constraints imposed, as well as the opportunities provided by, 
the political geography of Pondoland.464 So too was the type of autonomy exercised 
by Siyoyo and Gwadiso, whose mutual rejection of Nqwiliso highlighted how power 
was locally constituted and contested in different parts of the country.465 Officials 
had sought solely to centralise authority in the West at the expense of the East. Yet 
that division entailed the simplification of a swathe of intra-Mpondo relations that 
ultimately undermined this endeavour. Hardly imposed, Frere’s edict instead 
underlined the multiple chiefly jurisdictions that had long comprised the country; 
moreover, it was both resisted and re-qualified by various communities as they 
instrumentalised or ignored the partition altogether. Such varied responses not only 
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highlighted the heterogeneity of the Mpondo polity. They also suggest that the 
proclamation could only function at best as a ‘utopian claim’ - one predicated on the 
attempted redrawing of Pondoland’s political boundaries but which fundamentally 
failed to correspond to indigenous perceptions of space and sovereignty.466  
In certain moments even Nqwiliso questioned his newfound authority. His 
support for the Cape in the capture of Gcalecka rebels, for example, was allegedly 
preceded by a payment of cattle to Mqikela ‘so that in case a war took place he might 
receive assistance from his paramount’.467 Moreover, given the controversies 
precipitated by the partition, officials themselves remained constantly concerned by 
the prospect of Mpondo re-unification. When Mqikela proposed to visit the grave of 
Nqwiliso’s father, Oxley-Oxland viewed it ‘as the first step 
towards…reconciliation…and [as] preparatory to their entering into an alliance 
prejudiced to our interests’.468 In 1881, he noted with similar nervousness a meeting 
of ‘the whole Pondo tribe’; apparently called to resolve a conflict between Siyoyo 
and Valelo, he nevertheless urged that ‘great vigilance and caution’ be exercised in 
monitoring the relationship between the two paramounts.469  
Such anxieties demonstrate inefficacy of European borders in trying to reduce 
these regional complexities into two essential political domains; there existed 
multiple customary or socio-economic ties that stretched across the country and 
which paid little respect to this new jurisdictional divide. As demonstrated above, 
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these various affiliations were rooted in a processes of differential incorporation that 
connected the polity’s composite communities to the Eastern royal house. These 
were most explicitly articulated through those intra-Mpondo conversations about 
the exercise of authority and subjecthood in Pondoland. Despite his deposition, this 
political dialogue arguably appeared to underline Mqikela’s position as paramount. 
In reality, however, it functioned less as a personal endorsement and more as an 
attempt to maintain the autonomy typically enjoyed by Mpondo chiefs. As will be 
seen, these discussions were likewise echoed by the Xesibe following their 
incorporation as British subjects.  
 
Authority, Autochthony and the Annexation of Xesibeland: 
Clearly, Frere’s proclamation intended to achieve what the colonial state could not – 
the stabilisation of its eastern frontier through the circumscription of an independent 
Pondoland. This intervention reflected the Cape’s wider conquest of the Transkei, 
which was predicated on the introduction of new political boundaries and the 
centralisation of rule within them. Such measures sought simultaneously to 
rationalise intra-Mpondo relations and better regulate the system of Mpondo 
governance. Attempted in part by the partition, these objectives were also to be 
realised through the annexation of Xesibeland (Fig 2.3). Doing so not only entailed 
the jurisdictional shrinking of Eastern Pondoland; it also served to undermine 
Mqikela’s authority through the extra-territorial extension of British subjecthood to 
those otherwise claimed by the Great Place.  
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Fig. 2.3: ‘Sketch map of Pondoland and the Transkeian Territories in the 1880s’, in Beinart, Political 
Economy, p. 10.   
Denied to the Xesibe in 1874, officials made their offer in light of the poor 
state of Mpondo-colonial relations in 1878. But it also reflected colonial concerns 
over the increased outbreak of stock-theft between the Xesibe and Nci – a large 
immigrant group settled by Faku following the tumult of the 1820s.470 Numerous 
sources attest to the violence of these encounters. One man, Gaqa, explained to 
Oxley-Oxland how several Mpondo men had approached his kraal and had 
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‘destroyed my grain, plough, pots, and carried away a great many of my things and 
tobacco’, firing upon his wives and children as they did so.471  
Beyond such immediate material devastation, others too recalled the ‘terrible 
atrocities’ committed against the Xesibe. On 10 August 1879, Blyth received a 
telegram detailing the murder of four women, one of whom was in labour; as Diko’s 
men approached their kraal, ‘one of the women went out and begged for 
mercy…[but] the Pondos thrust her back into the hut, set it on fire, and burnt the 
women alive’.472  
This particularly gruesome episode was no isolated incident.473 Given the 
regularity of these attacks, the Secretary for Native Affairs debated arming the 
Xesibe, whilst the British Resident recommended sending a force to defend Jojo and 
his followers.474 These considerations were unsurprising given their acceptance of 
British subjecthood. Yet the fact that it was offered in the context of such instability 
arguably underlines Turan Kayaoglu’s contention that the extension of 
extraterritorial protection was often rooted in issues of local injustice and 
lawlessness.475 Hardly imposed, it rather demonstrated how colonial expansion was 
integrated with, and dependent upon, the exercise of power within non-Western 
polities.476  
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Indeed, the outbreak of conflict forced officials to once again consider the 
question of Mpondo governance and the culpability of the royal house. Despite 
feigning ignorance, Mqikela was held personally responsible.477 For his part, the 
paramount placed the blame squarely on the Nci; at a gathering at the Great Place, 
he claimed that ‘the country shall not die because of Diko [the Nci chief]. I have 
ordered [him] to give out everything [stolen] from Jojo…if…anything is 
stolen….whether the thief is a common man or a chief, I shall kill him’.478 
His warning, however, failed to prevent further attacks. On 11 November 
1879, officials reported the theft of Xesibe cattle by the Nci; following the spoor to 
Diko’s location, their owners were met by armed men who openly admitted their 
guilt. Brazenly defying the paramount’s orders, they challenged ‘Umqikela to come 
and get [the stock] if you can’, whilst daring Jojo to ‘go to Blythe…we will not permit 
him to live on Mqikela’s land any longer, nor will we allow his magistrate to build up 
the country’.479  At first glance, their response appears contradictory. Whilst Diko’s 
men dismissed the paramount, he was simultaneously re-invoked in order to assert 
that the Xesibe, as colonial collaborators, had no right to graze cattle in Mpondo 
territory. Yet such ambiguity arguably reflected the political autonomy typically 
enjoyed by Mpondo chiefs. After all, stock-thefts and border raids often yielded 
those local resources which underpinned the personal and political pre-eminence of 
regional chiefs. Whilst these activities were increasingly criminalised by colonial 
officials, they remained fundamental features of what was a highly heterogeneous 
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and politically decentralised polity. In this sense, recognising the institution of the 
paramountcy was not inconsistent with defying the personal authority of its 
incumbent.  
Indeed, it was not Mqikela to whom the Nci commonly referred to in 
vindicating their crimes – it was his father. In reporting yet another altercation, Read 
noted that as Diko’s men fired upon the Xesibe they could be overheard shouting, 
‘You took Faku’s ground…[so] we will take your stock’ – reasoning which recalled 
their earlier settlement in the 1820s.480 When interviewed by the British Resident on 
24 June 1879, Mqikela went further: ‘the country occupied by the Xesibe…belongs to 
the Amanci. As far back as my grandfather’s time it was their country’.481 In advancing 
this argument, the paramount arguably sought to justify Nci thefts on the basis of 
their original habitation of territory that was likewise claimed by the Xesibe. But 
whilst Oxley-Oxland admitted that ‘it is true…that the Xesibes are now living in a 
country once occupied by the Amanci…it is equally true that Umqikela’s Pondos are 
now occupying the country belonging to the Xesibe from which they have driven 
Jojo’.482 
Clearly then, the conflict between Jojo and Diko’s communities was a product 
of earlier processes of conquest, migration and re-settlement that had shaped the 
Mpondo polity in previous decades. Yet this acknowledgement of past upheaval was 
noticeably absent from Nci justifications; theirs was what Peter Geschiere calls ‘an 
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insistence of having stayed still…a denial of history’.483 In doing so, Diko’s men 
arguably articulated an autochthonous claim to this particular tract of land. As 
Jeremy Prestholdt explains, such assertions represent a ‘political mode of thought in 
which entitlements are imagined to flow from historical, communal and exclusive 
relationships to territory’, which is viewed as ‘the property of a discrete cultural 
group…[to] undergird claims to rights and resources’.484 By insisting on their ‘hav[ing] 
been in a certain place first’, the Nci sought to privilege their own claims by proving 
that they pre-dated those made by Jojo and his followers.485 Emphasising their 
longer-term affiliation to ‘Faku’s house’ thus allowed them to alienate the Xesibe 
from this otherwise contested space, there by justifying the attempted appropriation 
of their property and stock.486 
Recent studies have noted the contemporary rise of autochthonous 
discourses as a significant aspect of post-1980s globalisation.487 Yet as Prestholdt 
rightly notes, ‘we should recall that other conjectures encouraged similar strategies’ 
– not least in the era of decolonisation.488 The same can also be said of the earlier 
phase of colonial expansion. Whilst scholars tend to emphasise an autochthonous 
privileging of “traditional” or essentialised ethnic identities, the ‘basic questions of 
power, inclusion and exclusion’ that it raises were equally central to those intra-
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Mpondo conversations about authority and subjecthood precipitated by Frere’s 
proclamation.489 Indeed, the Nci arguably sought to emphasise their exclusive 
entitlement to Xesibe territory precisely because of the latter’s willingness to 
facilitate the foreign annexation of Mpondo land. In this sense, their contestations 
represented less a desire for ethnic unity than it did an internal struggle over what 
Ruth Marshall-Fratani terms ‘the conditions of sovereignty’ itself.490  
Jojo’s response to these accusations demonstrates this very point. To quell 
the further potential for violence, the government had offered the Xesibe land in the 
neighbouring district of Qumbu.491 Yet they refused, arguing that other “tribes” who 
had been taken over had been allowed to remain ‘in their country’; as one councillor 
explained, ‘a chief who asks for land is one that has not land of his own’.492 Justifying 
their position, Jojo recalled the entire genealogy of Xesibe chiefs, stating that the 
tribe had never occupied a part of the country where an ancestor was not buried.493 
Doing so thus allowed him to demonstrate his own autochthonous connection to the 
land, thereby implicitly re-casting his Nci competitors as ‘latecomers’ to this now 
contested territory.494  
Given Diko’s affiliation to the Great Place, the advancement of this ancestral 
claim simultaneously served as the means by which the Xesibe could assert their 
historical independence from the royal house. Doing so required calling into question 
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the contemporary orthodoxy regarding Mpondo regional hegemony, which, as 
chapter 1 illustrated, was encapsulated by the 1844 treaty. Indeed, Jojo suggested 
that it had been ‘simply a matter of convenience to enter into [this] treaty…rather 
than with all the clans who were erroneously believed to be a tributary to the 
Pondo’.495 As a result, the Mpondo had felt entitled to encroach upon Xesibe land 
that had once reached ‘over the Umzimvubu…and across to the Umtamvuna 
Rivers…up to the Ingeli Mountain’ and had even included Mfundisweni mission 
station until 1862.496 Speaking in autochthonous terms, Jojo questioned ‘how [his] 
heritage had become the property of the Pondo chief’; after all, whilst aggression 
had long typified their treatment of the Xesibe, he was adamant that they had never 
been subordinate.497 With his own enforced recognition of Mqikela’s authority in 
1874 in mind, he noted how the Xesibe had never paid cattle to the Mpondo during 
his father and grandfather’s time.498 Rather, it was ‘Faku [who] was indebted to the 
Xesibe for his chieftainship’ owing to the actions of his grandfather, Sinama, who had 
compelled a large number of chiefs to recognise the then paramount following their 
refusal to do so.499 
Recalling these past interactions undoubtedly intended to validate Jojo’s 
claim to the land by highlighting both the historical fact of Xesibe sovereignty and, by 
extension, the limited reach of the royal house. In this way, asserting an ancestral 
autonomy served to legitimise his call to be taken over by the British authorities; 
indeed, he presented himself as ‘the first [Xesibe chief] to be subordinate; that is, 
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[by] placing [him]self under [the] Government’.500 This was not, however, successful 
in every instance. When the Chief Magistrate of East Griqualand extended the same 
offer to those Xesibe residing in the adjacent Rode Valley, he was criticised by the 
British Resident for ‘erect[ing]…a Xesibe state independent of Mqikela, an “imperium 
in imperio”, in the heart of a district which…has been recognised as Pondo territory’; 
‘should…lives be lost, the whole blame must rest with you’.501  
Clearly then, demonstrating an autochthonous connection to the ground was 
central to the extension of British subjecthood to the Xesibe. But the above 
disagreement also underlines how this extraterritorial offer was only designed to 
circumscribe, rather than undermine entirely, the Mpondo paramountcy. As I argued 
above, such a limited objective was reflective of the Cape’s own restricted capability 
to act beyond its eastern frontier; officials were fearful that more direct action might 
provoke political upheaval. Whilst tied to the wider colonisation of the Transkei, 
imperial intervention was thus offered in lieu of a colonial incursion into Mpondo 
society. In this way, the autochthonous argument between the Nci and Xesibe 
underlines Donald Moore’s contention that ‘even the most localized [sic] of struggles 
that link…ancestral rights to place…are translocally routed, not essentially rooted’.502 
Put another way, whilst their dispute concerned the original inhabitation of a 
particular tract of land, this issue had been precipitated by Frere’s proclamation.  
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 To be sure, at a meeting with colonial officials on 30 August 1882, the 
Mpondo “Prime Minister”, Mhlangaso, refuted Jojo’s ability to offer his land to the 
Government. Speaking in front of 200 Mpondo subjects, he asked the Cape to 
‘consider this matter as if there was a…British subject wishing to join another chief 
together with the country he occupies’.503 Invoking the differential incorporation of 
multiple clans into the polity, he asserted that ‘there are many…chiefs…desirous of 
coming under the Pondos but we say they must come personally and not with their 
land…if a man amongst the Europeans wanted to do…as Jojo has done, he would be 
termed a rebel and not be allowed to take the country with him’. Supporting his 
argument, he cited the 1844 treaty and the Griffiths-Ayliff-Grant Commission (1872), 
stating that ‘the government knows the extent of land in Pondoland…You have 
documents…which will corroborate this’. Moreover, whatever Jojo’s claim to an 
ancestral autonomy, he had since recognised Mqikela’s paramountcy in 1874. As a 
result, he was simply one of ‘many petty chiefs, some of them higher than Jojo, but 
all of the[m]…under Umqikela’.504 
 Mhlangaso’s statement clearly intended to negate the Xesibe appeal to be 
taken over by the British by countering their autochthonous claim to land. This 
entailed proffering a competing conceptualisation of the long-term relationship 
between the two that confirmed Jojo’s submission to the Mpondo. In doing so, his 
argument encapsulated Sara Berry’s contention that ‘competition…among African 
elites [often] fostered debates over the legitimacy of competing claims to power 
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which turned on multiple interpretations of history’.505 These disagreements were 
unlikely to be resolved, not least because Mqikela reportedly feared that any 
settlement would serve as his ‘acknowledging their position as British subjects, and 
their right to the ground on which they are now living’.506 But in many respects, this 
was beside the point. Debates over Pondoland’s political past, and the authenticity 
of autochthonous claims to land, were not designed to proffer a resolution; as Kevin 
Dunn suggests, they often functioned ‘to obscure other cleavages…[in an attempt] 
to achieve a degree of certainty and security’.507 
Indeed, however limited Frere’s proclamation was in undermining the 
paramountcy, it had undeniably precipitated instability in both East and West. That 
this was manifested through the contentious conversations concerning the exercise 
of authority and subjecthood is significant. As Berry again notes, ‘it was the process 
of debate, rather than any particular interpretation, which shaped the exercise of 
power and…access to resources in rural areas’.508 In this instance, the contestation 
over the past configuration of intra-Mpondo relations had been sparked by the 
outbreak of violence between the Nci and Xesibe. Whether emblematic of a regional 
or ancestral autonomy, this conflict was arguably typical of the decentralised and 
heterogeneous nature of the polity. In this way, the attempted enforcement of 
Xesibe subordination by the Great Place embodied a political centralisation that ran 
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counter to the way in which power was conventionally exercised. As such, it was 
likely to only cause further unrest. 
Certainly, from early 1882 the Cape began to report particularly violent 
encounters between Xesibe and Mpondo communities. On 17 March, Mhlangaso 
reported a murder in the Tonti Forest – a dense woodland that fell between the 
two.509 Brought before officials, the local headman, Gaga, explained how the Xesibe 
had been confronted by men armed with ‘shields, assegais and guns’, but given their 
status as British subjects, had ‘followed the orders of the Government…and acted 
only in self-defence’.510 For them, this was hardly homicide; instead, it was a 
tempered response to a coordinated attack. Indeed, Gaga recalled that whilst the 
corpse of the victim had remained, ‘the following morning two mounted Pondos 
came and took his gun’.511  
Further investigation revealed that the ringleader behind this attempted 
assault was an Mpondo named Moni, who had been sent by Mhlangaso to interfere 
with Xesibe settlers in the region.512 His crimes were numerous; on one occasion, a 
local man, Gwayingina, recalled how he had been surrounded by eleven armed men 
from Moni’s kraal as he was cultivating ground near his village. Whilst he explained 
he was in Jojo’s country, the men told him that they would till his land and reap his 
grains, and forced him to return home. When he returned the next day, he saw up to 
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fifty armed Mpondo cultivating his plot, who then began firing at him as he 
attempted to challenge them.513 Such encounters were commonplace; indeed, Jojo 
complained that forty-nine Xesibe villages had been burnt down since they had 
accepted British subjecthood.514 Whilst colonial officials doubted their innocence in 
every instance, the Xesibe chief nevertheless felt aggrieved enough to question 
whether ‘our own magistrate, after governing us for five years, [had]…yet become 
acquainted with us…do they not know…that we have obeyed the orders of the 
Government?’515 
Such frustration indicates the limited success of Frere’s proclamation in 
consolidating the Xesibe as British subjects. Moreover, it also betrays the continued 
prominence of Mqikela’s paramountcy, as followers of the royal house sought to 
ensure that this contested space remained under Mpondo jurisdiction. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the Cape could only think of one suitable solution: the establishment 
of a boundary between these hostile communities. In April 1883, a commission was 
appointed by the government to define the border between the Mpondo and Xesibe 
– ‘with or without Mqikela’s consent’.516 Reviving an idea first aired in 1881, the 
commissioners, who included both Oxley-Oxland and Charles Brownlee, were 
instructed to emphasise the permanency of this boundary to the Great Place – a 
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proposal that was promptly dismissed. In a telegram to the Native Affairs 
Department on 22 April, the British Resident described how the paramount would 
not allow Faku’s land to be ‘cut up’; likewise, Mhlangaso decried the initiative as a 
deliberate attempt to divide Pondoland between Mpondo and ‘rebel subjects’.517 
Their complaints were, however, in vain. By 26 May, the commission had 
selected a line to run across the north of the country – one that used its topographical 
features in order to cause as little disturbance as possible (Fig. 2.4). Despite the 
antagonism between the paramountcy and state, the resulting demarcation was 
surprisingly favourable to the Mpondo. As the commissioners reported, the new 
boundary incorporated ninety-three gardens still in Xesibe possession into 
Pondoland; so too was the Dambeni Valley, ‘from which the Xesibes were expelled 
in 1879’. By contrast, only twelve Mpondo gardens were to be ‘thrown on to the 
Xesibe side’.518 Such a favourable outcome was perhaps designed to offset the 
irreversibility of the boundary. Indeed, on the one hand the commissioners 
maintained that ‘the Xesibe country [could] scarcely be considered as having been in 
the beneficial occupation of the Pondo’; but in formalising this takeover, they 
likewise claimed that ‘in reality, [the government] was relieving [Mqikela] from a 
source of anxiety and danger which will in future be transferred to their shoulders’.519 
Naturally, the Cape agreed; the line was thus fixed on 14 July 1883.520  
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Fig 2.4: Sketch Map of Boundary Between Pondos and Xesibes as Selected by the Commission in 1883, in (CA) NA-163: British Resident, Port St. John to Mqikela, 
16 November 1883. 
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Conclusion: 
The drawing of a boundary as an adequate solution to the instability in Pondoland 
brings this chapter full circle. Like Frere’s proclamation, Wood’s memorandum and 
Tainton’s map, the desire to formalise a division between Mpondo and Xesibe 
territory betrayed an official belief in a bounded notion of the “tribe”. For its part, 
the Eastern royal house refused to recognise the legitimacy of this new boundary for 
a further three years; on 9 December 1886, they were forced to concede any claim 
to both Port St. John and Xesibeland following the outbreak of further violence along 
the country’s contested northern borders.521  
Nevertheless, in seeking to relieve Mqikela of ‘a source of anxiety and 
danger’, the apparent generosity of the Cape’s latest endeavour arguably 
demonstrates what Dunn rightly identifies as an inherent tension within the process 
of colonial state-making: that the state simultaneously created ontological 
uncertainty whilst offering itself as the solution to that problem.522 Indeed, Frere’s 
proclamation – undertaken on the Cape’s behalf - had precipitated those contentious 
conversations concerning the exercise of authority and subjecthood across the 
country. Doing so had provoked a wave of uncertainty about political order, the 
welfare of particular communities, the right to territory and the demarcation of 
space.523 As the autochthonous argument between the Nci and Xesibe 
demonstrated, it inspired insecurity about who did and did not belong in the country. 
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And in other instances in the East and West, it had also forced various chiefly 
constituencies to articulate how they belonged as well.  
 As this chapter has illustrated, these conversations clearly varied according to 
context; they expressed the latent loyalties and long-term rivalries between the 
country’s composite clans and revealed the process of differential incorporation that 
bound them in numerous ways to the Eastern royal house. The institutional 
arrangements that underpinned these intra-Mpondo relations were reinforced by 
the physical location of these multiple constituencies; the power relations and the 
communal solidarities and divisions that comprised the kingdom were largely 
fostered by the political geography of Pondoland. Both British and colonial officials 
sought to rationalise and regulate this system of Mpondo governance through the 
introduction of new political boundaries. Such measures were designed, in the long-
term at least, to encourage the cultivation of “tribal” distinctions between those 
delineated and demarcated communities. By foregrounding the centrality of intra-
Mpondo relations in re-qualifying these interventions, however, this chapter has 
arguably validated Nugent’s contention that these often ‘proved far less salient than 
local and…territorial identities’.524 
 It is for this reason that Frere’s proclamation largely failed in its immediate 
objectives to depose Mqikela, bolster Nqwiliso as a useful local ally, and consolidate 
the Xesibe as British subjects. As a disciplinary tool designed to signify the 
subordination of the paramountcy to the colonial state, it was clearly ineffective. 
Whilst its promulgation undoubtedly reflected the breakdown in political relations 
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between the two, it cannot realistically be viewed as the milestone which marked the 
road to annexation. As an important moment in the reconfiguration of political 
authority and subjecthood within Pondoland, however, it was crucial. In the West, 
numerous actors refused to acknowledge the authority afforded to the newly 
recognised paramount; they either instrumentalised or ignored altogether the 
jurisdictional divide created by the partition. Instead, they articulated their older 
affiliations to the Eastern royal house in order to uphold the conventions that had 
structured the exercise of authority and subjecthood since the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century. Whilst this seemingly favoured Mqikela, their responses 
functioned less as an endorsement of the paramount and more as an attempt to 
maintain the autonomy typically enjoyed across the country. 
The insecurity of his paramountcy was further underlined by the reaction of 
local communities to the annexation of Xesibeland. Both the Nci and Xesibe engaged 
in an autochthonous argument that served as the means by which both could assert 
their primacy over land and local resources. Whilst the latter claimed an affiliation to 
the Great Place, this was by no means beneficial. Ultimately, their disputes 
precipitated further outbreaks of violence which the royal house was unable to 
control. In this context, the further intervention of the colonial state in April 1883 
probably did provide some relief to an otherwise much maligned Mqikela, even if 
leading Mpondo protagonists maintained their opposition to this intervention.    
 Indeed, the following chapter will demonstrate that colonial encroachment 
facilitated the implicit interdependence between Mpondo paramountcy and the 
Cape government. Whilst officials undoubtedly sought to stabilise the country’s 
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jurisdictional boundaries for their own ends, such measures paradoxically served to 
stabilise the arena of rule in which the royal house could better assert its influence. 
This was particularly necessary given the contentious conversations that had been 
provoked by Frere’s proclamation. As will be seen, these discussions did not abate in 
the aftermath of this imperial intervention. Quite the opposite; as imperial 
annexation gave way to the colonial assumption of administrative responsibility, 
Mpondo actors became even more aware of the need to protect their autonomy.  
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Chapter 3: From Independence to Annexation? Political Possibilities 
and Competing Claims in Pondoland, 1884-1894: 
 
Introduction: 
On 10 August 1887, the Assistant Colonial Secretary of Natal received a letter from a 
Mr James B. Aiken, a settler in the colony’s lower Mzimkhulu district.525 In it, Aiken 
described his encounter with ‘Herr Augustus Einwald’, one of several German land 
speculators to have arrived at the eastern coast of southern Africa from the mid-
1880s. A guest of Aiken, Einwald stayed with the settler and discussed ‘various 
objects of interest…including the German missionaries near the river in Alfred 
County’. On the pretext of visiting his fellow countrymen, Einwald left his lodgings, 
‘stating that he would return for dinner’. Instead, he sent his host a letter, which, 
‘conveyed from his travelling wagon’, explained that he was about to cross into 
Pondoland to present the paramount and his “Prime Minister”, Mhlangaso, with 
some gifts. Surprised by his impromptu departure, Aiken recalled ‘how eagerly 
[Einwald] seemed to enter into conversation upon any subject which concerned the 
future of Pondoland’ – a subject ‘which…is of considerable interest to us settlers at 
this end of Natal’.526  
 Einwald’s journey did not go unnoticed; Cape officials also reported the 
arrival of the German at Mqikela’s Great Place. This time, Einwald was the guest of 
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Mhlangaso. Corroborating Aiken’s account, the Mpondo chiefs were indeed 
presented with gifts: a sword, a medal and a flag, which, should the paramount ‘find 
himself hard pressed at any time’, was to be hoisted, whereupon ‘the Germans 
[would] make common cause with him’.527 This peculiar offer was bolstered by 
rumours suggesting that 3000 German settlers were on their way to Pondoland, 
bringing with them ‘breach-loading rifles and ammunition, cannons and machine-
guns’.528 Officials noted the ‘insolent and aggressive mood’ of the public and 
detected a newfound ‘fanaticism in favour of the Germans’, who they believed would 
help them ‘take back all the land that has…been taken from them by the English 
Government’.529This allegedly liberating force were to be settled on a piece of land 
originally granted to another German, Emil Nagel, in 1885. Whilst that concession 
had fallen through, Mhlangaso had since offered it to Einwald.530  
Unsurprisingly, the Cape reminded Mqikela of the annexations that had taken 
place in 1878; the banks of the St. John’s River, recently claimed by the British, had 
been formally transferred to the colonial government on 22 July 1884. As such, the 
Mpondo paramount was warned that he had no right to dispose of this particular 
tract of land.531 As William Beinart has explored, Mhlangaso responded by drafting 
his own decree ‘denying Britain’s right to control the coast and inviting foreign 
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powers to open trade with Pondoland’ in 1885.532 This had followed the introduction 
of increased levies on imported goods brought in from the port, and the levying of 
tolls on loads passing through the country on the main wagon-route between the 
Cape and Natal.533 More seriously, the royal house had sought to establish a rival port 
– Port Grosvenor – precisely at ‘a time when the Cape was attempting to block gaps 
in the tariff wall around the colony’.534 In response, another imperial edict was issued 
on 5 January 1885, this time placing the entire Mpondo coastline under British 
protection.535 
 Einwald was likewise precluded from choosing any land that fell within 
Xesibeland. With the border laid out in April 1883, legislation confirmed its 
incorporation into the Cape on 24 September 1886. Yet this colonial encroachment 
was likewise met with another international appeal. Writing from his homestead in 
Esihlonyane, Mhlangaso penned a letter to St. Petersburg on 10 November 1886. 
Addressed to the Russian Tsar, Alexander III, the Mpondo “Prime Minister” explained 
that ‘the English Government wants to take away our country. They have recently 
taken…a portion…occupied by the AmaXesibes…without any just cause’; he warned 
the Emperor not to ‘listen [to what] the English…might say. They might say…the 
Pondo country belongs to them. They might say this to delude you as you are not 
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aware of the facts’. In order to stave of this alleged English threat, Mhlangaso 
requested that ‘the Pondo nation…be protected by you’.536 
In the previous chapter, I argued for the limited impact of Frere’s 
proclamation in achieving the successful subordination of the Mpondo paramountcy. 
Yet Mhlangaso’s willingness to treat with what were Britain’s imperial rivals just 
three years later suggests that the Mpondo royal house felt the burden of British and 
Cape interventions more keenly than ever before. As the above epistolary exchanges 
illustrate, the response of leading chiefs was to deny ‘English’ exclusivity to Mpondo 
land and its resources by reaching out to alternative European agents in order to 
maintain their economic and political independence. Such attempts were clearly 
suffused with anti-colonial sentiment.537 But just as important was the medium 
Mhlangaso chose to express his antipathy towards the British and the Cape. By 
cultivating commercial treaties with German concessionaries, and submitting a state-
sanctioned application for Russian protection, he arguably demonstrated David 
Strang’s contention that non-Western polities, in seeking to avoid conflict with 
ostensibly “civilised” nations, often deliberately couched their initiatives in the 
conventions of European statecraft and sovereignty.538  
Indeed, the signing of paper treaties and the issuing of proclamations were 
central features of European expansion into the extra-European world. As Lisa Ford 
                                                          
536 Apollon Davidson, ‘Russia and South Africa Before the Soviet Era’, Higher School of Economics 
Research, National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Paper No. WP BRP 
21/HUM/2013, pp. 18-20, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2253209 [accessed 
14 March 2014].   
537 Beinart, ‘European Traders’; Saunders, ‘Annexation’. 
538 David Strang, ‘Contested Sovereignty: The Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism’, in Thomas 
J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds), State Sovereignty as Social Construct, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 37. 
166 
 
notes, they had acquired increasing significance throughout the early modern period; 
embodying the sovereign right to particular tracts of land, they served as the 
supporting documentation used to displace rival claims to the same space.539 For 
Lauren Benton, the pomp and procedure that surrounded the ratification and 
defence of these agreements represented a form of ‘legal posturing’; that is, they 
served as the acts through which Europeans far from home ‘imperfectly 
reconstructed’ legal rituals ‘as a familiar kind of strategic cultural practice’.540 Broadly 
speaking, there thus existed a ‘shared repertoire of law that help[ed] to make sense 
of the processes through which legal conflicts on the margins of European spheres of 
influence’ could be resolved and regulated.541  
In Pondoland, this was especially easy since Mhlangaso’s initiatives were 
ultimately unsuccessful. He received no Russian reply; moreover, following overtures 
from London, the German government refused to support Einwald’s activities, or 
those of any other German trader and settler that treated with the royal house.542 
The non-achievement of these international overtures may well have represented an 
implicit consensus amongst Western nations that precluded the legitimacy of non-
Western claims to sovereignty.543 Or it may have better reflected the realities of 
imperial geo-politics.544 Either way, the failure to secure substantial interest in 
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Mpondo affairs ensured that British and Cape claims to Mpondo territory remained 
uncontested – in the eyes of other imperial powers at least. 
There was, however, a limit to such litigiousness. As Benton rightly notes, 
‘treaties…only went so far in establishing sovereignty for [the] signers’.545 Likewise, 
Ford suggests that at best they embodied a ‘figurative possession’ or ‘tenuous claim 
[to] sovereignty and jurisdiction’ that masked the legal pluralism which ruled on the 
ground.546 As chapter 2 demonstrated, this was certainly true of Frere’s 
proclamation. But it was also applicable to the more recent interventions undertaken 
by the Cape, and the response of the Mpondo royal house. The former asserted their 
own ‘tenuous claims’ as evidenced by the ratification of legislative acts which 
confirmed the assumption of administrative responsibility over parts of the country. 
The paramountcy was no different; Mhlangaso was eager to demonstrate the 
sovereignty of the Great Place through the attempted cultivation of formal treaties 
with alternative European partners. On the surface, such action typifies the antipathy 
between colonial officials and leading Mpondo chiefs which characterised the 
eventual incorporation of the latter by the former. In this chapter, however, I suggest 
the precise opposite: their shared recourse to treaty was in fact indicative of a mutual 
vulnerability and shared circumscription.  
This position is predicated on two interconnected arguments. Firstly, I assert 
that the eventual annexation of Pondoland did not solely reflect the increased 
hostility between paramountcy and state; it just as easily demonstrated their 
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increasing, if unwitting, interdependence. Secondly, I contend that this process was 
precipitated by a number of competing claims that were articulated both within and 
outside the country by actors on either side of the colonial divide. Designed to 
maintain or extend existing autonomies, these embodied a range of jurisdictional 
ambitions and alternative political possibilities to that implied by annexation in 1894. 
These were incredibly important – even if their realisation was precluded by the 
formalisation of the Cape’s claim to rule in 1894. 
At first glance, this proposition may seem counter-intuitive. After all, the 
unilateral encroachments undertaken by the British and Cape governments were 
clearly antithetical to the continuation of Mpondo independence. Whilst the Cape 
had been reluctant to consolidate its authority in 1878, its willingness to act 
undoubtedly intensified from the mid-1880s. This was, in part, a reflection of the 
failure of what Beinart has termed ‘the Mpondo diplomatic offensive’.547 Following 
Frere’s proclamation, the royal house had sought to reverse the Cape’s annexations 
of Port St. John and Xesibeland by appealing directly to the imperial government. 
Deputations were sent to England in both 1880-1 and 1883-4 - initiatives which 
attempted to garner the support of the Aborigines Protection Society in London, 
through the mobilisation of the social and familial connections of leading European 
influences at the Great Place.548 Both efforts, however, failed; the Colonial Office 
refused to receive any party from Pondoland.549  
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 As Christopher Saunders suggests, such reticence reflected an increased 
awareness amongst metropolitan officials of their inability to exert any real control 
over the Cape’s African policy.550 Of course, notions of imperial trusteeship over 
indigenous populations still nominally underpinned British policy in southern 
Africa.551 This same impulse underpinned the more ambiguous proclamation over 
the Mpondo coastline in 1885, although in this instance, the Cape sought its 
extension over the entire country as a necessary precursor to its peaceable 
transferral to the colony.552 To better facilitate this objective, officials had thus 
formalised the annexation of Port St. John (1884) and Xesibeland (1886), as well as 
the adjacent Rode Valley (1886). In doing so, these interventions represented a 
renewed effort to demarcate the colonial boundaries around, and the jurisdictional 
boundaries within, the Mpondo polity. 
Such initiatives arguably intended to achieve three principal objectives: to 
consolidate colonial authority in Pondoland, to circumscribe the jurisdictional reach 
of the paramountcy and to preclude any rival claim to the country. In this chapter, 
however, I argue that officials failed in each; Pondoland became further fragmented 
into a multi-jurisdictional space comprised of increasingly exclusive imperial, 
colonial, and Western and Eastern Mpondo arenas of rule. As will be seen, colonial 
pretensions to power remained limited to certain regions whilst simultaneously 
centralising specific areas in which the royal house could better assert its own 
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authority. Such developments bolstered the hostility between the two and increased 
the likelihood for greater instability, whilst fostering an ambiguity over who precisely 
governed Pondoland. Consequently, a swathe of Mpondo, European and extra-local 
actors sought to advance their own claims to the country. Chiefs and commoners, 
resident traders, Natalian settlers and the Natal government: each attempted to take 
advantage of this jurisdictional impasse.  
In order to achieve this, I contend that various historical protagonists were 
able to switch between, simultaneously treat with, or avoid altogether the multiple 
authorities that now comprised the country. In this sense, their actions suggest that 
the jurisdictional spaces implied by colonial intervention were transformed into 
important resources to be used. In doing so, I draw on Eric Lewis Beverley’s 
suggestion that, in certain contexts, the increasing presence of the colonial state did 
not necessarily entail the decreased productivity of jurisdictional borders - despite 
the political consolidation that such demarcations inferred.553 Rather than 
emphasising the closure of these spaces, they maintained a ‘differential character 
that persisted beyond colonial expansion’.554 Whilst these encroachments tended to 
represent a clearly delimited edge ‘in normative legal and institutional terms’, they 
just as easily signified a fluidity that shaped the social and political practices of those 
communities which resided in close proximity to multiple, often conflicting 
authorities.555  
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In Pondoland, this encouraged historical actors in the swapping of affiliations 
between paramountcy and state, allowing them to better negotiate colonial 
intervention towards diverging ends. In acknowledging this multiplicity of interests, 
this chapter employs Jodi Byrd’s ‘understanding [of] colonialism as a cacophony of 
contradictorily hegemonic and horizontal struggles [which] offers an alternative way 
of formulating…the dynamics that affect[ed] people as they move[d] within 
empire’.556 Put simply, I seek to highlight the jurisdictional contestations both within 
and between numerous communities on either side of the colonial divide as central 
in shaping the process of political incorporation. To be clear, this is not to say that 
Mpondo chiefs, Natalian settlers or European residents acted in conscious 
collaboration to challenge either the royal house or colonial state. Rather, it is to 
argue that a swathe of otherwise unconnected disputes could intersect in meaningful 
ways to render both mutually circumscribed. Despite their clear antipathy, colonial 
officials and the Mpondo royal house both seemed to share in the struggle to 
command the loyalty of those they sought to rule. Played off against each other, both 
were thus faced with the stark limitations placed upon their pretensions to power.  
This process was, however, implicit; it did little to mitigate the explicit hostility 
that persisted between the two. As Beinart has demonstrated, the propensity for 
conflict increased, not least because the annexation of Port St. John had removed an 
important stream of revenue that was critical to the survival of the paramountcy.557 
Mhlangaso’s support for European traders and foreign concessionaries was designed 
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to provide an independent source of wealth that was unaffected by imperial and 
colonial intervention. His actions, however, raised the suspicion of numerous chiefs 
and commoners. They viewed his transactions as threatening the independence of 
individual homesteads through the commoditisation of what were otherwise 
communal resources.558 Their potential alienation thus increased tensions within the 
Mpondo polity; it ‘provided fuel for conflict with other chiefs who were concerned 
about the threat to their position not only from Mhlangaso in his personal capacity 
but…from the paramountcy as an institution’.559 
As previous studies have noted, these tensions reached their peak following 
the death of Mqikela in 1887 and the election of his son, Sigcau, as paramount in 
1888. Not of the Great House, Sigcau was nevertheless posited as ‘a strongman [and] 
representative of the minor chiefs, to resist Mhlangaso’; he was viewed as more 
conciliatory towards the Cape and less likely to lead the Mpondo to conflict.560 His 
ascendancy thus marked the increasing isolation of the “Prime Minister”, whose 
reluctance to accept subordinate status resulted in the eventual outbreak of civil war 
in 1890.561 As Saunders has noted, officials used the occasion to swiftly secure 
Mpondo acquiescence to annexation.562 But as Beinart makes clear, the civil war also 
represented ‘a struggle for power between a new paramount and the dominant 
councillor of the old, a struggle over policy towards the colonial powers’; one that 
signified an important contestation over the role and reach of the paramountcy.563 
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This struggle was intimately tied to the material considerations of various Mpondo 
actors; they sought to shape the terms of their incorporation in order to maintain a 
degree of control within their own communities ‘in the face of larger social forces 
which they could hardly influence’.564  
This chapter seeks to make a similar point by highlighting the competing 
claims made on Pondoland by various Mpondo and European actors both within and 
outside of the country. Posited as central to the process of political incorporation, it 
seeks to qualify those arguments that solely emphasise the hostility between the 
paramountcy and colonial state. Indeed, simply acknowledging the mutual antipathy 
between the royal house in the East and Government House at the Cape precludes 
an examination of the multiple interests that prompted their shared circumscription 
and increasing interdependence. Designed to maintain or extend existing 
autonomies, these embodied a range of jurisdictional ambitions and alternative 
political possibilities which ultimately underscored the essential contingency of the 
Cape’s own claim to rule.  
By foregrounding these competing claims, this chapter evokes what Frederick 
Cooper terms ‘the changing definition of the possible’; it demonstrates how various 
communities could ‘mobilise to claim new futures’ during moments of political 
rupture and transition.565 This approach is typically adopted to explore claims to 
citizenship in the era of decolonisation that cut across state-sponsored ethnic or 
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urban/rural distinctions.566 As William Roger Louis suggests, however, these later 
developments were often the ‘mirror image’ of those that accompanied the 
establishment of European rule.567 In this sense, this approach can readily be applied 
to consider the range of political possibilities articulated by historical actors as they 
sought to negotiate, shape and subvert the formalisation of colonial authority at the 
end of the nineteenth century.  
In establishing this argument, this chapter will examine how historical actors 
sought to utilise the patchwork of jurisdictional spaces that now comprised the 
country. Highlighting these ‘multiple forms of attenuated and partial sovereignties’ 
allows for an exploration of how otherwise unconnected claims and disputes fed into 
a broader contestation of power and political authority in Pondoland.568 The chapter 
will first explore how the consolidation of the colonial border at the Rode Valley 
served to centralise the reach of the royal house in what was a highly contested space 
on the margins of the polity. Doing so will allow for an early identification of those 
pressures that emerged between the Great Place and its border communities which 
would ultimately precipitate civil conflict. The chapter will then conceptualise Port 
St. John as an imperial enclave that served to undermine the jurisdiction of a Western 
paramount only recently bolstered by British intervention. It will illustrate how this 
ambiguity over who precisely governed the region encouraged various historical 
actors to similarly claim this same space. Particular attention will be paid to the Natal 
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Government, whose own jurisdictional ambitions demonstrated a desire to 
incorporate Mpondo and other Transkeian territory that was largely rooted in 
concerns over trade. As will be seen, their objectives were intimately tied to the 
continuing conversations about the exercise of authority and subjecthood within the 
Mpondo polity. By highlighting the overlapping nature of this range of disputes, the 
chapter will demonstrate how the Mpondo paramountcy and Cape government were 
both rendered similarly circumscribed and interdependent in the moment 
immediately preceding annexation in 1894. 
 
Contested Authority - The Rode Valley: 
As chapter 2 demonstrated, by 1883 colonial officials were determined to fix a 
jurisdictional boundary between the Nci and Xesibe in order to quell the propensity 
for violence between the two. Whilst that region remained unsettled, it was the 
adjacent Rode Valley that began to concern both state and paramountcy alike (Fig. 
3.1). Whilst the Rode had been of parochial interest to British and colonial 
administrators for much of the nineteenth century, this small parcel of land acquired 
a new significance in light of the annexation of Port St. John; as the government
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 Fig 3.1: ‘Sketch Map of the Country between the Kei and Umzimkulu Rivers, or the Transkeian Territories’, in in Henkel, 
History, Resources and Productions. 
177 
 
sought to better control its coastal trade and tariffs, attention likewise turned to the 
overland roads used to transport goods between Mthatha and Natal.  
Whilst the majority of the route ran through East Griqualand, the journey 
entailed entering the Rode Valley for a stretch of approximately sixteen miles – the 
only point at which this highway traversed Mpondo territory.569 Despite this small 
incursion, the Rode revealed how an independent Pondoland could potentially 
disrupt colonial trade. Indeed, as part of his response to the British proclamation over 
the Mpondo coastline, Mhlangaso had ordered the imposition of a toll to be levied 
on any goods that were caught passing through the country.570 
 Mhlangaso’s orders were not, however, inviolable; rather, they belied the 
contestation of Mpondo authority on the ground. After all, no Mpondo had settled 
at the Rode until 1882 – ten years after the Griffiths-Ayliff-Grant Commission (1872) 
had incorporated the country into Pondoland.571 Instead, the region was occupied 
primarily by a large Baca community, whose chief, Makaula, resided in neighbouring 
Mount Frere. In his absence, Makaula had appointed a Hlubi man named William 
Nota to administer the territory as its principal headman in order to counter the 
competing claims made by Adam Kok’s Griquas. Following the commission’s decision, 
the Baca had been permitted to stay on their land provided that they recognised 
Mqikela’s authority - an arrangement maintained even when Makaula’s own country 
was annexed in 1876. Nota was thus re-appointed as an Mpondo headman, although 
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like Jojo, he successfully applied to be taken over as a British subject in 1878.572 What 
was cast as ‘serious and binding step’ on 22 July, was however, quickly reversed – 
most likely due to the controversies caused by the annexation of Xesibeland in the 
same year.573 
Obliged to make his peace with Mqikela, Theal states that this reconciliation 
occurred without much difficulty.574 Yet on 11 March 1879, the British Resident, 
Oxley-Oxland, reported that Nota had refused to pass on any of the fines he had 
collected to the Mpondo paramountcy.575 Three months later, the official was forced 
to visit the Rode following the Hlubi’s forced removal from the region by a party of 
armed Mpondo.576 The incident had encouraged numerous Baca, both from the Rode 
and Mount Frere, to retaliate in defence of the headman, thereby risking a larger 
conflict between Makaula and Mqikela’s men. In an interview with several Mpondo 
councillors, Oxley-Oxland made clear that the country belonged to the paramount; 
should Nota choose to stay, then he would be recognised as an Mpondo subject, but 
in return he was to be protected. Their response was, however, less than 
sympathetic. Reading aloud a personal message from Mqikela, the British Resident 
was told: ‘Let them [Nota and the Baca] leave…I DO NOT WANT ANYMORE 
GOVERNMENT PEOPLE TO LIVE IN MY COUNTRY BESIDES MY RESIDENT…LET THE 
BOUNDARY OF MY COUNTRY REMAIN AS DEFINED BY GRIFFITHS’.577 
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Given this messy history of inter-African contestation, temporary imperial 
annexation and then rapid retrocession, it is unsurprising that Mqikela was eager to 
assert his own authority over the Rode. As the Resident Magistrate in Mount Ayliff 
made clear, this was a ‘tract of land to which [the Mpondo] neither have hereditary 
right nor right by conquest’.578 In this sense, the colonial boundary established in 
1872 - and reaffirmed in 1878 - provided the best means by which to legitimate his 
claim to rule. To be sure, the Baca who remained in the valley refused to recognise 
the paramountcy; given their longer occupation, they maintained ‘a right by purchase 
to the land and therefore would not remove to British Territory’ – despite the best 
efforts of the royal house to force them back into Mount Frere.579 
The potential for conflict was obvious, but its likelihood increased given the 
region’s proximity to Valelo’s country. As chapter 2 demonstrated, his long-term 
rivalry with the Cwera had provoked numerous bouts of instability as both sought to 
expropriate local land and resources from one another. The Rode was no different; 
stock thefts were unsurprisingly frequent. As William Hulley, a farmer from Mount 
Frere noted, local Baca communities fully ‘expect[ed] to be attacked by Valelo’. 
Indeed, such was the regularity with which cattle was stolen that ‘people [did] not go 
after their stock in [less than] twos or threes for fear of being beaten up’.580 Too 
unsafe to follow the spoor into Mpondo territory, Reverend Charles White suggested 
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arming the border Baca; ‘it would have a deterring effect on the Pondo…[who] being 
so well armed…think they are invincible [as] they taunt the government people’.581 
Of course, stock-thefts and border raids were of particular importance in a 
politically decentralised polity. For autonomous regional chiefs, they often served as 
‘an effective strategy to mobilise [the] popular support and resources’ deemed 
essential to the maintenance of their authority.582  Whilst Valelo was a principal 
offender, colonial officials and local residents were, however, more suspicious of 
those ‘Pondomise who [had] settled in the district since the [1880 Mpondomise 
rebellion]’; Hulley, for example, accused them of stealing and ‘send[ing] stock to their 
friends in Pondoland’, who likewise came to visit them across the border in order to 
‘take Baca cattle back with them’.583 His claims were supported by Diko, half-brother 
of Makaula, who specifically named Mbali, an Mpondomise chief settled in the region 
by Faku, as responsible for orchestrating these raids.584 As Nota likewise noted, 
‘some of our people [in the Rode] are connected to Mbali’s people through marriage 
and relationships, and although they have been visiting and drinking together…I am 
of the opinion that they have been hostile all along’.585 
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 Such suspicion perhaps reflected a belief in a clandestine network of thievery 
rooted in clan and familial affiliation - doubts which were seemingly confirmed 
following a particularly violent encounter along the Mount Frere border on 20 June 
1885. Prompting a Commission of Inquiry established at Ishingwana on 29 August, 
officials took evidence from the mission station’s headman, Pedros Dikwayo.586 He 
explained how Mpondo thieves had crossed the colonial border on two occasions, 
stealing numerous horses and 80 head of cattle and sheep. Dikwayo attributed the 
theft to Magatyana, a man residing in Mbali’s location. Tracing the stock to his 
territory, the Baca party ‘came across a sheep which had been stabbed to 
death…When we saw this we knew what it meant…It means that the owners of the 
sheep are to be treated in the same way. It [was] a challenge’. Further provocation 
was provided by numerous Mpondo parties, who, sitting on the ridge just beyond 
the boundary, ‘danced and flourished [their] assegais’. Exasperated, Dikwayo 
explained how such scenes were commonplace: ‘The Pondos have eaten us up. They 
take our stock…into Pondoland and refuse to give it up. If we go in…they come out in 
arms against us and they beat us…Is this boundary only to restrain us?’ 
The blame was placed squarely on Mbali, whose brother Manga had been 
prominent in the recent provocations.587 Yet the testimony provided by the 
Mpondomise chief alleged that the ‘thefts complained of had not been committed 
by his own people but by Pondos living farther from the line’ – by those connected 
to the royal house.588 Indeed, Mbali explained that he had immediately condemned 
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the theft of Dikwayo’s property and had called for the Resident Magistrate, but was 
met first by representatives from the Great Place, who insisted that the cattle be 
handed over to them. Accused by a councillor, Tadana, of ‘incriminating the whole 
Pondo nation’, Mbali angrily exclaimed: ‘who says I should not talk? I pass spoors on 
and others leave me to bear the blame. I am being killed…The Government ought to 
ask me what I stop…instead, I am not asked anything. I am killed by the Government 
and by my own people’.589 
Having been settled on his land by Faku, the Mpondomise chief had once 
been accorded high-status by the then paramount.590 His protestations, however, 
suggest a change in the constitution of power in this now contested region. Indeed, 
the return of the Rode to the royal house and the annexation of the Mount Frere 
Baca in 1876 arguably precipitated a reconfiguration in relations between the 
paramountcy and its border communities. As Tadana explained to Mbali, ‘you are on 
the border and I…cannot see all that is going on and what you are doing there’.591 
Denying the involvement of the Great Place in the theft, he pleaded with the 
Commission: ‘Umqikela does not pretend to be able to stop thieving but he is 
opposed to it…cannot you make Mbali recollect his duty to the chief and tell him if 
he does not obey…he will be removed from his present location?’592  
                                                          
589 (CA) NA-437: Minutes of a Meeting held on the Pondo Border near the Ishingwana Mission 
Station, 29 August 1885. Statement by Mbali. 
590 Brownlee, Transkeian Native Territories, p. 115. 
591 (CA) NA-437: Minutes of a Meeting held on the Pondo Border near the Ishingwana Mission 
Station, 29 August 1885. Statement by Tadana. 
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The consolidation of the colonial border therefore crystallised the 
competition over local resources between the various communities that comprised 
the region; moreover, it also facilitated the centralisation of authority exercised by 
the royal house. In this sense, the increased number of stock thefts arguably 
demonstrates Paul Nugent’s contention that the ‘creation of a paper border set in 
motion a local dynamic in which populations became actively engaged in the 
inscription of the contours on the ground’.593 Indeed, it hardened the jurisdictional 
divide between two inimical realms of rule – colonial and Mpondo – thereby 
transforming this once ill-defined boundary into a resource to be used by Mpondo 
protagonists. Not only did this allow the Great Place to appropriate stock through 
proxy chiefs. It also allowed them to blame their own subjects – a fact demonstrated 
by Mbali’s arrest by Mhlangaso on 27 December 1888.594 As such, Mpondo 
councillors were able to forge a consensus with colonial officials on the need to 
strengthen the boundary between the Rode and Mount Frere: ‘if we cannot prevent 
our people stealing then the government has no power to prevent their people from 
violating the border and fighting in Pondoland’.595  
This acknowledgement qualifies those accounts that have viewed the 
developments at the Rode purely in terms of the increased hostility between 
Mpondo paramountcy and colonial state.596 Clearly, the formalisation of colonial rule 
over the region was intended to circumscribe the jurisdictional reach the 
paramountcy. But such interventions also arguably provided an opportunity for 
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leading Mpondo protagonists to centralise their authority over those that still 
remained within the country.  
Indeed, attempting to consolidate his position still further, Mhlangaso was 
reported to have visited the border in December 1885 with the intention of settling 
numerous Griqua families in the nearby Mnceba region. As mentioned above, it was 
Adam Kok’s followers who had claimed the land prior to its incorporation into 
Pondoland in 1872; according to the Resident Magistrate in Mount Frere, ‘the Griqua 
talked loudly of claiming “all the land” between the Umzimhlava and 
Umzimvubu…[and] talk of fighting if things don’t go their way’.597 Such claims only 
intensified over time. Writing on 10 December 1899, officials noted how the ‘Griqua 
believe that an absolute grant of territory has been made to them and that they will 
be able to establish farms for themselves and a quasi-independent method of 
regulating their own affairs. One of their numbers was [even] appointed as Resident 
Magistrate’.598 In this way, Mhlangaso’s actions paradoxically fused with an older 
claim to land that had previously been precluded by its placement within Pondoland 
itself.  
Posited as the ‘protégés’ of Mhlangaso, Griqua settlement was arguably 
designed to provide a loyal bulwark against any Baca who sought to claim this same 
space.599 To that end, officials noticed their increased presence in the region, 
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September 1889.  
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counting ‘100 fighting families’ at the Mnceba in 1889.600 Unsurprisingly, this swell in 
numbers only provoked further stock-thefts, as officials reported the rising 
impoverishment of neighbouring Xesibe and Baca communities.601 Not only did this 
increase the propensity for violence; crucially, it also reignited those intra-Mpondo 
disputes concerning the exercise of authority and subjecthood that had been 
provoked in 1878. 
The experiences of the Nci are especially instructive in this regard. As chapter 
2 demonstrated, the Nci had asserted an autochthonous claim to territory on the 
basis of their affiliation to, and settlement by, the royal house in order to justify their 
appropriation of Xesibe land and stock. Yet when conflict erupted in 1885-86, Qipu, 
son of Diko, instead travelled to the Mfundisweni mission station under the charge 
of Reverend Peter Hargreaves from 1882.602 Refusing to support the Great Place, he 
explained to the missionary that nothing ‘would induce [him] to fight unless 
[Mhlangaso] changes tactics’; referencing his settlement of the Griqua, Qipu 
described the scheme ‘as bound to fail…[it] does not carry the chiefs or the people 
with him’.603 His hesitancy undoubtedly reflected Nci resentment at the increased 
number of stock-thefts committed against them by Mhlangaso’s newfound allies and 
the ‘non-protection’ afforded by the Great Place.604 But it also indicated a willingness 
to evade the centralisation of Mpondo authority that had followed the consolidation 
                                                          
600 (CA) RCP-4: Resident Commissioner, Pondoland to Under Secretary for Native Affairs, 10 
September 1889. 
601 (UCT) Stanford Papers, W. P. Leary to Stanford, 18 November 1885, File BC293-BC116-5. 
602 (UCT) Stanford Papers, Rev. Hargreaves to Stanford, 14 December 1885, BC293-File B84-14; 
Andries Conradie, ‘The Life and Work of the Methodist Missionary Peter Hargreaves in the Land of 
Sigcau, Chief of the Amampondo, 1882-1901’, MA Thesis., University of Pretoria, 1967, p. 74. 
603 (UCT) Stanford Papers, Rev. Hargreaves to Stanford, 14 December 1885, BC293-File B84-14. 
604 (UCT) Stanford Papers, W. P. Leary to Stanford, 25 November 1885, File BC293-BC116-3; (UCT) 
Stanford Papers, W. P. Leary to Stanford, 5 December 1885, File BC293- BC116-5. 
186 
 
of the colonial boundary. Speaking within the confines of the mission station, Qipu 
declared that he was no subject of the paramountcy; rather, he described himself as 
‘a Fingoe’, and simply asked Hargreaves: ‘what am I to do?’605 
 The use of such a term is instructive since its employment by African chiefs 
beyond the Kei River was usually designed to pejoratively imply a collaboration with 
British colonists.606 To that end, Qipu’s self-description arguably served to help him 
solicit support from the missionary in this increasingly unstable region. Indeed, 
Hargreaves recalled a particularly violent encounter concerning a Xesibe retaliation 
upon the Mpondo in August 1886. Writing to the President of the Wesleyan 
Methodist Missionary Conference, he recalled the ‘terrible slaughter’ of 128 Nci two 
weeks’ prior.607 Fearing another attack, large numbers of Nci appeared at 
Mfundisweni, attempting to drive their stock onto the mission grounds. Hargreaves 
described how several men surrounded the church building and demanded that any 
Nci property be handed over to them. Threatening the missionary, they were alleged 
to have proclaimed: ‘we will never suffer Pondos to…live in peace here. You will be 
killed by mistake…or perhaps in the night…you hold the Pondos: you save their 
women and children and stock. You are their protector and witness. You are 
Pondo’.608    
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Given such violent encounters, it is hardly surprising that Qipu later invited 
colonial officials to his kraal in order ‘to give his tribe and lands to the Cape 
Government’.609 In this respect he was no different from those other border chiefs, 
including Mbali, who had already made their own application to be “taken over”.610 
These appeals obviously reflected the increased pressure placed upon their 
relationship with the Great Place following the consolidation of the colonial 
boundary. Hardly an imposition, the interventions of the Cape in fact facilitated the 
centralisation of authority exercised by the royal house – temporarily at least.  
Nevertheless, the complaints made by both Mbali and Qipu arguably point to 
an important tension between the ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’ of this newfound 
boundary. On the one hand, it functioned as a regulatory tool in differentiating 
between Mpondo and colonial territory; on the other, it contributed to a change in 
the socio-territorial organisation of local communities.611 To be sure, their willingness 
to be taken over by the Cape arguably suggests that it was the colonial government, 
rather than the paramountcy, that now served as the best means by which Mpondo 
chiefs could maintain their long-held autonomy. This represents an important 
qualitative shift in intra-Mpondo relations, especially since the Nci had invoked their 
settlement by the royal house just three years earlier. In this sense, the hostility that 
characterised the relationship between the Mpondo paramountcy and the Cape 
actually effected a complex and contradictory intersection of indigenous and colonial 
jurisdictional disputes. Not only did it centralise the arena in which the royal house 
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sought to exercise its authority; it simultaneously undermined the position of the 
paramountcy by placing pressure on the very relations that underpinned it. To that 
end, colonial intervention thus ‘masked and fed [a series of] jurisdictional tensions’ 
that would soon enough contribute to the outbreak of civil conflict.612 
 
Port St. John – Tensions and Trade: 
If colonial intervention in the Rode helped facilitate the temporary centralisation of 
Mpondo authority in the East, the same could not be said of the West. Frere’s 
proclamation had intended to bolster Nqwiliso’s position as an independent 
paramount; but in many respects it ironically undermined the very authority it was 
meant to endow. Whilst this imperial edict had largely failed to regulate intra-
Mpondo relations and rationalise the country’s jurisdictional boundaries, there was 
one region where Frere’s proclamation was able to effectively demarcate the 
parameters of imperial power: Port St. John.  
Besides the partition, the deed signed by Nqwiliso also formalised the 
acquisition of a tract of land around the estuary of the Mzimvubu River which 
measured approximately 10 000 acres.613 Designated as British territory, the 
establishment of this imperial enclave was particularly problematic for Nqwiliso. In 
one incident, a trader residing in Western Pondoland, John Lloyd, was caught stealing 
twelve head of cattle from an Mpondo village and driving them back to Port St. 
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John.614 Lloyd claimed he had a right to the stock, since they were grazing on land 
that had been granted to him by the paramount years before the proclamation had 
been issued. Its promulgation, however, clearly emboldened one local chief, Tono, 
who allegedly denied the trader access to his property on the assumption that the 
land had been exclusively reserved for the Western Mpondo. Nqwiliso, eager to 
resolve the issue, sent his brother to negotiate Lloyd’s extradition, who branded the 
trader ‘a white Pondo’ and ‘subject’ of the paramount. Whilst he had paid a licence 
fee to live and trade in the country, this did not infer any title to land; quite the 
opposite, his theft had constituted a ‘grave violation of Pondo law’. Nevertheless, 
Oxley-Oxland refused his request, arguing that Lloyd, by ‘virtue of his birth and colour 
[was] entitled to aid at my hands as the British Resident’. 
This was no isolated incident; the official lamented the regularity with which 
‘British subjects were…connected [to] the seizing and removal of cattle from 
Pondoland’.615 For Nqwiliso, such acts represented a very different challenge to that 
posed by the earlier resistance of particular Mpondo chiefs. The latter had been 
eager to articulate their older affiliations to the Great House as a means of resisting 
the Western paramountcy. Lloyd’s actions, however, arguably demonstrated the 
potential of the proclamation to re-write certain relationships within the polity itself. 
Through private transaction and licence-fee payment, white traders had long 
operated on the basis of chiefly sufferance. Yet the annexation of Port St. John meant 
that, in certain moments, those same residents could now treat with an entirely 
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independent power in Pondoland. Lloyd, for example, continuously maintained his 
right to the land guaranteed to him by Nqwiliso. But archival sources also record that 
the trader spent most of 1883 and 1885 residing at Port St. John seeking government 
employment at a graphite mine and through the Public Works Department 
respectively.616 This ability to move between Mpondo and imperial jurisdictions 
clearly reflected material self-interest. So too did the disagreement with Tono, as 
both historical actors fought over the accumulation of socio-economic resources. But 
it also provided political protection; following the cattle theft, Nqwiliso complained 
that Lloyd had ‘fled to Port St. John to avoid the consequences of his offence’.617 
Such comments reveal the inherent paradox of the proclamation. Whilst 
officials had intended to bolster the Western paramountcy, they had simultaneously 
created a jurisdictional space that in fact underlined its impotency. As the British 
Resident reported in June 1885, Lloyd’s case necessitated that the jurisdiction of his 
court be extended to cover the numerous others concerning the European theft of 
stock. Failure to do so would mean that ‘the idea will become prevalent that British 
subjects can commit offences in Pondoland with impunity, relying…on the extreme 
improbability of their being handed over to the mercies of a native chief’.618  
Yet this ability to evade the jurisdictional reach of either the Mpondo or 
British authorities did not just entail moving between different legal spaces – it could 
also occur within them too. Writing in 1890, Oxley-Oxland – now Resident Magistrate 
of Port St. John following the transferral of the region to the Cape in 1884 – reported 
                                                          
616 (CA) CMT-3/651: John Lloyd to R. W. Stanford, 10 October 1905; (CA) NA-31: Chief Magistrate, 
Tembuland to Secretary for Native Affairs, 7 Jan 1886. 
617 (CA) CMT-1/57: British Resident, Port St. John, to Chief Magistrate, Tembuland, 14 May 1884.  
618(CA) CMT-1/57: British Resident, Port St. John, to Chief Magistrate, Tembuland, 15 June 1884.   
191 
 
that on two separate occasions, traders travelling from King William’s Town had been 
stopped by a petty Mpondo chief, Nkoyane.619 Aided by his followers, the men 
stopped the waggon-carts and threatened the drivers to pay a toll ‘or face 
molestation on their way back through’.620 Oxley-Oxland recorded his fear ‘that great 
loss to the trade of the district…will result from this action’; ‘these men will no 
doubt…relate the manner in which they have been…delayed on their journey…and 
so transport riders will be wary of loading up for Port St. John except for abnormally 
high rates.’.621 Whether founded or not, such concerns arguably pointed to the 
‘changing and locally differentiated qualities of rule’ that characterised these 
otherwise ‘European-claimed spaces’.622 Writing with regards to early nineteenth-
century Georgia, Ford encapsulates precisely the risk undertaken by colonists as they 
travelled across what still remained indigenous territory: ‘settlers could disappear 
from the purview of the state…without [ever] leaving its chartered boundaries’.623 
It was this potential danger that perhaps accounts for the following letter. 
Writing on 19 August 1885, the Resident Magistrate of Alfred County, the 
southernmost district of Natal and situated along the Mpondo border, recalled the 
numerous applications by white residents in Pondoland for guns and powder. 
Contacting his Colonial Secretary, he sought to inquire whether he should ‘continue 
to treat the white population…as residents of [his] country’, as he had always 
done.624 His reply was blunt: ‘The Resident Magistrate has no authority or right to 
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consider [them] as residents…if such a practice has been followed, then the sooner 
it is discontinued the better’.625  
Such a petition underlines the limited impact of the Cape’s claim to rule at 
Port St. John. Nkoyane’s behaviour clearly suggests that the assumption of 
administrative responsibility meant little to Mpondo actors; but the fact that 
residents in Pondoland looked to Natal for protection is significant. Certainly, besides 
Oxley-Oxland the Cape had no official representatives in the country. Yet these 
appeals also likely signalled the longer-term relationships in commerce and trade 
that existed between Natal and the port. As Beinart notes, coastal shipping between 
Natal and the Mzimvubu River had begun in the 1840s; by 1861, Natal had 
established a permanent station and had begun to extend its trade further into the 
interior.626 Writing his annual report in 1883, Oxley-Oxland noted how ‘Natal still 
continues to monopolise almost the whole trade of Port St. John….East Griqualand 
and East Pondoland’.627 Whilst the Cape had recently begun to invest vast sums in 
the improvement of the wagon routes connecting the colony to the port, he 
nevertheless lamented that ‘another colony practically reaps the benefit of our large 
public expenditure in the vast tract of country lying between Tembuland and 
Natal’.628 With the majority of wool, wheat and hides making their way into its sister 
colony, the development of better transportation links was expected to yield ‘not 
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less than thirty to forty thousand pounds of revenue…which finds its way into the 
coffers of Natal’.629  
Such complaints typified the inter-colonial rivalry between these British 
colonies; both equally made ‘strenuous efforts…to monopolize [sic] the transit trade 
to the expanding markets of the interior’.630 In the mid-1880s, these long-term 
networks with East Griqualand and Pondoland were of vital importance to Natal since 
the colony was struggling to break out from the grip of economic depression.631 In 
Kokstad too, such trade was highly significant given the territory’s distance from Cape 
ports and the huge expense involved in the overland transportation of goods (Fig. 
3.2).  
                                                          
629 (CA) NA-163: Resident Magistrate, Port St. John to Secretary for Native Affairs, 1 January 1883. 
630 B. A. Le Cordeur, ‘Natal, The Cape and the Indian Ocean, 1846-1880’, Journal of African History, 
7:2 (1966), p. 247. 
631 John Lambert, ‘The Responsible Government Question in Natal, 1856-1893’, Kleio, 7:1 (1975), p. 
37. 
Fig. 3.2: ‘Sketch Map of Approximate Distances of Trade Centres from Port St. John’, in 
(CA) NA-163: British Resident to Secretary for Native Affairs, 1 January 1883. 
194 
 
Despite its annexation by the Cape in 1879, this convergence of interests had 
encouraged merchants and traders to consider the annexation of East Griqualand to 
Natal.632 Calls for executive action increased in 1885 when the Cape erected its own 
customs house on the border between the two colonies.633 Doubling the duties paid 
on imported goods into East Griqualand, such costs became an important political 
issue; the Kokstad Political Association argued for the country’s disannexation from 
the Cape – a demand that was somewhat tempered by the granting of parliamentary 
representation in the colonial parliament in 1887.634 
Such economic grievances were clearly linked to a broader strategy to extend 
the colony’s borders. This was particularly evident during a highly charged session of 
the Legislative Council held throughout October 1886, where numerous 
representatives bemoaned the Cape’s annexation of Port St. John – an action ‘that 
debars this country from supplying Pondoland with merchandise from Natal’.635 
As chapter 2 noted, officials had justified their acquisition in part on the need 
to prevent the potential smuggling of firearms into an already volatile Transkei. Yet 
such motives were doubted by leading political representatives. One-time Prime 
Minister Sir Harry Escombe (1894) suggested that ‘if that port is kept closed, it is kept 
closed not to stop smuggling but to answer the purpose of the Cape 
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Colony…because…our government is under a glamour with respect to the Cape’.636 
Keen to assert their own colonial credentials, the future Premier, Sir George Sutton 
(1903), thus proposed the peaceable annexation of the country on the grounds that 
Natal was ‘territorially too small to form a proper and strong Government…we should 
take advantage of every opportunity…to increase our borders and…to prevent, so far 
as we are able, any other Government taking possession of Pondoland’.637 
Advancing this objective therefore required a negation of the Cape’s claim to 
rule. Acting Lieutenant-Governor Sir John Bisset, for example, recalled the 
negotiations between Theophilus Shepstone and Faku in 1851, during which he 
claimed that ‘the St. John’s River was ceded to this country’.638 Predating those 
interventions undertaken by both the British and Cape governments, his comments 
were also designed to question the preference seemingly shown towards its sister 
colony. Emphasising Natal’s parity as ‘an equal…dependency of England’, numerous 
speakers singled out the High Commissioner for ‘work[ing] only in the interests of 
one colony’; indeed, the Cape was denounced as ‘a colossal neighbour who has 
steadily year by year, with Muscovite aggressiveness…endeavoured to enlarge its 
area…utterly regardless [to] the interests of our community’.639 
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Yet Natal’s pretensions to Pondoland were not based solely on a criticism of 
the Cape’s expansionism; they were justified by the apparent ‘consent’ and 
‘willingness’ of the Mpondo to their proposal.640 Such assumptions were in part 
predicated on the proximity between the two territories. Bisset stated simply that 
‘its geographical position naturally appertain[ed] to Natal’, and that the natural 
border with the Cape in fact lay along either the Mthatha or Mtamvuna rivers.641 
Moreover, if it was a choice between ‘looking southward or northward’, then 
Escombe was convinced that the long-standing friendship between Natal and the 
Mpondo would prove persuasive, especially since the Cape had engineered the 
attempted deposition of Mqikela in 1878.642 
This willingness to interfere in a post-proclamation Pondoland was bitterly 
noted by Transkeian officials. Writing in June 1880, the Chief Magistrate of East 
Griqualand complained that the tensions that now existed between the Eastern 
paramountcy and the Cape had partly been encouraged by a ‘“Natal point of view” 
[that] the Pondos have been wronged by us’.643 According to this perspective, 
politicians in Pietermaritzburg absolved Mqikela from any involvement in the Griqua 
rebellion; moreover, the conflicts along the Xesibe border were attributed to the 
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aggressiveness of those who had since been designated British subjects.644 Precisely 
how influential this “view” was is impossible to gauge, although it was perhaps 
evidenced by Mqikela’s appeal to Theophilus Shepstone to represent Mpondo 
grievances to the Cape following the outbreak of further fighting along the colonial 
border in 1886.645 Of course, such ties were just as likely forged because of the 
increasing tensions between the paramountcy and the Cape. Nevertheless, they 
undoubtedly bolstered Natalian politicians’ belief about the colony’s own 
jurisdictional appeal. As Bisset explained: ‘I refer to the willingness of the Pondos to 
join this country, while they are unwilling to join the Cape. Their associations and 
feelings have always been towards Natal, they are part and parcel of the Zulu nation 
and not of the Kaffirs of the Old Colony’.646 
This painting of the Mpondo as ‘part of the Zulu nation’ is striking. Officials’ 
willingness to speak in such terms perhaps reflected the confidence of the settler 
state following the defeat of the Zulu kingdom in the Anglo-Zulu War (1879). The 
extension of this term to populations beyond its own boundary suggests that the 
desire to incorporate Mpondo territory was tied to the parallel demands of land and 
labour-hungry colonists in the north of the country.647 Moreover, the invocation of 
Zulu nationhood was also likely based on a misunderstanding of the appeals made 
by certain Mpondo subjects themselves. Writing in 1894, the imiZizi chief, Patekile, 
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(CA) CMK-1/2: Secretary for Native Affairs to Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, 5 November 1877. 
647 For a recent account of the jurisdictional ambiguities that characterised the immediate post-war 
period in Zululand, see T. J. Tallie, ‘Racialised Masculinity and the Limits of Settlement: John Dunn 
and Natal, 1879-1883’, Journal of Natal and Zulu History, 30 (2012), pp. 1-22.  
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contacted the Resident Magistrate at Harding to ask to move under the Natal 
Government. His request was likely precipitated by the civil conflict in Pondoland; yet 
the chief’s language is of particular interest: ‘I am not a Pondo. I have become one 
(hereditarily)…I always had country extending beyond the Umtamvuna…I belong to 
Natal and so does my country. I cannot go to the Cape’.648 
Patekile’s appeal usefully illustrates how otherwise unconnected disputes 
could coalesce to question the Cape’s authority in Pondoland. Certainly, Natal’s 
willingness to ponder the extension of its southernmost boundary reflected a desire 
for economic and territorial expansion that was, in part, inspired by the jurisdictional 
struggles at Port St. John and the appeals made by various European settlers. But 
such ambitions were also arguably invigorated by the further instability precipitated 
by royal house rule from the mid-1880s. After all, whilst the imiZizi chief made clear 
that he was no Mpondo subject, his plea to the Natal Government also underlined 
his explicit rejection of the Cape. In this way, his own jurisdictional claim to autonomy 
coincided with the political possibilities considered by Natal. As such, his petition thus 
betrayed a perception of the Mpondo paramountcy and colonial state as largely 
indivisible, thereby suggesting the increasing interdependence of these otherwise 
inimical institutions.  
Such a view was likely born from the Cape’s support for Sigcau - who succeed 
Mqikela to the paramountcy following the latter’s death in 1887 - during the 
outbreak of civil conflict from 1891. Patekile, who supported Mhlangaso’s rival 
                                                          
648 (PA) CSO-1396: Resident Magistrate, Harding to Colonial Secretary, 15 May 1894. Statement by 
Umbontyi ka Mhlanhla.  
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pretensions to power, unsurprisingly sought to remove himself from under the 
authority of a paramount who he rejected, and who was in part dependent on the 
recognition of the Cape government. This process of increasing imbrication had been 
well under way prior to the precipitation of conflict. Indeed, the Cape had struggled 
to assert its authority over Port St. John and along the country’s north-western 
borders, whilst the paramountcy had begun to place huge pressure on those intra-
Mpondo relations upon which it ultimately depended. As the following section will 
show, this ambiguity over who precisely governed Pondoland allowed Mpondo 
actors to utilise the jurisdictional boundaries of the polity at the same time as the 
Cape sought to instrumentalise the growing fissures within it. It was this dynamic that 
characterised the outbreak of conflict and which facilitated the further imbrication 
of paramountcy and state in the immediate pre-annexation period.   
 
Civil War and Annexation: 
As noted above, the tensions that characterised the northwest of the country were 
not abated by the consolidation of the colonial boundary along the Rode. Quite the 
opposite; the settlement of Griqua loyalists had increased the propensity for violence 
in the region, thereby inflaming the already fraught relations between the various 
Mpondo, Baca and Xesibe communities that resided in the region.649 The impact of 
such instability was unevenly spread; although, it was the Nci who had arguably 
                                                          
649 Archival sources detail numerous outbreaks of conflict – both major and minor – throughout the 
mid-1880s. For examples, see (CL) Hargreaves Papers, Rev. Hargreaves to Mr Mason, 2 April 1886, 
MS.15.470; (UCT) Stanford Papers, Rev. Hargreaves to Stanford, 31 October 1886, File BC293-B84-
78; (UCT) Stanford Papers, Rev. Hargreaves to Stanford, 8 November 1889, File BC293-B84-78.  
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suffered the most since their location sat at the confluence of the competing claims 
made upon the Rode, Mnceba and Xesibe border (Fig. 3.3).  
  The continual outbreak of conflict ultimately forced the Cape to compel the 
Mpondo to drop their pretensions to the entire region; following two particularly 
serious encounters, the colonial government demanded that the paramountcy 
formally cede the Rode on 9 December 1886.650 The same request was also made of 
Xesibeland and Port St. John, thereby limiting the possibility for the further economic 
expansion of the Mpondo state.651 As the previous section illustrated, however, 
these developments meant little to, and actually created new opportunities for, 
various extra-local and extra-Mpondo actors.  
                                                          
650 Beinart, ‘Production, Labour Migrancy and the Chieftaincy’, p. 104; Saunders, ‘Annexation’, pp. 
399-400. Correspondence concerning the encounter can be found in (CL) Hargreaves Papers, Rev. 
Hargreaves to Mr Mason, 5 November 1886, MS.15.470. 
651 Beinart, ‘Production, Labour Migrancy and the Chieftaincy’, p. 106. 
Fig 3.3: ‘Sketch Map of the Country between the Kei and Umzimkulu Rivers, or the 
Transkeian Territories’, in Henkel, History, Resources and Productions; The Mnceba, Rode 
Valley and Xesibe boundary. 
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Here too, the acquisition of the Rode – which was formally annexed on 29 
July 1887 – was similarly re-qualified by local interests. Just two days before its 
ratification, Mqikela alleged that the Baca chief, Makaula, had claimed this territorial 
acquisition as a form of ‘government assistance’ designed to ‘extend our 
boundary…[so that] the Pondos will be reduced to nothing…[and that] we shall 
become a great and mighty people’.652 But whilst the Baca were bolstered by the 
Rode’s formal cession to the Cape, this change in political status did not automatically 
translate into a change in jurisdictional practices on the ground. As late as 1889 
Mhlangaso could be found at the adjacent Mnceba, pointing out the boundaries of 
the Griqua settlement which extended beyond those formalised by the 
government.653 His actions, which undermined the Cape’s claim to rule the region, 
unsurprisingly fostered greater tension along the border; Hargreaves reported the 
burning down of a school by the Griqua on the Rode border, whilst the Baca were 
alleged to have declared war on the Mpondo.654 
 As Beinart has discussed, these developments provoked the ire of the colonial 
state whilst simultaneously causing discontent amongst Mpondo chiefs.655 Such 
antipathy towards the “Prime Minister” only increased following the death of 
Mqikela in 1887, and the nomination of Sigcau as his successor a year later.656 Posted 
as a ‘strong man [and] representative of the minor chiefs’, his ascendancy was 
likewise welcomed by the colonial government. Writing to Sigcau on 20 February 
                                                          
652 (CA) CMK-1/147: Donald Strachan to Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, 27 June 1887.  
653 (UCT) Stanford Papers, Rev. Hargreaves to Stanford, 14 February 1889, File B84-66. 
654 (UCT) Stanford Papers, Rev. Hargreaves to Stanford, 27 December 1888, File B84-62; (UCT) 
Stanford Papers, Rev. Hargreaves to Stanford, 5 December 1889, File B84-65. 
655 Beinart, ‘Production, Labour Migrancy and the Chieftaincy’, p. 110.  
656 For a description of an oral testimony detailing his succession to the paramountcy, see Beinart, 
‘Production, Labour Migrancy and the Chieftaincy’, p. 108. 
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1888, the Secretary for Native Affairs viewed the occasion as an opportunity to re-
establish ‘friendly relations…remove all disturbing and irritating influences’ along the 
border and to secure ‘the prosperity of the Pondo nation’.657 
 Consequently, the Cape thus supported Sigcau’s attempts to remove those 
Griqua that had been settled by Mhlangaso in 1885. Reifying the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the polity arguably allowed them to instrumentalise the divisions 
within it. After all, whilst Sigcau underlined his intention to ‘carry on the government 
of the tribe’, Mhlangaso was simultaneously spotted ‘doctoring’ his people for 
war.658 When civil conflict eventually broke out in 1890, officials thus offered to arm 
Sigcau and provide his supporters with ammunition – on the condition that they 
accept a government-appointed Resident Commissioner for Pondoland.659 
 Sigcau had repeatedly rejected this request ever since the position was 
ratified by the Cape parliament on 6 July 1888. Done so without his consent, he 
naturally viewed the appointment as an ‘imposition’ designed to undermine Mpondo 
sovereignty.660 The man nominated to the role was John Scott, a seasoned “native” 
administrator who had served as special magistrate on the Cape’s northern border 
from 1880 to 1887.661 Whilst officials were surprised by Sigcau’s refusal to recognise 
Scott, there was one chief who was willing to acknowledge the Commissioner: 
Mhlangaso. Even before the outbreak of conflict, the much-maligned chief had 
                                                          
657 (CA) RCP-1: Secretary for Native Affairs to Sigcau, 20 February 1888. 
658 (UCT) Stanford Papers, Rev. Hargreaves to Stanford, 8 November 1889, File BC293-B84-78. 
659 (CA) RCP-1: Secretary for Native Affairs to Resident Commissioner, Pondoland, 9 December 1890. 
660 (CA) RCP-1: Sigcau to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 November 1888. 
661 On his role in the region, see Martin Legassick, ‘From Prisoners to Exhibits: Representations of 
‘Bushmen’ of the Northern Cape, 1880-1900’, in Annie Coombes (ed.), Rethinking Settler 
Colonialism: History and Memory in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, (Manchester, 
2006), pp. 63-84. 
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viewed Scott as a potential boon to his wavering position within Pondoland. Writing 
on 2 November 1888, he noted that the country was not ready to accept the official 
but offered his personal support.662 In another letter, he cast himself as the only 
agent capable of bring peace to Pondoland; underscoring his ‘loyalty to…[his] 
country’, he refuted his castigation as a rebel and claimed his fighting was ‘the best 
action…to pursue for the safety’ of both his polity and the paramountcy.663 
Divisions within the country clearly provided an opportunity for the Cape to 
better establish its authority within it. Given Mpondo independence, Scott was 
ordered to compile a list of all those ‘influential chiefs’ who had ‘shown an inclination 
to come over to the government’.664 Also indicative of officials’ willingness to 
manipulate Mpondo fissures was Stanford’s advice to Scott to base his prospective 
residency between Sigcau’s Great Place and the powerful chiefs near the Natal 
border; doing so would drive a wedge between those ‘not born Pondo and [who] 
would accept [his] control’ and who ‘are, at present…being fined [by Sigcau] for not 
joining the last movement against Mhlangaso’.665 
Such comments underline an argument made in chapter 2 concerning the 
importance of political geography in shaping the communal solidarities and divisions 
that comprised the Mpondo polity. As Beinart has noted, those groups incorporated 
and settled by Faku in the mid-nineteenth century were often placed on the 
perimeter of the kingdom for defensive reasons.666 Whilst those related to the royal 
                                                          
662 (CA) RCP-1: Mhlangaso to Scott, 2 November 1888. 
663 (CA) RCP-1: Mhlangaso, to Scott, 17 January 1891. 
664 (CA) RCP-2: Secretary for Native Affairs to Resident Commissioner, Pondoland, 29 April 1891.  
665 (CA) CMK-1/149: Chief Magistrate, Transkei to Prime Minister, 13 November 1893. 
666 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 12. 
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house fought for Sigcau, many of the larger immigrant communities did not – a 
decision partly facilitated by their distance from the Great Place itself. The Cwera, 
under Siyoyo, requested that the Mpondo leave them and their stock alone; the Nci 
were understandably reluctant to involve themselves; and the imiZizi, under their 
chief, Patekile, occupied the geographically distant and difficult Isisele Valley and 
were out of the reach of the royal house.667 Indeed, the latter had long contested the 
authority of the Great Place and thus found a usefully ally in Mhlangaso. Given his 
location and his antipathy towards Sigcau, it is unsurprising that it was from the 
imiZizi stronghold that Mhlangaso had sought refuge from April 1891, having fled 
colonial custody in Natal via Mount Ayliff.668 
These chiefly responses arguably underline Herbst’s contention concerning 
the harmony between the physiology of state power and the realities of political 
geography.669 It was the political terrain of Pondoland which both underpinned and 
reflected the forms of differential incorporation that bound the country’s composite 
communities in various ways to the paramountcy. By extension, this possibly 
determined the (un)willingness of particular sub-chiefs and their followers to engage 
in the conflict – on whichever side they chose. Detailing the movement of Sigcau’s 
forces, Mhlangaso noted only those likely to support the paramount: the Bala, a 
principal branch of the Nyawuza royal clan; Langa, a prominent ally in Flagstaff, and 
Langasicki, a powerful sub-chief in Bizana.670 
                                                          
667 On the Cwera request, see (CA) RCP-2: Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand to Scott, 2 June 1892; on 
Nci reluctance, see (CA) (CA) RCP-1: Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand to Scott, 23 March 1891. 
668 (CA) RCP-2: Secretary for Native Affairs to Scott, 22 April 1891; (CA) RCP-2: Secretary for Native 
Affairs to Scott, 24 April 1891. 
669 Herbst, States and Power, p. 135. 
670 (CA) RCP-1: Mhlangaso to Resident Magistrate, Mount Ayliff, 27 November 1890. 
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To be sure, Hunter provides details concerning the military organisation of 
the Mpondo polity. As she notes, each military district was organised on a territorial 
basis; they served as the hub through which able bodied men in a given region were 
collected together before marching to the Great Place. In turn, each district was 
attached to an imizi (local kinship group and residence) of the royal house. Yet these 
were all located fairly close together; three in Lusikisiki and one in Flagstaff.671 Given 
the jurisdictional heterogeneity of the kingdom, and the autonomy typically enjoyed 
by Mpondo chiefs, it is therefore reasonable to suggest that military organisation, 
much like the exercise of political authority, was circumscribed by an expansive 
political geography and the relative concentration of a royal presence.  
Certainly, episodes of violence were mostly confined to the eastern region of 
Bizana, particularly along the border regions shared with both Natal and with Mount 
Ayliff (Fig. 3.4). The initial impetus for conflict stemmed from a series of disputes 
between Mhlangaso and Manundu – a powerful sub-chief with a large following and 
the Great Son of the Isikelo House.672 Archival research has revealed a litany of letters 
detailing the instability precipitated by the two. Not only did officials report 
numerous instances of fighting, they also noted both the instrumentalisation and 
ignoring of these jurisdictional boundaries owing to the increased movement of 
people and stock across them. Both Mhlangaso and Josiah Jenkins requested 
permission to drive their property into Mount Ayliff – a request that was denied.673 
Nevertheless, the resident magistrate reported that 7344 head of cattle had been 
                                                          
671 See Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, pp. 400-10.  
672 (CA) RCP-4: Resident Commissioner, Pondoland to Under Secretary for Native Affairs, 24 July 
1889. 
673 See (CA) RCP-1: Mhlangaso to Resident Magistrate, Mount Ayliff, 27 November 1890; (CA) RCP-1: 
Resident Magistrate, Mount Ayliff to Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, 3 December 1890. 
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placed by the Mpondo as part of a ‘private arrangement…with their friends’ in the 
district for the purposes of protection.674 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But whilst this movement of important socio-economic resources 
transformed the border into a potential resource to be used by various actors, it also 
undermined its jurisdictional saliency. When a headman from Mount Ayliff, Gaqa, 
crossed over into Bizana to search for his stolen stock, he was chased back into his 
district and then severely beaten by Sigcau’s ally, Langa, who accused him of entering 
the country to bewitch him at the behest of Mhlangaso.675 The same issues likewise 
befell Natal, which was particularly concerned by the instability caused by the conflict 
                                                          
674 RCP-2: Assistant Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand to Scott, 14 July 1891. 
675 (CA) RCP-1: Resident Magistrate, Mount Ayliff to Scott, 2 April 1891. 
Fig 3.4: ‘Sketch Map of the Country between the Kei and Umzimkulu Rivers, or the 
Transkeian Territories’, in Henkel, History, Resources and Productions; Bizana, 
Manundu and Patekile’s location, and the Natal borderlands.  
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between Manundu and Patekile. One man, who stood accused of attempting to steal 
stock for Manundu, was chased over the border, shot, beaten and disembowelled by 
followers of Mhlangaso and Patekile.676 Of course, there were numerous other 
incidences that both preceded the outbreak of war and were far less violent. 
Nevertheless, officials reported an aggregate loss of 365 horned cattle, 137 horses, 
231 sheep and 37 goats between 1 June 1890 and 9 September 1894.677 And this, 
during a time ‘throughout which the Government of the Cape Colony claimed its 
rights to be solely consulted in regard to Pondo affairs’.678 
In this respect, the conduct of conflict along these borders highlighted the 
limited reach of both the royal house and the Cape, in ways that underlined the 
ambiguity over who precisely governed the country. It was the potential 
opportunities provided by these marginal spaces that undoubtedly motivated 
Mhlangaso to offer his country and followers to the Natal government – a proposal 
rejected by Sigcau, who instead expressed his determination to submit to the 
Cape.679 For their part, Transkeian officials likewise faced repeated pressure from its 
sister colony to suppress the stock thefts along the inter-colonial boundary, lest 
‘someday people will take the law into their own hands’.680 Whilst their warning 
referred to those local communities which occupied this contested region, Natalian 
officials were in no doubt of ‘the loyalty of our natives to their Government’.681 This 
implicit jurisdictional claim was also given further credence, since Natal had incurred 
                                                          
676 (CA) RCP-3: Resident Magistrate, Harding to Scott, 27 January 1893. 
677 (PA) CSO-1938: Minute from Prime Minister’s Office, 9 September 1894. 
678 (PA) CSO-1938: Minute from Prime Minister’s Office, 9 September 1894. 
679 (CA) RCP-3: Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand to Major Elliot, 15 February 1894.  
680 (CA) RCP-3: Secretary for Native Affairs, Natal to Scott, 19 October 1892. 
681 (CA) RCP-3: Secretary for Native Affairs, Natal to Scott, 19 October 1892. 
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financial costs by having to maintain a patrol of mounted policeman along its 
Mpondo border.682 
Outbreaks of violence clearly underscored the need to formalise a 
jurisdictional settlement of Pondoland’s boundaries. On 23 February 1893, the 
Governor of the Cape, Lord Loch, received a telegram warning the colony that unless 
Sigcau ‘can put a stop to the aggressiveness of Manundu’s people, it will be necessary 
to consider whether he should be relieved…by British authority of his responsibility 
as Paramount Chief’.683 These instructions were given additional impetus when, just 
one week later, Loch’s Natalian counterpart received word that Sigcau ‘intends going 
up against Umhlangaso and taking him dead or alive, even if he should cross into 
Natal’.684 Given the difficulty of this north-eastern terrain, such threats remained 
largely idle. Yet in January 1894, one member of the Natal Mounted Police, Colonel 
William Clarke, recalled a huge offensive led by Sigcau, Manundu and Langasiki 
involving more than 15 000 men.685 Whilst the attack failed, Clarke nevertheless 
counted ‘109 dead bodies, all mutilated, and native dogs eating the remains of the 
horses. There were, of course, many dead bodies in the bush’. With little prospect of 
a political settlement, Mhlangaso, along with ’54 chiefs and headmen…accompanied 
[Clarke] to the Police Camp. Here, they petitioned Colonel Dartnell to move the police 
into Pondoland and annex the country, the only method, they said, of restoring 
peace’. 
                                                          
682 See (PA) CSO-1938: Secretary for Native Affairs to Colonial Secretary, 26 January 1892 and 28 
January 1892.  
683 (CA) RCP-3: Downing Street to High Commissioner, Cape Colony, 3 February 1893. 
684 (CA) RCP-3: Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson to Lord Loch, 1 March 1893.  
685 The following is taken from (KCL) Clarke Papers, ‘My Career in South Africa, 1878-1918. Parts I 
and II’ and ‘How Natal Lost Pondoland’, by Colonel W J Clarke, MS. CLA., Series KCM-65582, File 1.  
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Such activity thus compelled the Cape to pressurise Sigcau to prevent further 
conflict in order to demonstrate his ‘respect [for] Natal territory’.686 Given 
Mhlangaso’s overtures to Natal, however, their instructions arguably doubled as the 
best means by which to prevent its sister colony from pressing its own claims to the 
country. Clarke, for example, rushed back to Pietermaritzburg to speak at the 
Legislative Council, where ‘ministers were delighted with the prospect of annexing 
Pondoland’; informed that he would be appointed Natal’s Resident Commissioner, it 
was only after leaving Ixopo that he learnt that the Cape had instead been ordered 
to assume authority over the polity.687 
As such, Saunders is arguably correct when he states that Natal’s 
jurisdictional ambitions provided the final impetus for annexation.688 Nevertheless, 
this process cannot simply be explained in terms of an inter-colonial rivalry alone. As 
has been shown, their competing claims were thoroughly embedded in a shifting 
network of intra-Mpondo relations that, in turn, had become increasingly fractured 
as a result of the hostility between the Cape and Mpondo paramountcy. The former 
had intended to further circumscribe the jurisdictional reach of the latter through a 
series of annexations across the country. Yet this wrought paradoxical results, 
temporarily centralising the arena in which leading Mpondo protagonists could 
exercise their own right to rule. Doing so fused together a swathe of formerly 
antithetical claims to the Rode whilst undermining the decentralised structures of 
political authority that had long underpinned the polity. Transforming Pondoland 
                                                          
686 (CA) RCP-3: Prime Minister to Scott, 16 January 1894. 
687 (KCL) Clarke Papers, ‘My Career in South Africa, 1878-1918. Parts I and II’, by Colonel W J Clarke, 
MS. CLA., Series KCM-65582, File 1. 
688 Saunders, ‘Annexation’, p. 422. 
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into a multi-jurisdictional space, Mpondo actors began to turn to alternative sources 
of political protection – the Cape, Natal, Mfundisweni – in order to maintain their 
long-held autonomy; moreover, local communities sought to instrumentalise an 
array of jurisdictional boundaries to facilitate the movement of people and stock. At 
the same time, this served to underline an ambiguity over who governed the country 
that encouraged various extra-local and extra-Mpondo actors to take advantage of 
this jurisdictional impasse.  
Such confusion likewise blended with the outbreak of civil war; Mhlangaso 
sought to move between various colonial and Mpondo jurisdictions in order to evade 
both the royal house and the Cape. His actions highlighted the limited reach of these 
otherwise inimical institutions, whilst pointing to the importance of Pondoland’s 
political geography – and the processes of differential incorporation it underpinned 
– in shaping the conduct of the conflict. To be sure, the Cape’s annexation arguably 
did little to settle the recalcitrance of those communities who had decided to support 
Sigcau’s rival. Writing in reference to the Mpondo revolts (1960-63), it is unsurprising 
that Hendricks and Peires should identify those same constituencies – ‘of non-
Mpondo origin’ – and the same location – ‘a small portion of…Bizana…and Flagstaff’ 
– as the centre of rebellion against the Eastern paramountcy in the mid-twentieth 
century.689 Their acknowledgement not only underscores the longevity of those 
fissures and factions that emerged at the end of the nineteenth; as this chapter has 
demonstrated, it also suggests that the increasing interdependence of paramountcy 
                                                          
689 Hendricks and Peires, ‘All Quiet on the Western Front’, p. 138. 
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and state – best embodied by the Mpondo Revolts – thus began in the moments 
preceding annexation itself. 
 
Conclusion: 
Certainly, in the short term annexation arguably served three broad ends: it relieved 
border communities from the pressures precipitated by Mhlangaso’s actions, it 
secured Sigcau’s authority over the paramountcy, and it ensured the Cape’s claim to 
the country. To that end, the formalisation of colonial rule was born, as Beinart rightly 
notes, from a tripartite alliance between multiple minor chiefs, the paramount and 
the government.690 However, this coalition of interests would not last long. Just days 
before the formal cession of the country on 17 March 1894, Thomas Hargreaves, son 
of the Mfundisweni missionary, wrote: ‘it appears that annexation is determined on. 
We were hoping that Pondoland would be placed under Imperial rule, to which 
people would not object. The dread is colonial power’.691  
Such objection likely referred to the fractious politics of the Mpondo polity. 
During the pre-annexation negotiations, Bokleni, son of Nqwiliso, was seen at 
Sigcau’s Great Place, sowing ‘the seeds of dissention among the chiefs [in order] to 
precipitate war’; his aim was to facilitate ‘the downfall and disgrace of Sigcau [which] 
would enable him and his father…to secure better terms from the Government’.692 
For his part, the paramount was ‘willing to be guided by his chiefs if they stand by 
him’; ‘he will fight’, Hargreaves noted, although ‘he feels that if he resolved on war 
                                                          
690 Beinart, ‘Production, Labour Migrancy and the Chieftaincy’, p. 110. 
691 (UCT) Stanford Papers, Diary of Thomas Hargreaves, 5 March 1894, File BC293-D5. 
692 (UCT) Stanford Papers, Diary of Thomas Hargreaves, 13 March 1894, File BC293-D5. 
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some of the minor chiefs would treacherously forsake him in his time of greatest 
need and rejoice at his downfall’.693 Hargreaves’ description of these intra-Mpondo 
discussions arguably points to the precarious position of the paramount. With his 
authority only just re-established, and in part dependent on its recognition by the 
Cape, Sigcau ran the risk of alienating the very support that had been undermined by 
Mhlangaso. This need for consensus not only reflected the factions and fissures 
recently exposed by conflict; it also highlighted how any resistance or acquiescence 
to colonial rule would inevitably fracture on the regional autonomy of Mpondo 
chiefs.  
In this sense, the formalisation of colonial rule did not necessarily imply the 
consolidation of colonial authority; like other moments of intervention, annexation 
would be re-qualified by those conversations concerning the exercise of authority 
and subjecthood that had been precipitated by Frere’s proclamation in 1878. Indeed, 
Pondoland’s newfound status as a colonial possession should not preclude an 
acknowledgement of the broader imperial context in which these more localised 
developments occurred. Whilst Pondoland was annexed to the Cape, this loss of 
Mpondo independence also marked the country’s formal admission to empire. With 
this in mind, the jurisdictional disputes, competing claims and political possibilities 
explored in this chapter did not simply dissipate; rather, in the post-annexation 
period, they became inflected with an additional imperial impetus.  
Take, for example, the complaints of certain Natalian traders. As Beinart has 
explored, many were invested in the continuation of Mpondo independence for 
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commercial self-interest.694 One such man was Mr W J Rethman of Messrs Mills and 
Rethman Ltd, a trading business with stores in Flagstaff and Bizana, and who, in 1891, 
was also elected as the representative of Alfred County in Natal’s Legislative 
Council.695 Rethman had been a strong supporter of Mhlangaso; denied a trading 
licence by Sigcau, he was alleged to have been authorised by his rival to mobilise 
numerous farmers to march to his assistance ‘upon promises of farms as re-
numeration’.696 Moreover, Cape officials accused him of using his political position 
as ‘a force for filibustering’ the council to press the issue of Mpondo annexation.697 
In this way, Rethman represented the fusion of two competing claims to the country 
that were antithetical to the authority of both Sigcau and the Cape. 
Of course, by 1894 numerous traders were pleased by the prospect of 
annexation, especially since their personal property had been badly affected by the 
outbreak of conflict.698 By contrast, the stability provided by colonial rule arguably 
provided a boon to local business.699 Certainly, by 1902 Major Sprigg counted a 
trading community of fifty Europeans in Bizana; living alongside 35 000 Mpondo, the 
official complained that this concentration of trade meant that the ‘interests of the 
whole district’ were often ‘sacrificed for the interests of this small number of 
                                                          
694 Beinart, ‘European Traders’. 
695 On Rethman’s stores, see (CA) RCP-3: Rethman to Scott, 29 January 1894; on his election as an 
MLA, see (CA) RCP-1: Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, to Scott, 8 January 1891. The company is 
listed in the Transkeian mercantile directory in Henkel, History, Resources and Productions, p. 107. 
696 (CA) RCP-1: Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, to Scott, 8 January 1891. 
697 (CA) RCP-1: Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, to Scott, 8 January 1891. 
698 For numerous examples of Mpondo looting, some involving the paramount himself, see Beinart, 
‘Production, Labour Migrancy and the Chieftaincy’, p. 114; (CA) RCP-1: Under Secretary for Native 
Affairs to J. H. Scott, 27 June 1889. Deposition of John Brown; (CA) RCP-1: Chief Magistrate, East 
Griqualand to Scott, 8 January 1891. 
699 As one resident remarked: ‘Justice showed a little sign of showing in Pondoland. O Lord, Yes!’ See 
(CA) A-1403: O’ Donnell Papers, Vol. 7: Diary, 1894, 21 August 1894. 
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people.700 Desirous to keep out further competition, the prices for essential goods 
were extraordinarily high; indeed, Sprigg recalled how several non-Europeans had 
‘combined to import their own supplies [to] prove that the prices being charged by 
the traders…were from fifty to a hundred percent in excess of the prices at which the 
consumers could import for themselves’.  
 Among them was a Mr Hoosen Haffagee, an Asian man from Ixopo, Natal. 
Local residents welcomed his trade in Bizana; one headman explained that his 
business ensured that ‘the prices of sugar and rice [had]…dropped one penny per 
pound since his arrival’. Diluting the supply of essential goods, European traders 
unsurprisingly sought his removal.701 Chief among them was Mr Walton, manager of 
Rethman’s company. Writing to Sprigg, he questioned how Haffagee had been 
allowed to trade in the district, citing his ‘very strong feeling against granting licences 
to Asiatics’.702 Such comments reflected those rights – whether personal, 
proprietorial or political – enjoyed by British colonists but denied to Natal’s Asian 
population.703 Yet Sprigg dismissed the complaint. He noted how Haffagee’s 
application had been accompanied by ‘a high certificate of [his] character’ from the 
Ixopo magistrate, and ‘strong testimonials by gentlemen of good standing in Natal’; 
‘aware’ of the argument ‘that the musselman will have a moral effect on the natives’, 
                                                          
700 The following is taken from (CA) CMT-3/48: Resident Magistrate, Bizana to Chief Magistrate, 
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Indians in Colonial South Africa’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 26:4 (2013), pp. 479-502, here p. 
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he nevertheless considered it to be ‘a grave injustice if all the British citizens of Asiatic 
blood were forbidden on that account all the rights of trade in a British Colony’.704    
 Whether similar petitions were lodged by European traders is unclear. 
Regardless, the dispute between Walton and Sprigg highlights how pre-annexation 
claims to Pondoland could fuse with a broader politics of imperial belonging to 
similarly question the Cape’s authority in the post-annexation period. Despite the 
formalisation of colonial rule in 1894, officials were clearly vulnerable to challenges 
to colonial authority predicated on an invocation of membership to empire. In this 
instance, Walton’s complaint was largely ineffective; the practicalities of colonial 
governance overrode any protestation rooted in an inherently idealised and 
racialised notion of imperial subjecthood. As the following chapters will 
demonstrate, however, this was no isolated incident; various Mpondo and extra-
colonial actors were able to re-qualify the meaning and impact of annexation to 
advance an array of often contradictory interests. In this way, annexation did little to 
solve the question of who ruled Pondoland, whilst the conversations concerning the 
exercise of authority and subjecthood continued. 
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Chapter 4: British Subjects in Colonial Pondoland (1): The Cooks vs. 
Colonial Government, 1894-95: 
 
Introduction: 
The Chief Sigcau was summoned to Rhodes and told in plain words that…his people would 
be annexed. The Chief was taken to a cornfield. Suddenly, at Rhodes’ command, machine-
guns began to spray bullets into the high maize stacks which were mown down…Looking at 
the frightened Chief and pointing at the field…Rhodes told him: ‘And that will happen to 
you and your tribe if you give us further trouble!’705 
By the time that Pondoland was annexed on 17 March 1894, colonial officials hoped 
that the ambiguity and instability fomented by earlier interventions had now been 
resolved. This desire for peace across the Transkei was paralleled by a metropolitan 
desire to avoid direct involvement in the management of the Cape’s African policy. 
Not only was the attempt to exert control from London deemed impractical, but 
British interest in Mpondo affairs appeared to be waning.706 Encapsulating this 
sentiment, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Knutsford, emphasised how ‘Her Majesty’s 
Government has never sought to…enforce any policy of their own in relation to 
[Pondoland]…in order that the…interests of the Cape Colony….might be allowed the 
fullest scope’.707 Following the signing of the Deed of Cession by both Mqikela and 
Nqwiliso, colonial authority over the country thus seemed assured. 
 Yet annexation was not just an act of territorial acquisition. It also formed 
part of a longer history of interactions between multiple Mpondo chiefs, colonial and 
                                                          
705 Felix Gross, Rhodes of Africa, (New York: Cassel, 1956), pp. 240-41. 
706 The last imperial Blue Book devoted to Pondoland was printed in 1888 and a request that papers 
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extra-colonial Europeans and border communities. As the previous chapters have 
demonstrated, these various relationships were shaped by the complexities of 
Pondoland’s jurisdictionally heterogeneous and politically decentralised nature. As a 
result, the country had long been riven by overlapping, sometimes conflicting and at 
other times complimentary claims to rule that were articulated from multiple sites 
of power by often inimical historical actors. The political conversations that took 
place within the polity served to highlight a contestation over notions of Mpondo 
authority and subjecthood that simultaneously re-qualified the competing advances 
made upon the region by both the Cape and Natal. The acceptance of annexation 
would likewise be no simple matter. Indeed, the following two chapters will argue 
that this process was about more than just the transfer of administrative authority 
to the Cape. Whilst it was ultimately irreversible, it was never wholly totalising. In 
fact, it provided numerous opportunities for African and European actors alike to co-
opt this new political dispensation towards ends for which it was never intended.  
 Accounting for why this was possible requires a re-examination of the precise 
nature of Pondoland’s incorporation into the Cape. When the country was finally 
annexed on 17 March, it was first done so by imperial proclamation under the 
authority of the Governor of the Cape, Lord Loch. Administrative responsibilities were 
not transferred to colonial hands until six months later on 25 September, following 
its ratification by the colonial parliament.708 Whilst this was a procedural technicality, 
it nonetheless raises an important question about what exactly Pondoland was being 
incorporated into. Was it empire? Or was it colony? 
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For those more sympathetic to colonial rule, this was a non-issue. In a meeting 
with Major Elliot on 19 March, Nqwiliso, unable to distinguish between the colonial 
and imperial governments simply pledged to ‘give up my country, my people and my 
forests…to the Queen’.709 In the East, by contrast, historical actors felt the distinction 
to be an important one. This was most apparent during the pre-annexation 
negotiations, when Sigcau attempted to achieve for Pondoland the status of an 
imperial protectorate. As Major Elliot noted, ‘he inquired if it was still possible to 
make a submission to the Queen…[but]…I answered him that His Excellency the 
Governor was acting as [her] representative…and the only submission he could make 
must be under the conditions His Excellency has laid down’.710 Here, both the 
paramount and Chief Magistrate of Tembuland similarly invoked an idea of imperial 
membership. For the former, it likely served as an attempt to defer direct colonial 
annexation. But for the latter, it was the veneer of imperial association that seemed 
to endow this process with added legitimacy. Just as Sigcau sought to actively 
differentiate between empire and colony, the state attempted to conflate the two.  
That this notion of imperial belonging could be instrumentalised for 
apparently antithetical ends is a well acknowledged characteristic of a pliable British 
subjecthood that was carried across empire.711 Less concerned with the jurisdictional 
ties between crown and colony, this was a “Britishness” that, as Saul Dubow has 
argued, may best be seen ‘as a field of cultural, political and symbolic attachments 
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which includes the rights, claims and aspirations of subject-citizens as well as citizen-
subjects – ‘non-Britons’ as well as ‘neo-Britons’.712 As Pondoland entered the imperial 
fold, many of its inhabitants – not just government officials but Mpondo chiefs and 
extra-colonial residents and traders – would now be able to better claim the 
protections and privileges conferred by their imperial membership in order to 
advance their particular interests.  
This was made especially clear during the proceedings of two high-profile 
cases heard in the Cape Supreme Court in the immediate post-annexation period. The 
first concerned Thomas and James Cook, English concessionaries who sought to 
challenge the colonial government’s decision to annul the commercial treaties they 
had negotiated with a then independent Sigcau. The second involved the paramount 
himself, as he protested against his arrest by the state on multiple charges of sedition 
and disloyalty.  In both instances, claims to imperial membership and appeals to 
notions of British justice were employed to challenge colonial incorporation. In doing 
so, they provoked a new debate about the nature and exercise of British rule in 
Pondoland. How British was the colonial state? Who exactly was British? Who was 
loyal to the crown? What values, practices and institutions best embodied British 
authority? 
The following two chapters will examine the answers to these questions as 
they were debated by historical actors during each judicial encounter. Taken 
together, they will illustrate how those on either side of the colonial divide shared in 
a mutual recourse to a notion of imperial membership that functioned as a powerful 
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construct in the re-negotiation of colonial rule. Assertions of “Britishness” thus served 
to fracture the moment of annexation in the service of a swathe of long-held interests 
that were bolstered by this added imperial impetus. Consequently, there emerged a 
debate over the precise practice and nature of British rule in Pondoland. Such 
contestations were intimately tied to the Cape’s capacity to govern, as colonial 
officials struggled to monopolise its meaning in the immediate post-annexation 
period. By drawing attention to these disputes, these chapters will demonstrate how 
incorporation did little to settle the question of who ruled the country. Quite the 
opposite, it revealed the continued potency of competing ideas of political authority, 
even as the range of possibilities was drastically narrowed by the formalisation of 
colonial rule. 
 
Agents of Empire? The Cook Brothers in Pondoland: 
Writing from London in the early 1900s, James Charles Cook published a retrospective 
account of his time spent in Pondoland as a concessionary and industrial capitalist. 
Along with his brother, Thomas, the two Englishmen had spent four years negotiating 
with Sigcau to secure four leases between 1889 and 1893. The brothers were granted 
the right to dig for precious minerals, to construct a railway through the country and 
were provided with inalienable access to 160 square miles of land with the exclusive 
right to use its natural resources. This portfolio of purchases allowed the brothers to 
significantly shape Pondoland’s economy. As Beinart argues, the potential impact of 
their investments differed radically from the transformative effects already wrought 
by the longer-term trade in pastoral products on Mpondo state and society.713 Yet 
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such concentrated influence was presented by Cook in distinctly utilitarian terms. The 
development of the rail line was meant to provide local and regional farmers with an 
outlet to Port St. John for their produce, triple government custom dues, provide 
employment for thousands of African labourers and ensure increased revenues from 
agricultural and mineral production.714 More importantly, the signing of the 
concessions had served to indirectly extend British influence over an area recently 
riven by civil war. According to Loch, the Cook’s agreements with Sigcau had 
reconciled the chief to the beneficial prospects of colonial rule, facilitating a ‘peaceful 
surrender and…provisional cession of his country [that had been] attended with much 
labour and risk’.715  
In emphasising the transformative potential of his concessions, Cook 
undoubtedly framed his efforts in Pondoland as part of a longer tradition of private 
enterprise in the service of African development. This was a moral and material 
project of incalculable imperial worth powered by British enthusiasm and capital.716 
By brandishing his imperial credentials, his narrative thus neatly reinforces Lauren 
Benton’s assertion that European expansion into extra-European territory was first 
and foremost predicated upon a historical ‘system of rewards that required subjects 
to sustain their ties to sovereigns and seek future patronage on the basis of evidence 
that they had advanced crown interests’.717 However, the onus to evince an imperial 
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utility was hardly unidirectional. If entrepreneurship under the aegis of empire 
entailed certain responsibilities, then it was likewise presumed that reciprocal rights 
and protections would be afforded to those engaged in the heavy lifting of empire-
building itself. Indeed, the title of Cook’s account betrayed this very point. His Facts 
of an Injustice Done by the Imperial Government of Great Britain did more than just 
describe the cultivation of their agreements with Sigcau in an independent 
Pondoland. Crucially, it narrated in disparaging detail the manner in which those 
leases were nullified following its annexation by the Cape in 1894. 
The Cooks’ fear of the non-ratification of their concessions prior to annexation 
was well known. During the pre-annexation negotiations, Major Elliot had recorded 
how they had tried ‘strenuously to prevent the Chief from making a submission which 
would place the country under the administrative control of the Cape Government, 
going even so far as to offer Sigcau a large sum of money to treat with the Imperial 
Government…through their agency’.718 This attempt to underline their own centrality 
in the management of Pondoland’s affairs arguably served as the means through 
which empire’s role as the facilitator of private venture could be maintained. This 
implicit instrumentalisation of imperial resources revealed a clear preference for 
imperial rather than colonial rule that was perhaps less evident in Cook’s version of 
events ten years later. To be sure, the title of his tract suggests that the blame for the 
nullification of his concessions was placed squarely on imperial shoulders. That he 
identified Loch as particularly culpable gives further credence to this assumption.719 
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Along with Rhodes, Cook retrospectively ridiculed the assurances they had given him 
that his commercial ventures would survive annexation intact. After all, at the same 
time he was encouraged to continue his annual lease payments to Sigcau, he also 
discovered a newspaper report of an after-dinner speech in which Rhodes had made 
clear his intention not to recognise the concessions.720  
 Yet Cook’s argument was about more than the dishonesty of a few officials. 
His critique had less to do with the fact of Pondoland’s annexation than it did with 
the precise nature of its transfer from imperial to colonial hands. The concessionaries 
never challenged the proclamation that annexed the country to empire. Indeed, 
following the Governor’s actions Cook made clear that he ‘not only considered their 
rights sanctioned [by] the Imperial Government…but that the Colonial Government 
would declare their rights on taking over the country’.721 That it took the formal 
transition to colonial rule to negate the concessions was therefore telling. Given the 
absence of controversy prior to this handover, Cook claimed that it was for 
conspicuously vague ‘state reasons’ that the colonial government had decided to 
repudiate his claims.722 Such conspiratorial language was designed to draw attention 
to the role played by Loch, who had already acknowledged the potential “civilising 
influences” of the schemes.  
Such inconsistency was perhaps to be expected from the man whose dual role 
as High Commissioner and Cape Governor required the mediation of often conflicting 
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colonial and metropolitan demands.723 At the very least, Cook was confused as to 
whose interests Loch was meant to represent. After all, the concessions had been 
signed in a region recently demarcated as British territory and inhabited by newly 
designated British subjects. As Cook’s attorney argued, had the brothers been the 
subjects of a foreign power, ‘[their] claims would have been granted…but being 
British subjects, advantage was taken by the High Commissioner to outrage every 
principle of justice by the shameful repudiation of their rights’.724 For him, the episode 
signalled the imperial government’s willingness to sacrifice the legal protections of 
British citizens on the altar of colonial rule. 
Cook’s argument predicated itself on two issues. The first concerned the 
changed status of Pondoland from an independent polity to colonial possession. This 
transfer of power begged a second, more complicated question regarding the ability 
of Englishmen, operating as agents of empire in a formerly sovereign African 
kingdom, to uphold their claims against the Cape in the wake of annexation. In many 
respects, his dilemma invoked the much older notion of a portable British 
subjecthood carried out across the Atlantic by empire’s early settlers and sojourners. 
Indeed, his complaint represented what James Muldoon has termed ‘the problem of 
overseas empire from the perspective of the Englishman abroad’ - the assumed 
retention and enforcement in the non-European world of those rights and privileges 
usually enjoyed at home.725 Such a position entailed a basic view of English law as the 
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guarantor of individual liberty and freedom against the arbitrary power of the state – 
a protection considered the innate right of free-born men.726 For Cook, the 
repudiation of his leases therefore implied the capriciousness of colonial rule as 
anathema to Britain’s empire, predicated as it apparently was on the violation of the 
rights of British subjects. 
In advancing his argument, the concessionary arguably sought to cast doubt 
on the legitimacy of the Cape’s claim to govern. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was this 
jurisdictional dispute that had prompted the Cooks to challenge the colonial 
government, albeit unsuccessfully, in the Cape Supreme Court from 6 March 1895. At 
the precise moment when the issue of annexation appeared to have been settled, 
Cook thus threw back open the question of who exactly wielded power in Pondoland. 
Was it the imperial government, in whose name the concessionaries appeared to 
have acted? Was it the colonial state, whose rule had been ratified through the Deed 
of Cession? Or was it the paramount himself, whose own authority had remained 
intact despite these colonial and imperial interventions?  
In reality, the answer was all three. At various times the spectres of the state, 
crown and paramountcy had been simultaneously invoked by multiple historical 
actors as a means of navigating between the multiple ‘forms of attenuated and partial 
sovereignties’ that had comprised the country prior to its incorporation.727 But by 
questioning the state’s claim to rule, Cook’s critique arguably served to highlight the 
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acute dissonance between the issuing of imperial proclamations and their impact on 
the ground in Pondoland.  
Certainly, this was a subject of intense debate during the Supreme Court 
proceedings. For Justice Schreiner, the central issue was whether Sigcau had any 
authority to grant the Cooks’ concessions given that his father had been deposed in 
1878. He asked Donald Strachan, Resident Magistrate in Mzimkhulu, who replied that 
Mqikela’s influence had remained intact, ‘more so than ever before...He was looked 
upon as a martyr for standing up for the rights of the nation…those that did not 
recognise him before, recognised him after the proclamation’.728 His argument was 
supported by Oxley-Oxland, who explained that beyond the region of Port St. John, 
‘there was nothing in the treaty in which the Pondos would [have] acknowledge[d] in 
any way as admitting the sovereignty of the Queen’.729 Both underscored the relative 
impotency of the proclamation since it had not been followed by any sustained 
intervention in Mpondo society. Sigcau had thus inherited a paramountcy whose 
power had been little affected by imperial policy. His ability to exercise authority 
within Pondoland, which included the granting of land to its inhabitants, had 
remained largely unchecked. 
Such testimonies raised the issue of how to define imperial jurisdiction. For 
Schreiner, it was nonsensical to argue ‘that because [Frere’s edict] had not been 
followed up by a proper policy that the original act of the Crown [had] become 
void’.730 Instead, the defence pointed to the longer history of imperial intervention in 
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Pondoland, recalling a litany of proclamations that charted the steady subordination 
of the paramountcy to British rule. The Chief Justice referenced the 1844 treaty 
signed by Faku, which was still considered ‘undoubtedly…binding on this court’.731 It 
was the violation of this contract that had warranted the 1878 edict, about which 
Schreiner was adamant there had been ‘no formal abandonment’.732 Whilst Sigcau 
had obviously succeeded his father at the Great Place, it simply meant that ‘there 
[had] always [been] a chief with whom the Imperial Government could deal…but who 
was in all respects under [the] sovereignty’ of the Crown.733 Schreiner thus 
maintained the irreversible authority of the Queen - decreed in 1878 but confirmed 
by the cession treaty in 1894, which stated that ‘Sigcau and his subjects were desirous 
of becoming full subjects of Her Majesty’.734  
Clearly, the defence paid little attention to the purchase of these 
proclamations within the country itself. Instead, they were portrayed as irrefutable 
proof of the long-term political primacy of a British rule that was, on 25 September 
1894, formally transferred to the Cape. This teleological interpretation of the political 
past undoubtedly served to underline the authority of the colonial state whilst 
implicitly recasting Sigcau as a secondary, subordinate power in Pondoland. If the 
chief was to be recognised as paramount at all, then it was ‘only in relation to his own 
tribe’, otherwise he was to function ‘as sub-paramount…to the High 
Commissioner’.735 Such an argument intended to leave little doubt as to who could 
determine the fate of the Cooks’ concessions. As Schreiner explained, it was ‘useless 
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for the adventurer to…think that by dealing solely with [the] chief…he gets rights 
which are legal. All he could get were rights on which his claims would be considered 
on a fair and equitable basis by the Government’.736  
Naturally, Cook disagreed. Far from assuming the mantle of British rule, 
colonial officials had failed to bring Pondoland into empire’s orbit. Whatever the 1878 
proclamation implied, it clearly had little effect within local communities or upon 
Mpondo political institutions. The royal house had remained intransigent and 
independent. As Cook noted, the brothers had cultivated their leases in what was an 
autonomous African polity precisely ‘because no Government thought of annexation 
in those days’.737 Situated beyond colonial borders, they had treated with Sigcau as 
imperial entrepreneurs rather than colonial subjects and thus considered themselves, 
both physically and legally, beyond the jurisdictional reach of the state. For the 
brothers, the nullification of their treaties arguably stood as an infringement of the 
protections they naturally assumed by virtue of their own undertakings. Subjected to 
a polity whose authority they failed to recognise, theirs was ‘an appeal…upon grounds 
of right and justice to loyal subjects of Great Britain’.738 Ironically, it was Cook who 
therefore most effectively articulated an idea of imperial intervention in Pondoland 
in his attempt to uphold the claims of British citizens against the Cape.  
Whilst the state sought to conflate its authority with imperial rule, for the 
concessionaries it was essential to distinguish between the two. This differentiation 
was, however, one that could seriously undermine the purchase of colonial authority 
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in the post-annexation period. Indeed, Cook’s distinction was taken up by leading 
Mpondo chiefs following an armed demonstration at the Cape Mounted Riflemen 
headquarters in Flagstaff in 1895. Reflecting their dissatisfaction with magisterial rule, 
officials noted how ‘a strong feeling in favour of the Cooks has spread right through 
the tribe. They say if the Cooks win [the court case] the country will be handed over 
to the Queen to be governed as Basutoland is’.739 Moreover, rumours spread that 
messengers had been sent to Sigcau by both the Basuto and Zulu chiefs - the latter 
advising the Mpondo to resist the Cape and the former urging the paramount to await 
the outcome of the trial.740  
In questioning the Cape’s jurisdictional claim over Pondoland, the Cooks’ trial 
clearly found currency amongst Mpondo, Zulu and Basuto chiefs. Re-appropriated in 
light of the struggle over the exercise of chiefly rule within Pondoland, it was 
employed to provide a broader critique of colonial governance. Given that this 
challenge was mounted by an extra-colonial Briton, the promise of empire appeared 
to offer an opportunity to negate the power of the state; put another way, ‘pro-
imperialism’ functioned as ‘a kind of anti-colonialism’.741 Of course, in reality Mpondo 
chiefs were engaged in a far more complex form of decision-making than this binary 
choice suggests. Indeed, Cook’s criticism of the Cape highlighted how Mpondo chiefs 
involved themselves in wide-reaching networks of communication that fused 
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together local, regional and imperial factors which informed their interactions with 
the colonial government.742  
It should be made clear, however, that Cook never intended to question the 
validity of some form of European rule in Pondoland. The fact of annexation itself was 
never up for debate. Neither was the extension of those rights he claimed for himself 
to these newly colonised communities. Writing to the Colonial Secretary in November 
1903, the Cooks’ attorney, Lewis Appleton, argued that he only sought ‘to secure for 
them all their great monetary sacrifices’.743 His statement serves as a useful reminder 
that, for all the rhetoric regarding the rights and loyalty of British subjects, the Cooks’ 
claim was as material as it was metaphorical. As Cook himself noted, the brothers had 
lost £42 250 as a result of the cancellation of their concessions; they had ‘imported a 
mining plant, built three dwellings, employed a staff of prospectors, interpreters, 
natives and horses and arranged the capital for the construction of the railway’.744 
Such expenditure did not include any possible return from their mineral discoveries. 
Nor did it reflect the commercial value of the land they had acquired.  
The colonial government was likewise aware of the potential worth of the 
treaties. As Justice Schreiner warned, should the Cape fail to repudiate the leases, 
then the government would be conceding the right ‘to deal with 
any…minerals…[or]…question[s] of development’. Furthermore, they would have ‘no 
power to develop the forests…[and] no power to prevent what [was] practically a 
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trade monopoly’ run by the Cooks but sanctioned by the paramount.745 The non-
nullification of the concessions carried serious political consequences for the state; it 
would preserve the chiefly right to determine European occupation of land, thereby 
severely limiting the commercial cultivation of potentially profitable natural 
resources.746  
 Such anxieties confirm Benton’s suggestion that jurisdictional disputes often 
intensified during critical junctures that marked a shift to new property regimes.747 
Annexation was one such occasion; it intended to signify the subordination of the 
chieftaincy to the colonial state, which entailed the restriction of wealth and power 
that chiefs derived from their control of local land and labour. For the Cape, the 
Cooks’ concessions – themselves a proprietorial claim to the country’s resources – 
depended on its continuity rather than on its post-annexation dismantlement. These 
material disputes thus touched upon the wider issue of colonial governance; as 
Benton again notes, ‘transformations in the law of property…were sometimes 
perceived by social actors as primarily about changes in [or challenges to] the 
ordering of legal authorities’.748 
Indeed, as the above example demonstrates, Mpondo chiefs were able to 
employ Cook’s challenge to similarly critique the Cape at precisely the moment they 
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were meant to capitulate. Yet as previous chapters have illustrated, the distinction 
between incorporation and independence was largely rhetorical. The actions of chiefs 
such as Siyoyo, Gwadiso or Qipu, for example, highlight how the boundaries between 
paramountcy and state had become inevitably blurred prior to annexation. Just as 
Africans displayed an assortment of responses to their increasing contact with 
colonial and extra-colonial actors, Europeans were evidently no less diverse in their 
dealings with Mpondo chiefs.  
This acknowledgement underlines a now taken for granted assumption about 
the need to differentiate between the varied power relations that comprised Britain’s 
empire at any given moment. Specifically, it emphasises the need to complicate the 
categories of “coloniser” and “colonised” in order to disaggregate between the 
different types of historical actors that moved within imperial spaces. ‘Settlers, 
sojourners, local officials or metropolitans’: each operated according to a 
heterogeneous set of interests and engaged with a variety of African agents in a series 
highly distinct interactions.749 As extra-colonial Europeans, the Cooks’ economic 
endeavours arguably embodied a very different project to that envisaged by the 
Cape. The fact that their concessions were cancelled betrays this very point. Whilst 
the state demanded the fixed distinction between coloniser and colonised, the Cooks 
arguably complicated this dichotomy. By invoking their imperial membership, they 
utilised their metropolitan roots to seemingly challenge the former and support the 
latter. Their commercial ventures thus had the potential to undermine the entire 
edifice of colonial rule in Pondoland. Consequently, they had to be repudiated. 
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In the courtroom, this was to be achieved by depicting the treaties as 
anathema to the wider interests of empire. As the following section will demonstrate, 
the defence aimed to prove that the most effective means of securing British rule in 
Pondoland lay in supporting Transkeian officials in their administration of African 
communities. It was arguably for this reason that Cook, in writing his retrospective 
account, sought to question the imperial efficacy of the colonial state. The fact that 
he emphasised the violation of his own rights as an imperial subject suggests that the 
Cape had advanced their own understanding of “Britishness” in justifying their 
cancellation of the concessions. As will be seen, this competing conceptualisation was 
intimately tied to the consolidation of colonial rule in this newly incorporated region. 
 
Defenders of Empire – The Colonial State in Pondoland: 
For officials, extending the benefits of British rule to African chiefdoms was central to 
the colonisation of the Transkei. These were best embodied by the tripartite alliance 
between ‘industrial capitalism, Protestant Christianity and parliamentary 
constitutional government’.750 It was the role of the colonial administrator to 
shepherd their African surrogates along a linear path of human progress, away from 
the primitive structures of the tribe and towards these hallmarks of civilised 
society.751 Chapter 1 explored the ideological underpinnings of this perspective as 
rooted in an earlier nineteenth-century tradition of Cape liberalism. It also 
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demonstrated that, despite its perceived progressivism, this policy of “assimilation” 
often facilitated violent episodes of colonial expansion.  
As the introduction discussed, these interventions were not simply 
destabilising; they also precipitated a broader transformation in the character of late-
nineteenth century colonialism predicated on the attempted instrumentalisation of 
“traditional” authorities. Certainly, Transkeian administrators still viewed their own 
role in terms of a ‘Victorian cultural and ideological milieu of Protestantism and 
improvement, progress, individualism, the dignity of labour and the 
contemptuousness of African institutions’.752 But the Cape also sought to better 
accommodate what it assumed were “native” expectations of government by 
replicating the power and personalism of chiefly rule.753 In the Transkei, the system 
of administration that emerged was thus necessarily cautious;  since the risk of 
political instability functioned to confirm an almost irrevocable cultural distance 
between white and black, the most effective means of consolidating British authority 
lay in the establishment of a custodial system that mitigated against its most dramatic 
effects. The Chief Magistrates of East Griqualand and Tembuland admitted as much 
when they wrote to the Prime Minister requesting a few years of ‘free reign’ in 
governing a newly-annexed Pondoland. Both claimed that they wished ‘to guide the 
Pondos step by step’, but owing to their ‘current condition’ they were not ready ‘to 
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be placed under the operation of the laws in force in adjoining territories where the 
people have had 20 years of training’.754 
Such careful language suggests that, for Transkeian administrators, the 
cultivation of a civilised society first required the consolidation of magisterial rule as 
an essential pre-requisite. This was no easy task, requiring officials to simultaneously 
subordinate the newly conquered to the increasing demands of the colonial state 
whilst attempting to legitimate their own authority over them. As Saul Dubow has 
argued, in the late-nineteenth century the Native Affairs Department often sought to 
ameliorate the harsh transformations wrought by the requirements of a rapidly 
industrialising South Africa.755 In this context, assimilationist rhetoric provided a 
moral justification for territorial acquisition; officials operated on the presumption of 
the superiority of a British-colonial culture that motivated them to work towards the 
best interests of their African charges whilst prioritising political stability.  
Of course, historians have rightly noted that their interventions largely 
functioned to redefine the political and economic functions of African subjects in the 
service of a white-dominated state.756 But it is nevertheless important to 
acknowledge the likely cultural outlook of officials as they found themselves trying to 
reconcile their protective role and coercive functions.757 For them, this could only be 
achieved by a system of governance that sought the steady “improvement” of black 
communities alongside the consolidation of white civilisation – the benefits of which 
                                                          
754 (CA) CMK-1/149: Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand to Prime Minister, 25 March 1894. My 
emphasis. 
755 Saul Dubow, ‘Holding a ‘Just Balance Between White and Black’: The Native Affairs Department in 
South Africa, c. 1920-33’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 12:2 (1986), p. 217. 
756 Parry, ‘“In a Sense All Citizens”’, p. 384. 
757 Dubow, ‘Holding a Just Balance’, p. 218. 
236 
 
they were ultimately to be denied. In the context of the Cooks’ trial this was 
particularly important, because the signing of their leases implied an interaction 
between African and European that was independent of magisterial oversight. 
Granted by a then independent Sigcau, the concessions thus maintained the power 
of Mpondo chiefs precisely at the moment of their intended subordination, thereby 
threatening the wider project of empire building itself.  
Certainly, this was the argument advanced by the defence during the trial, as 
they expressed their alarm at the manner in which the fortunes of the concessionaries 
appeared so entwined with the authority of senior Mpondo chiefs. Officials were 
acutely conscious of the political intransigence that new sources of income were likely 
to encourage. Major Elliot became convinced that Sigcau’s primary motive for 
supporting the concessionaries was because ‘he had no intention of committing 
himself [to the] Government…he expects [the] brothers to win [and] that he will be a 
millionaire with possibly a house in Park Lane, which he prefers to a convenient 
[government] pension’.758 Sigcau’s testimony confirmed as much; he made clear that 
his presence at the trial was to ‘come for the money I parted with the year before 
last’.759 Taken together, the four leases had endowed the paramount with £1906 in 
annual rental fees and £6070 in initial down payments.760 Following annexation, 
however, his income had instead been replaced by what he claimed was an annual 
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government subsidy of only £700.761 Little wonder, then, that the paramount viewed 
the cession treaty as something that he had been ‘pressed into’.762  
From the Cape’s perspective, it was clear that the financial bonds linking 
concessionaries and chiefs were potentially de-stabilising. This was further 
underlined following an investigation into the methods by which the Cooks had 
hoped to fund their commercial endeavours. Closer scrutiny revealed that the 
mineral lease was to be supported by a Mr W P Taylor, a venture capitalist from 
Johannesburg, who had offered the brothers £50 000 to purchase the rights from 
them through his own syndicate, aptly named Pondoland Incorporation.763 Through 
this collective, Taylor intended to link the Cooks’ schemes with his own railway 
concession, negotiated with Nqwiliso in Western Pondoland; this entailed another 
large grant of land near the St. John’s River that required the consent of Major Elliot. 
His refusal appeared vindicated when it transpired that, in purchasing the concession 
from the Cooks, the syndicate had tried to solicit the assistance of other government 
officials. Evidence heard at the trial confirmed that both Stanford and Oxley-Oxland 
had been approached.764 Elliot similarly refused to help, convinced that ‘there [had 
already] been a vast deal of bribery and corruption in connection with the obtaining 
of concessions in Pondoland’, with £1500 already paid to the Western Paramount 
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alone.765 The networks of private greed and chiefly autocracy thus spread far beyond 
Eastern Pondoland, compromising the political integrity of that portion of the country 
deemed most loyal to the colonial state.  
The revelation of these murky transactions served as undoubtable proof that 
certain Mpondo chiefs had colluded with the concessionaries in the self-
aggrandisement of each. But in doing so, the brothers also appeared to have 
alienated large, powerful Mpondo sub-chieftaincies from access to essential 
resources. When questioned, Cook was sure that he had been authorised to ‘go into 
any chieftain’s country…settle down upon his land, mine there…take his arable and 
grazing land…and drive his people off’.766 According to Sigcau, lesser chiefs and 
commoners would have little choice but to remove since he had ‘given Cook a right 
[to occupy] a spot that he wanted from me’.767 The potential for conflict was clear; 
witnesses were convinced that any refusal might be met with ‘the force of arms and 
the point of the assegai’.768 Consequently, officials were able to link the personal 
interactions between concessionary and chief with the increased likelihood of intra-
Mpondo instability.  
Referring to the 160 square mile land lease, Stanford noted that Sigcau was 
under no obligation to divide the income between those communities likely to be 
affected by this transaction. By contrast, he emphasised the state’s refusal to sanction 
the treaties alongside a government pledge to guarantee the grazing rights of every 
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Mpondo inhabitant.769 His priorities arguably reflected the type of stability that 
colonial rule sought to achieve, through the stricter supervision of white-black 
relations and the cementing of communal tenure as a central feature of African socio-
economic life.770 This explicit protection of black interests contrasted with Sigcau, 
who was instead accused of deceiving the Mpondo in ‘seeking his own advantage 
apart from the interest of the tribe’ by offering ‘the white man…exclusive right’ to the 
land.771 
For officials, it was the personal proximity between concessionaries and chiefs 
that meant that the leases could never be validated. Such relationships required 
greater governmental oversight and not just because their actions appeared to 
bolster the post-annexation position of the paramountcy. Intervention was also 
needed to protect the chief himself. Stanford’s testimony revealed a concern that 
Sigcau and his councillors had fundamentally misinterpreted the nature of their 
relationship with the Cooks. He claimed that, following the signing of the second 
concession, the paramount had explained how the brothers were ‘coming in…to join 
him and live in the country as Pondos’. Yet the official thought it unlikely that ‘a kind 
of feudal relationship was [to be] established between the white men coming in and 
the chief’.772 Suspicions were therefore raised that the Cooks had secured their leases 
through dishonest means.  
Indeed, throughout the trial the defence attempted to prove that the Pondos 
had completely misunderstood the meaning of the treaties owing to the impossibility 
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of translating the technical clauses contained within them. They called upon several 
“native experts” – former Transkeian administrators and interpreters – to translate 
terms such as mineral (‘money stone’), mining requisite, (‘no translation’), canal 
(‘hole through a mountain’) and acre (‘from such a place to such a place’).773 Even 
Sigcau himself, called as a witness by the defence, failed to explain precisely how long 
the leases he had signed were valid.774 The inexplicability of these terms was taken as 
tautological proof of both the barbarism of the Mpondo and the avariciousness of the 
Cooks themselves - willing to enter into agreements that African chiefs could hardly 
comprehend.  
Writing in 1904, this was an accusation that had clearly stuck; Cook was 
particularly keen to underline the honourable manner in which the treaties with 
Sigcau had been exacted. Supporting his claims were statements from the colonial 
and British press; they noted the usual ‘exploitation of the black man’s simplicity 
and…greed for the purposes of European speculation’ so common ‘to the concession 
system in general [but] to which their particular negotiation may form a brilliant 
exception’.775 The brothers were to be celebrated for their ‘conspicuous fairness’, 
which served to place them in a ‘distinguished position in the Company of 
Adventurers’.776 Throughout the trial too, Cook had emphasised how he had treated 
openly with the paramount; his testimony detailed the manner in which he had 
cultivated his treaties with the Mpondo, with the first lease taking over 12 months to 
negotiate.777 After being introduced through Mhlangaso, Sigcau recalled that it took 
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over three months before he sat down to speak with the concessionary: ‘at first we 
were suspicious…perhaps they may want to take the ground away from us’.778 During 
that time, Cook had based himself within nine miles from the Paramount’s Great 
Place so that he could travel quickly should he need to meet with Sigcau at short 
notice.779 He recalled how he would visit regularly, attending numerous meetings 
with many chiefs and councillors that could involve up to 5000 people and last over 
six hours at a time. It was only after much hesitancy and public consultation that he 
had managed to garner consent for his concessions at all.780  
Cook’s testimony revealed a crucial point. Whilst the brothers were locked in 
a rhetorical war of words with the colonial government over whether their 
endeavours best embodied British rule, central to their argument were the specific 
details concerning the decision-making processes that underpinned their 
negotiations with the paramount. Such information arguably intended to confirm the 
transparency of the concessionaries, who could point to the legitimacy of their 
treaties by proving that they had been debated and approved at the Great Place. In 
doing so, the Cooks sought to underline their argument that colonial annexation had 
wrongly overturned a popular and legal transaction considered beneficial to both the 
Mpondo and empire, whilst inflicting an injustice on two British citizens. Questioning 
the imperial inefficacy of colonial rule thus depended on a presumed knowledge of 
the ways in which the concessions were discussed amongst the Mpondo themselves.  
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For the Cape too, this information was essential. As the prosecutor explained, 
the defence sought to argue that the leases were invalid ‘according to Pondo 
law…[since] Sigcau did not call together his chiefs and deliberate with them…and that 
he did not do so because he knew perfectly well that they would not give their 
consent’.781 But in order to make pronouncements about the condition of Mpondo 
society, the state required insight into the interactions that took place within it. After 
all, these were significant concessions, involving vast sums of money and potentially 
huge tracts of land, necessarily implicating a large number of chiefs and their 
followers. Were the defence to be armed with the knowledge of Mpondo processes 
of sanction and decision-making, then their allegations regarding the regressive 
impact of the Cooks’ treaties would be substantiated by their proven illegality. 
What this suggests, is that the arguments advanced by both concessionary 
and colony both depended on specific representations of Mpondo governance and 
authority. Put another way, supralocal claims about the practice of British rule 
required a local legitimacy conferred by African law. To some degree this is hardly 
surprising. Both the Cooks and colonial officials were naturally eager to seek Mpondo 
support for their competing designs over the land, resources and inhabitants that 
both now claimed as their own. But that is the very point. Both assumed an authority 
that was largely taken for granted. Given that neither doubted the exercise of some 
form of British rule in Pondoland, their interest in the workings of Mpondo power was 
largely instrumental. Both required insight into the constitution and configuration of 
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political authority in the pursuit of commercial self-interest or political primacy. But 
where were they to get this information from? 
As Cook’s testimony illustrates, such knowledge could only be gained through 
the personal relationships that they themselves had cultivated. For the 
concessionary, this entailed regular meetings with Sigcau over a protracted period of 
time. Private conversations were bolstered by public consultations in an attempt to 
secure the trust of the Mpondo. Whilst the Cooks had only been in the country since 
1889, official representation in Pondoland had increased from 1878, following the 
placing of a British Resident at Port St. John. Coupled with the longer-term dialogue 
between various chiefs and numerous Transkeian administrators, diplomatic agents, 
traders and missionaries, it becomes clear how government officials were able to 
obtain an insight into the consultative mechanisms employed by Mpondo chiefs.782  
Yet this information was not value-free; intra-Mpondo relations and 
institutions had long been shaped by the increased interactions with colonial and 
extra-colonial Europeans. As the previous chapter demonstrated, these broader 
processes both relied upon, and precipitated, a shifting network of affiliations 
between chiefs, the paramountcy and the state. Most recently, these associations 
had fostered multiple loyalties and rivalries in the heat of civil war, although they 
were generally articulated during moments of intervention in the country. 
Annexation provided one such instance that was further aggravated by the Cooks’ 
challenging of the Cape’s claim to rule. To be sure, an awareness of the fissures within 
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Mpondo politics was likely to function as a valuable resource to be manipulated by 
the prosecution and defence in the soliciting of favourable testimonies. Yet the trial 
arguably served as an opportunity for multiple Mpondo actors to pursue agendas that 
were only indirectly connected to the ambitions of each.  
Whilst the Cooks and the Cape were busy questioning or defending the 
imperial efficacy of colonial rule, their debate necessarily foregrounded Mpondo 
networks of power and authority in settling the question of annexation. As Dubow 
suggests, lofty discussions about the nature of “Britishness” often masked very real 
conflicts concerning the control over contested spaces.783 Those spaces had long been 
fractured by factional cleavages within Mpondo society; from 1878 they were also 
marked by an increasing imbrication of local, colonial and imperial interests that 
intersected in complex and contradictory ways. The court case thus served as more 
than an abstract argument fought between colonial and extra-colonial Europeans; it 
likewise doubled as a participative forum for both coloniser and colonised alike, as 
intra-Mpondo relations re-qualified a transfer of power already presumed by 
concessionary and colony.  
 
Instrumentalising Empire? Loyalties and Rivalries within Pondoland:  
Rooting broader debates about “Britishness” in the messiness of local interactions is 
arguably key to highlighting the ways in which annexation was fractured by 
competing conceptions of political authority. Fought out in the Cape Supreme Court, 
                                                          
783 Dubow, ‘How British Was the British World?’, p. 20. 
245 
 
this approach also allows for specific judicial encounters to be placed in their wider 
context. As Bonny Ibhawoh states, this is important given the tendency of court cases 
to present themselves in the archive as ‘cold documents…that do not convey the 
atmosphere in the courtroom or the demeanour of the litigants or witnesses’.784 
Knowledge of the interactions that took place both before and beyond the trial are 
essential, if the procedural aspects of the case and the testimonies provided by 
witnesses are to make sense. As much as these encounters reflected moments of 
judicial judgement, they likewise doubled as episodes of ‘social and political 
theatre’.785 Acknowledging the role of intra-Mpondo relations as formative in the 
production of evidence is therefore crucial to understanding its content and form. 
Likewise, seemingly mundane issues such as the timing and location of the trial may 
be seen as resources to be used by both plaintiffs and appellants in the 
instrumentalisation of pre-existing enmities and affiliations.   
This was particularly evident during the pre-trial preparations, where the 
selection of witnesses to be called for both sides demonstrated a willingness to 
manipulate intra-Mpondo relations. In a letter sent from the Native Affairs 
Department, officials argued this ‘delicate and important’ task required proof that 
the concessions had violated Mpondo law and that statements should be taken from 
those favourably disposed to the government. Their first choice, unsurprisingly, was 
Mhlangaso. Acknowledging his hostility towards Sigcau, officials noted how the land 
given to the Cooks incorporated a large swathe of his former territory. In this context, 
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the grant was arguably interpreted as an attempt by Sigcau to re-inscribe his 
authority over a historically distant and difficult region. Mindful of the potentially 
inflammatory implications of this claim, the government’s attempt to capitalise on 
such divisions was tempered by an awareness of the need to ‘avoid [Mhlangaso] 
becoming aware of the object for which he is being asked to make a statement’.786 
With designs to extract an unwittingly agreeable testimony from the chief, 
government agents were further instructed to track the plaintiff’s attorney as he 
made his way through Pondoland to collect statements in support of the Cooks’ case. 
Discovering what evidence had been gathered by the prosecution did more than just 
provide officials with the pre-requisite knowledge needed to produce an effective 
rebuttal.787 It also served to highlight exactly who had decided to support the Cooks 
in the preparation of their case.  
This targeting of specific witnesses did not, however, imply an Mpondo 
passivity. Chiefs and commoners were all too aware of the significance of the Cooks’ 
case. After all, those called to give evidence were expected to travel to Cape Town to 
provide testimonies at the Supreme Court itself. The sheer logistical effort involved: 
issuing subpoenas, locating witnesses, taking statements and securing their 
attendance in court - all of this would have made participants highly conscious of the 
seriousness of the issues at stake. Claiming financial difficulties, the Cooks requested 
that the trial be heard at a specially convened concession court in either Pondoland 
or Kokstad, owing to the costs they would incur in transporting over thirty witnesses 
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to the colonial capital. But they also betrayed an unease about sending Mpondo 
chiefs unacquainted with Cape Town, to ‘a part of Africa they have never been’. 
Clearly, the brothers were concerned of the effect that such an unfamiliar 
environment might have on those asked to testify against them. The state refused 
this request, justifying their demands on the basis that it would be ‘impossible to find 
in Pondoland an uninterested person fit and competent to take evidence in a matter 
of such public importance’. In emphasising the ‘seriousness of the case and its wide 
reaching implications for other concessions elsewhere’, it is also possible that officials 
intended to force chiefs to give evidence before the Court, hoping to unsettle 
Mpondo participants with institutional pomp and procedural formality.788  
Moreover, the clandestine manner in which the government had sought to 
solicit testimonies from potential witnesses undoubtedly left many feeling anxious at 
the prospect of giving evidence against their paramount. Certainly for Sigcau, the trial 
provided an opportunity to bear down on those chiefs presumed to be allies of the 
royal house. Whilst Ntola, chief of the Ntshangase, had accepted a subpoena to give 
evidence to colonial officials, he was prevented from doing so by the paramount.789 
Eventually, Ntola was sent to Cape Town, but when questioned as to whether he 
would have opposed Sigcau had some of his land been granted to the Cooks, he 
refused to answer because he knew the paramount was sitting in the courtroom.790 
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 Such hesitancy arguably reflected the new political terrain along which 
Mpondo chiefs were now forced to tread. Whilst many had long been able to mediate 
the pressures of both the paramountcy and state, Stanford’s testimony revealed how 
the majority ‘knew that there was another power coming…which made them hurry 
up with [signing] the concessions’.791 A degree of uncertainty was to be expected, as 
older affiliations clashed with newer obligations to the Cape. Yet officials experienced 
no such confusion; they had an effective means of identifying those who were 
expected to support them in court. In his ‘Advice on Evidence’, the Attorney-General 
instructed the Chief Magistrate of East Griqualand to have resident magistrates draw 
up a list of all those chiefs and headman currently receiving pay from the colonial 
state. Having assented to the formal cession of the county in 1894, their names were 
then to be compared to the list of chiefs known to have witnessed or signed the 
concessions. The state was confident that ‘few names [will] appear on both lists; 
while many who do receive pay do not appear to have taken part in the execution of 
the documents in suit’.792 The implication behind this presumption was clear. Those 
in government employ were expected to be loyal to the Cape; those who were not 
would have their salaries withdrawn. 
Drawing up this list served other purposes too; resident magistrates were also 
asked to note down those chiefs and councillors who had not been consulted over 
the concessions, as well as the status of each.793 In doing so, the defence sought to 
arm itself with the evidence required to prove that Sigcau had broken Mpondo law 
                                                          
791 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Stanford, p. 84. 
792 (CA) CMK-8/27: William Schreiner to Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, 14 January 1895. 
793 (CA) CMK-8/27: William Schreiner to Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, 14 January 1895. 
249 
 
by failing to consult with other chiefs before signing the leases. Their argument was 
predicated upon what were referred to as the “constitutional acts” of the Mpondo, 
a term used to describe the practices that undergirded the public discussion of issues 
of national significance. Evidence provided by the paramount explained that matters 
of major importance always required councillors from the Bala and Kwetshube, two 
principal branches of the Nyawuza royal clan, to be represented at the Great Place.794 
In addition, Stanford’s testimony claimed that other influential chiefs, Pondos by 
birth rather than by affiliation, as well as those likely to affected by the issue under 
debate, were also expected to attend before any discussion could take place.795 
Numerous witnesses, however, attested to Sigcau’s flouting of these 
conventions. Unsurprisingly, the Cwera chief Siyoyo had been turned out from 
meetings at the Great Place owing to his known colonial sympathies.796 More 
seriously, a Bala chief, Ntolana, claimed he only found out about the mineral and 
railway concessions after they had been signed - a decision doubly significant owing 
both to the seniority and size of his clan.797 Ngonyolo, recently appointed chief of the 
Nci, alleged that he should have been invited to discuss the treaties because he 
occupied the single largest piece of land likely to be affected by at least one of the 
leases.798 And when Ntola was asked to identify the signatories to the concessions, 
                                                          
794 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Sigcau, p. 30. Arthur Jackson notes the confusion over the origins of the 
amaKwetshube, but states that owing to their historic role as the vanguard of the Mpondo army, 
many self-identified as Mpondo. See Jackson, Ethnic Composition, p. 24. 
795 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Stanford, p. 82. 
796 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Strachan, p. 46.  
797 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Statement by Ntolana, p. 100. 
798 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Statement by Ngonyolo, p. 102. 
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he explained that the majority of the names he recognised were known to be 
associated with the Great Place under the direct authority of Sigcau himself.799  
Such testimonies clearly suggested that Sigcau had colluded with the Cooks 
to the detriment of other Mpondo chiefs. As Stanford stated, he had ‘heard [the 
concessions] mentioned and spoken of as something done at the Great Place that 
was done without the knowledge of the tribe’. In his words, ‘the expression I heard 
was, “this is a thing of Umhlangaso and the chiefs”’.800 Proving this thus allowed the 
defence to argue that the royal house had sanctioned the alienation of African land 
for the private use of white men - ‘an entirely foreign notion’ to the Mpondo.801 
Indeed, Stanford was convinced that the concessions would never have been 
sanctioned according to Mpondo law since the ‘entire native system [was] founded 
upon the communal ownership of land’.802 True enough, the paramountcy had signed 
other treaties with German concessionaries in 1885 and 1891, but owing to non-
payments those leases had lapsed.803 The Cooks, on the other hand, had already 
begun paying their annual rental fees, thereby ratifying the treaties and ensuring the 
transfer of land and resources. Whilst Sigcau claimed he had the right to remove any 
chief, numerous witnesses explained that in reality the paramount’s power was 
measured ‘by the consent of his people…expressed by [his] council’ and that ‘in the 
native mind there [was] a clear distinction between an arbitrary and constitutional 
                                                          
799 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Ntola, pp. 104-5. 
800 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Stanford, p. 84. It must be remembered that the leases were signed prior to 
the outbreak of civil war in Pondoland. As the Prime Minister and principal spokesman of the royal 
house, Mhlangaso would have been instrumental in ensuring the signing of the concessions.  
801 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Stanford, p. 73. 
802 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Stanford, p. 73. 
803 Saunders, ‘The Annexation of the Transkeian Territories’, pp. 393-407. 
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act’.804 For Stanford, it was therefore obvious that Sigcau had not properly consulted 
with his chiefs and councillors, because  ‘if he had given authority to the 
concessionaries to go and occupy a portion of land which was held by one of the 
larger sub-tribes, [he] would have found himself in difficulties at once’.805 
 The evidence supporting his assumption was, unsurprisingly, provided by 
those chiefs identified as having been excluded from the public discussions held at 
the Great Place. Indicative of the breakdown in relations between the paramountcy 
and its sub-chieftaincies, these statements reveal the long-standing enmities that 
existed between them and the royal house. When questioned by the judiciary, 
Ntolana revealed that whilst he had not been personally consulted by Sigcau, his 
uncle, Fadane, currently served as a councillor at the Great Place and had even signed 
the concessions. Pushed further, the chief revealed that he lived away from the Bala, 
but was adamant that he still controlled the tribe and had even led his people when 
they last went out to fight for Sigcau. Such defensiveness suggests his evidence was 
likely linked to the insecurity of his position amongst his own followers and the 
privileging of his uncle at the Great Place, whose right to represent the Bala was 
queried by Ntolana.806  
Similarly, Ngonyolo’s testimony revealed a strained relationship with the 
royal house. His unfavourable evidence likely stemmed from the troubles 
experienced by the Nci as a result of the policies pursued by the Great Place in 
previous years. From 1885, they had long complained of being caught up in the 
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805 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Stanford, p. 76. 
806 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Ntolana, p. 102. 
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fighting that had taken place between the Mpondo and Baca in the Rode Valley.807 
More recently, they had suffered as a result of Mhlangaso’s settling of Griqua allies 
at the Mnceba prior to the outbreak of civil war, as Nci stock was stolen and property 
burnt.808 Given this contentious past, Ngonyolo was unsurprisingly willing to testify 
against the royal house, as decisions taken there once again would likely impact upon 
their access to local land and resources. 
These testimonies were clearly reflective of longer-term fissures; such 
personal enmities may thus have motivated particular chiefs to give evidence against 
their paramount. Whilst officials cited the exclusion of the Ntshangase as yet further 
proof of Sigcau’s alienation of Mpondo chiefs, they made no reference to the fact 
that Ntola headed a minor group.809 It therefore seems reasonable to argue that his 
lesser status was a primary factor in his non-invitation to the Great Place; the court 
case provided an opportunity for the chief to assert his importance in the presence 
of colonial officials. Indeed, whether tied to the position of individual chiefs amongst 
their own followers, the potential for recompense for past sufferings, or the chance 
to elevate certain chiefly fortunes: in all three cases the Cooks’ trial served as a 
platform for the advancement of particular self-interests that reflected past 
contestations with the paramountcy. 
This is important since it demonstrates the extent to which pre-existing 
loyalties and rivalries were formative in determining the outcome of the trial. Whilst 
                                                          
807 See (UCT) Stanford Papers, Rev. Peter Hargreaves to Standord, 30 November and 14 December 
1885, File BC293-B84-2 and File BC293-B84-3.  
808 See (CA) RCP-1: Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand to Resident Commissioner, Pondoland, 23 
August and 12 October 1889; (CA) RCP-2: Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand to Under Secretary for 
Native Affairs, 3 May 1891.  
809 Jackson, Ethnic Composition, p. 23.  
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the defence attempted to cite Mpondo processes of decision-making in order to 
prove the illegality of the concessions, it did so on the basis of evidence that was 
necessarily inflected with partisan aims. Whilst the Cape sought to demonstrate how 
the royal house had acted “unconstitutionally”, it did so by seeking testimonies from 
those affected by it. As Martin Chanock notes, ‘custom regarding a basic institution, 
already irrevocably altered in its workings, was to be ‘established’ by a series of 
hypothetical enquiries from those who had been adversely affected by the 
change’.810  
Moreover, its reification into a series of “constitutional acts” presumed a 
rigid, rule-bound method of sanction uniformly experienced across the country. The 
testimonies examined above, however, reflect the heterogeneous nature of the 
polity – a factor which determined which chiefs could engage in this process. As 
previous chapters have demonstrated, this was reflected in size, rank and location, 
as well as the methods of differential incorporation that bound multiple communities 
in various ways to the royal house. The consultative practices central to the 
ratification of the concessions were not simply separable from these important 
distinctions, but were fundamentally a part of the sociocultural order that these 
cleavages represented. Consequently, the “laws” allegedly broken by the paramount 
likewise doubled as a resource to be used by others to redress this imbalance. If the 
trial simultaneously served as the vehicle for numerous intra-Mpondo disputes, then 
the ‘rules, rank and relationships’ that usually structured intra-Mpondo relations 
were thus held by chiefs themselves ‘to be readily negotiable in the cause of 
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pragmatic advantage’ and personal ambition.811 Colonial officials were clearly keen 
to portray Mpondo laws as a series of rational rules. But the trial just as easily 
demonstrated what Terence Ranger rightly identifies as the centrality of ‘African 
participation and initiative in innovating custom’.812 
 Acknowledging the ways in which these intra-Mpondo disputes shaped 
colonial perceptions of local custom arguably reveals the limitations of focusing 
solely on the formal application of African law. Whilst writing in reference to Tswana 
legal culture, John Comaroff and Simon Roberts’ call to avoid what they refer to as a 
‘jural determinism’ by paying attention to the sociocultural and procedural 
flexibilities of such rules is particularly apposite.813 Doing so allows for a distinction 
to be made between the authority of institutions and the influence of particular 
individuals; a recognition that law and custom may frame the interaction between 
paramount and chief but cannot guarantee the personal legitimacy of the former in 
the eyes of the latter.814  
This was something that Sigcau himself would have been well aware. 
Whatever the laws that underpinned his authority, numerous witnesses attested to 
the fact that the paramount could only ‘do what he chooses so long as he has the 
power to enforce his rights.’815 Indeed, the limits of that power had recently been 
                                                          
811 The relationship between legal systems and their broader sociocultural contexts is explored in 
John. L. Comaroff and Simon Roberts, Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic of Dispute in an African 
Context, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981), p. 19.  
812 Terrance Ranger, ‘The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa’, in Terrance 
Ranger and Olufemi Vaughn (eds), Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa: Essays in 
Honour of A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1993), p. 81. 
813 Comaroff and Roberts, Rules and Processes, p. 16, 110.  
814 Comaroff and Roberts, Rules and Processes, p. 25; Hammond-Tooke, ‘The ‘other side’ of frontier 
history’, p. 232. 
815 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Strachan, p. 45. 
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proven by the outbreak of civil conflict. Given the precariousness of his position, it is 
perhaps telling that it was during this time that he had signed the final two leases, 
granting huge swathes of land to the Cooks for the immediate sum of £2250.816 When 
asked why Sigcau would wish to give his land away so willingly, one witness remarked 
that ‘the paramount will so receive whites, if in his opinion the white man so coming 
will be a source of protection’.817 That the Cooks’ bolstered his authority is suggested 
by Sigcau’s decision to use this income as a source of potential patronage: ‘according 
to our custom…a man goes to the chief and the chief gives him what he thinks’.818  
Moreover, it also enabled the paramount to threaten certain chiefs with 
forced removal should the Cooks choose their land as the site upon which to base 
their operations. For Justice Schreiner, it enabled him to simply ‘say to [a chief], you 
come from that place and go to another…[even] if he has lived in that place a long 
time and you want him to go you just say “go”?’819 Sigcau seemingly confirmed his 
queries; every chief knew about the leases, and as such, all had acknowledged him 
as head of the Mpondo before he did so.820 In this sense, the concessions likely 
provided him with a momentary confirmation of his authority during a time of acute 
vulnerability.  
Indeed, whilst the defence sought to portray the concessions as a violation of 
Mpondo law, for Sigcau, they served as a necessary reinforcement of his customary 
                                                          
816 This figure represents the total of the initial down-payments for the two smaller pieces of land 
and the 160 square miles of territory contained in the concessions, signed on 4 October 1891 and 30 
June 1893 respectively. See (CA) CMK-8/27: Plaintiffs’ Declaration, pp. 1-2. 
817 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Strachan, p. 50. 
818 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Sigcau, p. 41. 
819 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Schreiner, p. 43.  
820 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Sigcau, p. 43. 
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position as paramount. By presenting the leases in this way, Sigcau was arguably able 
to demonstrate a show of strength to both the colonial state and other Mpondo 
chiefs. This was important, especially since the court case took place in the 
immediate post-annexation period. Such an acknowledgement serves as a useful 
reminder that, just as other chiefs were able to instrumentalise the trial for their own 
ends, the paramount was no different. If the treaties functioned to confirm his 
seniority over other Mpondo belligerents, then the trial likewise created the 
opportunity to convey to the state an idealised version of his authority as ‘Chief of all 
the Pondos’.821 Following Pondoland’s incorporation, Sigcau would have been 
acutely aware of the need to proffer a self-presentation of power that demonstrated 
his continued influence to colonial officials. His own recourse to Mpondo custom thus 
functioned as the means by which this could be most effectively achieved. 
The problem was, however, that these actions typified precisely the chiefly 
rule that colonial officials sought to supplant. After giving his testimony, Justice 
Buchanan was quick to denounce Sigcau’s paramountcy as ‘despotic’, whilst 
Schreiner deplored the signing of the concessions as ‘a fraudulent act and breach of 
trust towards his people’.822 For them, the leases appeared to have compounded the 
coercive capacity of the royal house, as Sigcau exchanged privileged rights for private 
wealth to the apparent detriment of the Mpondo.  
Yet the court case demonstrates that the will of the paramountcy was 
anything but readily accepted by local communities. Every aspect of the trial suggests 
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822 (CA) CSC-2/1/1/317: Statement by Justice Buchanan, p. 43; Schreiner, p. 128. 
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as much: its timing and location; the selection of witnesses; the range of testimonies 
and the interests that underpinned them - all of this was influenced by the factions 
and fissures within Mpondo society. In this sense, Sigcau’s blunt articulation of 
Mpondo custom was a reflection of insecurity rather strength. His testimony was 
precipitated by political pressures from below and by annexation from above; it 
represented an attempt to manage an array of intra-Mpondo relations that both 
preceded and fractured the transfer of power from paramountcy to state. But for 
officials, it also confirmed a fiction that was central to the justification for 
incorporation - that ‘Sigcau’s right to make the concessions…[was] vested solely in [a] 
despotic…[rather] than any constitutional power’.823 As such, the treaties themselves 
were inimical to the praxis of civilised government.  
 
Conclusion:  
Demonstrating the despotism of the paramount was central to disavowing the 
concessions. Doing so allowed the Cape to enforce its wider point about the need to 
diminish the role of chiefly authority in Pondoland. Moreover, presenting the treaties 
as a private transaction between Sigcau and the Cooks meant that the latter could 
be implicated in the preservation of the former. As such, it enabled officials to 
undermine the brothers’ claims that their commercial endeavours best served the 
interests of empire.  
 This allegation was difficult to refute. Rather than countering the charge, the 
prosecution instead re-iterated that, since the leases had been negotiated in a then-
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independent Pondoland, it was incumbent upon the state to recognise them. 
Invoking Halleck’s International Law, Mr Solomon claimed ‘that when one country 
takes over another it must take over…and is bound by the liabilities of the new 
country. If Sigcau...was, the Government…before annexation, these obligations 
incurred by him to Messrs Cook Brothers….are taken over by the Cape’.824 Yet for 
Schreiner, there was no legal basis upon which the government could be forced to 
recognise the concessions: ‘You can only deal with these relations when you have 
two…members of the family…of European civilised nations’. As if the answer was self-
evident, he bluntly asked, ‘how can International Law apply when you come face to 
face with barbarism?’825 
 To prove their point, the defence remarked how the Mpondo lacked ‘the 
hallmarks of a civilised country’, with ‘no court of law…no public Exchequer into 
which [the Cooks’] money would be paid’ and no legal mechanisms through which 
their claims could be upheld against Sigcau.826 Consequently, the concessions were 
entirely dependent upon ‘enforcing some “nod” of [Sigcau’s]’.827 Such comments 
intendeded to highlight the cultural differences between the Mpondo and the Cape, 
whose own representative and judicial institutions were self-consciously crafted 
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around the commitment to the rule of law and accountable government.828 But in 
doing so, the defence also deliberately sought to underline the arbitrary power of 
the paramount, who, in signing the concession, had casually violated Mpondo law. 
As Schreiner again exclaimed, ‘His “yes” of to-day is his “no” of to-morrow…[the 
leases] were absolutely bad…this act was the act of a despot….and could only stand 
as long as despotism lasted’.829 
 This argument was enough to ensure the failure of the Cooks’ claims against 
the Cape; the Supreme Court found unanimously in favour of the state on 11 March 
1895. Undeterred, the brothers nevertheless sought to challenge the judgement by 
immediately appealing to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London – the 
final appellate court of the British Empire – on 19 March.830 Ironically, this was an 
institution that, as Andrew Smith notes, often promoted investor confidence in the 
colonies precisely because it provided an opportunity to overturn the judicial 
decision of colonial courts.831 Yet once again the brothers were to be disappointed; 
the Privy Council upheld the original verdict on 1 August 1899.832  
Whilst this victory undoubtedly confirmed the Cape’s authority in Pondoland, 
it did not settle the matter completely. Writing a decade later, James Cook would 
assert that, far from bolstering the alleged despotism of the Mpondo paramount, the 
treaties had secured the peaceful cession of Sigcau’s country to the Crown.833 He 
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continued to make this point as late as December 1928; writing to the editor of The 
Times, he explained how he was ‘loth to publish the fact (although it was well known 
at the time) that the peaceful annexation of Pondoland was bought about by me, 
alone, and at great personal risk.’834 This retrospective re-writing of Cook’s own 
agency clearly demonstrated his enduring belief in the potential benefits of his 
commercial ventures. But the persistence of this argument also suggests that, whilst 
the Cape had clearly won its judicial encounter with the brothers, its claim to rule in 
Pondoland was still vulnerable to challenges predicated on the invocation of empire.  
Of course, the fact that Cook couched his tract in the language of an imperial 
utilitarianism was perhaps reflective of the politics of post-war South Africa. As the 
introduction to this thesis discussed, throughout the South African War (1899-1902), 
numerous colonial and extra-colonial Britons had sought to emphasise their loyalist 
credentials in the pursuit of personal and financial recompense.835 Cook was no 
different; he made clear that their plans to construct a railway through Pondoland 
was based on a forfeitable deposit, which, had it taken too long to complete, would 
have ‘saved Government expenditure…at least £20, 000, 000 during the late Boer 
War’.836  
Such apparent self-sacrifice not only underlined the unfair nullification of his 
leases; it also allowed him to contrast his fortunes with those whose concessions had 
been granted by the Imperial Government. In particular, he drew attention to those 
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signed in Matabeleland and Mashonaland, which had formed the legal basis of the 
royal charter granted to Rhodes’ own British South Africa Company in 1889 - the same 
year as the Cook’s first treaty.837 Ironically, the brothers thus found their claims 
wanting against a state headed by a man who had likewise sought imperial sanction 
for his own commercial transactions. The difference, of course, was that whilst the 
Governor had sanctioned the latter, he repudiated the former.838 Whilst the Cape had 
alleged that the concessionaries had treated with Sigcau in the self-aggrandisement 
of each, for Cook it was the colonial and imperial governments who had acted 
duplicitously. Such hypocrisy thus revealed that the arbitrary exercise of power came 
not from Sigcau, but from the Governor himself, whose decision to cancel the treaties 
was branded a ‘despotic act’.839 
In making their final arguments, the Cooks and the Cape thus engaged in a 
debate over despotism. This choice of word was deliberate; both sought to liken each 
other’s actions to those of the paramount in an attempt to define and defend the 
meaning of Britishness in Pondoland. These terms were largely symbolic, but they 
underlined a real jurisdictional dispute over the state’s right to govern that persisted 
into the twentieth century. Whilst the court case confirmed the Cape’s legal authority 
in the country, it nevertheless revealed an inherently inability to monopolise the 
meaning of what precisely constituted British rule in a colonial context. This was 
readily exploitable by various non-state actors. The Cooks aside, this chapter has 
                                                          
837 Cook, Pondoland Concessions, p. 13. 
838 Paul Rich notes that Governor Loch ‘tried to have Matabeleland annexed by the British Crown, 
but was overruled by a Colonial Office that preferred to delegate responsibility to Cecil Rhodes and 
the British South Africa Company’. See Paul Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, (2nd edn, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 75.    
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highlighted how their legal action simultaneously served as a vehicle for the 
advancement of multiple intra-Mpondo interests. These were only indirectly 
connected to the court case itself yet were formative in determining its outcome. 
Specifically, they reflected the factions and fissures that comprised the polity, thereby 
extending those conversations concerning the exercise of authority and subjecthood 
precipitated by imperial intervention decades earlier. In this sense, the trial served as 
an important moment in the intersection of African and European jurisdictional 
disputes that – as the following chapter will demonstrate – allowed the newly 
colonised to shape the early evolution of the colonial state itself. 
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Chapter 5: British Subjects in Colonial Pondoland (2): The Arrest and 
Trial of Chief Sigcau, 1895: 
 
Introduction: 
On 8 August 1895, Cecil Rhodes and William Schreiner submitted a request to appeal 
to the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty’s Privy Council. Described by one member 
as the ‘supreme tribunal of the Empire [to which] every subject of the King-Emperor 
is entitled to go’ – this was the highest appellate court in the empire.840 In doing so, 
the Prime Minister and Attorney-General sought to overturn a recent decision by the 
Cape Supreme Court concerning the release of the Mpondo Paramount from colonial 
custody. The ruling, they argued, was doubly detrimental to the good governance of 
the Transkei, since it called into question the ability of colonial law to compel native 
acquiescence in the service of “native” administration. Moreover, the court had 
released into the public a duplicitous and dissentious chief who had knowingly 
undermined the government in Pondoland since its annexation on 17 March 1894. 
Substantiating their accusations was a corpus of evidence amassed by a commission 
of enquiry into the behaviour of the paramount. Undermining the judicial powers of 
resident magistrates, encouraging armed demonstrations, opposing registration for 
hut tax payments: Rhodes and Schreiner were convinced that they had proven 
Sigcau’s involvement in numerous crimes against the state. Indeed, such was the 
severity of these claims that the paramount had even handed himself in to the Chief 
Magistrate at Kokstad on 18 June 1895. Yet following his appeal to the Supreme Court 
on 29 July, the two were aggrieved to discover that the chief was to be released. With 
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his custodial charge castigated as a violation of his rights as a newly conferred British 
subject, Sigcau thus walked free just one day later.  
This was not the first time that events in Pondoland had brought Rhodes and 
Schreiner before “empire’s court”; the appellants were simultaneously engaged as 
defendants against the claims of the Cook brothers.841 As the previous chapter 
demonstrated, that encounter necessitated that the government argue for the 
efficacy of the Cape’s Transkeian administration as the best embodiment of British 
rule. That such a system was alleged to have infringed upon the rights of two of 
empire’s apparently loyal agents was beside the point. The protections afforded to 
individual subjects of the Crown were deemed secondary to the stability of the 
colonial state.  
Within five months, however, the situation appeared to have been reversed. 
Petitioning the Privy Council, this time it was Rhodes and Schreiner who prostrated 
before the Crown. The Supreme Court was no longer the champion of the Transkeian 
administration in Pondoland; it had become its chief critic. Moreover, Sigcau, 
previously decried as a ‘despot’ by the colonial judiciary, was now portrayed as a loyal 
subject of the Queen, having demonstrated his allegiance through the act of 
annexation. As a result, the paramount was able to challenge the judicial sovereignty 
of the state, as his attorney questioned ‘under whose authority and under what 
warrant…he [was to be] detained a prisoner at Kokstad’.842 
                                                          
841 I borrow the term from Ibhawoh, Imperial Justice. 
842 (CA) CSC-2/6/1/159: Edward Jones to Cape Supreme Court, 29 July 1895.  
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The fact that the paramount was arrested at all, however, arguably points to 
the insecurity of the Cape’s authority in Pondoland. As the Cooks’ case demonstrated, 
officials assumed that incorporation meant both Sigcau’s subordination to British rule 
and his service to the colonial state.843 In this chapter, however, I suggest that his 
prosecution in fact betrayed the failure of the state to consolidate his newfound 
colonial subjecthood. Whilst his actions seemingly conflicted with the exigencies of 
Transkeian governance, they were themselves born from the instability of his own 
position as paramount - challenged by annexation from above and political pressure 
from below.  
Sigcau’s arrest provided another such moment; as will be seen, it was 
promulgated after the paramount had sought to re-establish his authority over those 
recalcitrant rebel communities that had supported Mhlangaso during the civil war. 
This attempted exertion of influence undoubtedly reflected the continued potency of 
those intra-Mpondo debates concerning the exercise of authority and subjecthood 
within the polity. As such, it arguably demonstrated how annexation had once again 
failed to settle the issue of who ruled in Pondoland. Instead, these jurisdictional 
disputes fractured the transfer of power implied by the country’s incorporation, 
thereby re-qualifying the Cape’s authority in unexpected ways. In exploring this 
controversy, this chapter draws on Lauren Benton’s assertion that such ‘jurisdictional 
politics’ were ‘not merely procedural conveniences or tactical weapons but [were] 
important, even vital, symbolic markers of the boundaries separating colonial 
                                                          
843 During the trial, Justice Schreiner referred to Sigcau as both a ‘sub-paramount in relation to the 
High Commissioner’ and as ‘a chief…who in all respects was under [the] sovereignty of the Crown’. 
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constituencies’.844 Whilst the Cooks’ trial had highlighted a potentially problematic 
dissonance between the rights and roles of colonial and extra-colonial Britons, it was 
especially crucial to maintain the distinction between coloniser and colonised. 
Ensuring the subordination of the latter to the former was not just a legal technicality; 
it entailed ‘judgements about the character of these groups and the qualities that 
separated them from one another’.845  
Certainly, Sigcau’s actions were ill-received by colonial officials; viewed as 
typical of a “native” barbarism, his detention was ordered by the Prime Minister on 5 
June 1895 and enforced by gubernatorial decree six days later.846 Yet the paramount’s 
defence was able to successfully counter his incarceration by claiming that his recent 
incorporation into empire endowed him with the basic protections of personal liberty 
afforded to every imperial subject. In chapter 4, I suggested that the authority of the 
state remained vulnerable to challenges predicated on an invocation of imperial 
membership. Whilst the Cooks’ trial had confirmed the Cape’s legal primacy over 
Pondoland, it likewise revealed an inherent inability to monopolise precisely what 
British rule meant in a colonial context. Consequently, various non-state actors could 
lay claim to this concept in order to undermine or circumvent the jurisdictional reach 
of the colony itself. In exploring Sigcau’s arrest and successful appeal to the Supreme 
Court, this chapter extends that analysis. 
                                                          
844 Lauren Benton, ‘Colonial Law and Cultural Difference: Jurisdictional Politics and the Formation of 
the Colonial State’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 41:3 (1999), p. 564. 
845 Benton, ‘Colonial Law’, p. 564. 
846 A copy of the decree can be found in (CA) CSC-2/6/1/159: Judgement of the Lords of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, 26 February 1897. 
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Indeed, I argue that Sigcau’s release from colonial custody was in part 
rhetorically rooted in an earlier-nineteenth century tradition of Cape liberalism. As 
the introduction explained, this non-racial notion broadly emphasised the 
universality of humanity, the equality of European and African before the law, and 
the latter’s capacity to improve through the workings of free trade, market-
orientated production and education. Nevertheless, the outbreak of anti-colonial 
rebellions at the end of the century tempered the transformative potential of these 
initiatives. In the Transkei, officials thus sought to balance the promises of British rule 
with the practicalities of colonial governance through the cultivation of institutional 
and cultural distinctions that marked the boundaries between coloniser and 
colonised. As Poppy Fry notes, these developments have been viewed as part of a 
teleological tendency towards segregation and the eventual emergence of apartheid; 
proving its ‘inherent hollowness or falseness’, at best, Cape liberalism has been 
viewed as ‘impotent…at worst, it constituted an overt project of deception’.847  
Certainly, this was the position advanced by Sigcau’s defence; they alleged the 
hypocrisy of the state in claiming the virtues of British rule whilst seemingly violating 
the liberty of one its subjects. But in doing so, they revealed an important tension 
between the acquisition of new territories and the transmission of English liberties to 
non-European populations. More importantly, by petitioning the Supreme Court, 
they arguably ‘contributed to…intra-British debates over the nature of liberties in the 
British world’ by provoking a dispute between the colonial executive and its 
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judiciary.848 This chapter therefore examines the disagreements over the imperial 
efficacy of colonial rule precipitated by Sigcau’s arrest and trial. It does so by asking 
the following questions: How was Sigcau able to claim the rights and protections 
afforded to British subjects? In implying a parity between African and European, how 
did the Cape seek to enforce Sigcau’s colonial subjecthood? For what crimes was he 
arrested? How did these reflect his changing position as Mpondo paramount? On 
what grounds did the Supreme Court seek to overturn his detention? And what does 
this contestation reveal about the process of state-formation in the immediate post-
annexation period? 
In answering these questions, this chapter will again highlight how those on 
either side of the colonial divide could similarly invoke a notion of imperial 
membership in the re-negotiation of colonial rule. Moreover, it will demonstrate how 
competing conceptualisations of “British rule” provided another moment in the 
intersection of European and African jurisdictional disputes that were formative in 
shaping the evolution of the state itself. In doing so, it also seeks to re-qualify those 
studies that emphasise the inevitable failure of Cape liberalism as a successful 
strategy for negotiating colonial rule at the end of the nineteenth century. 
 
Imperial Belonging in a Colonial Context – Limits and Possibilities: 
As mentioned above, Sigcau’s defence sought to challenge the Cape’s legal authority 
by invoking his innate rights as a British subject. This position was predicated on a 
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self-conscious distinction between the exercise of colonial and imperial power, 
appealing to the latter in order to mitigate the harsher application of the former. As 
chapter 4 suggested, the ability to differentiate between the two was arguably born 
from the nature of Pondoland’s annexation – ratified by the Crown before being 
transferred to colonial hands. Whilst largely an administrative technicality, it 
nevertheless underpinned the Cooks’ complaint against the cancellation of their 
leases. Here too, it provided Sigcau with an opportunity to critique colonial rule.  
 The fact that both chief and concessionaries adopted similar legal strategies 
was arguably indicative of a British subjecthood that was ill-defined and which lacked 
a codified constitutional framework which delineated the rights and obligations of 
empire’s diverse subject populations. As Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol explain, the 
question of ‘who was and who was not legally British was never systematically 
reviewed…the character of British protected persons’ allegiance was unclear; [its] 
territorial basis…outside the United Kingdom was unclear [and] the attributes of 
subjects in different territories differed’.849 In one sense this ambiguity was hardly 
surprising, since this seemingly shared imperial identity served only to signify a 
common subordination to the Crown.850 ‘No individual’, as Daniel Gorman notes, ‘was 
ever legally a citizen of the Empire…In British law…all [were] subjects rather than 
citizens’.851  
                                                          
849 Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and 
Immigration Law, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson: 1990), p. 91. 
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270 
 
Nevertheless, it was this absence of conceptual clarity that allowed - 
rhetorically at least - both free-born Englishmen and African chiefs mutual access to 
the sites, symbols and language of imperial protection.852 This shared recourse was 
central to conceptualising empire in holistic terms, given that its very production and 
maintenance was dependent on the broadcasting of British national sovereignty 
across a highly heterogeneous imperial space. As a result, the political, social and 
cultural interchange between its disparate peoples could never simply be regulated 
by or within strictly “national” contexts.853 Whilst intrinsic to the eventual emergence 
of a swathe of colonial nationalisms and settler colonial states, articulations of British 
subjecthood were both pre-emptive and constitutive of them. First and foremost, 
they were rooted in, and reflective of, a transnationalism designed to appeal to every 
inhabitant that fell within empire’s ambit. 
 Such a political ascription was, however, hardly static. Ideas of imperial 
belonging did not simply concern the relationship between the Crown and its 
individual subjects. It also underwrote the formation of those political units that 
developed within it. Understandings of what British subjecthood meant therefore 
changed in response to the varied processes of territorial expansion and the 
diversified needs of empire’s composite parts. By the end of the nineteenth century 
its conferral had been largely devolved to colonial-national legislatures, who 
reframed the issue according to questions of colonial naturalisation and the 
appropriate advancement of political rights, both personal and proprietorial, to those 
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who resided within their own geo-political borders.854 Accelerated by the granting of 
self-government to the Dominions, such developments were intimately bound to the 
racial politics of empire as officials sought to engender a sense of imperial unity 
among the white settler colonies.855 In doing so, they therefore precluded the 
extension of those same protections to numerous non-white populations.    
In the Cape, Africans thus witnessed their evolving exclusion from the means 
of political participation, through the introduction of measures such as the 
Parliamentary Voters Act (1887) and Franchise and Ballot Act (1892).856 This 
legislation placed greater restrictions on the franchise, increasing the property 
qualification from £25 to £75 and establishing a new literacy requirement whilst 
disallowing any communally-held land as grounds for enfranchisement.857 Striking 
nearly 20 000 African voters from the electoral roll, officials undoubtedly feared being 
swamped by a rapidly increasing African population which had already influenced the 
election of a sixth of parliamentary representatives in 1890.858 
                                                          
854 Karatani, Defining British Citizenship, p. 57.  
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These concerns were perhaps best embodied by the Glen Grey Act (1894), 
ratified in the same year as Pondoland’s annexation. The Act contained three major 
provisions: the trebling of taxation to be paid by adult men, the reform of communal 
land tenure, and the introduction of District Councils.859 The labour tax intended to 
hasten the process of proleterianisation, placing new financial burdens on those 
without employment in order to encourage them to seek work in the Cape.860 
Additionally, officials circumscribed the chiefly right to determine the access to and 
ownership of land by replacing communal land tenure with individual titles; 
households were granted allotments of four morgen that were safeguarded against 
alienation and were inheritable only by primogeniture.861 The restricted size and 
availability of these plots deliberately limited the productive potential of 
communities in order to force the majority into migrant labour. Unsurprisingly, these 
measures maintained a commitment to the liberal reform of “native” society through 
its emphasis on self-government, the dignity of (wage) labour and the importance of 
economic individuation as central to moral upliftment.862 
Ultimately, however, its provisions aimed to control the movement of Africans 
into, whilst limiting their meaningful interaction with, European society. To that end, 
the introduction of District Councils inaugurated a de facto system of racial 
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segregation. Designed to cater for local administrative and infrastructural needs, the 
councils were deemed a more appropriate forum for engagement than national 
politics.863 As such, even those who held land on individual tenure were 
disenfranchised.864 Compounding the state’s control still further, these local bodies 
were comprised of men appointed directly by the government and were 
representative neither of those landowners whose property levy funded their 
initiatives nor those Africans who resided under the authority of traditional 
leaders.865 The failure to properly reflect the interests of these groups remained a 
constant source of irritation, since it largely served to cement an alliance between 
Transkeian administrators and chosen local elites. As late as 31 March 1904, one 
baTtlokwa chief asked, ‘What is the use of a Council if the people have no voice in the 
election of Councillors?...No good can come from [them] if they are…afterwards 
directed by the Magistrate’.866 For some, this process of disingenuous 
disenfranchisement underlines what Richard Parry terms ‘the political bankruptcy of 
liberal “native policy”’.867 Whilst they could never efface the fact that the colonised 
in some way “belonged” to empire, these legislative acts nonetheless enabled 
colonial officials to re-define what that membership meant in practical terms. As 
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Rieko Karatani argues, ‘their status of British subjecthood had an imperial name, but 
only a local effect’.868  
Exploring articulations of British subjecthood thus reveals an inherent tension 
in its transnational appeal and its simultaneous circumscription by the demands of 
colonial rule. For one Natalian Prime Minister, however, there was no such 
contradiction. He could easily delineate between those ‘inalienable rights, 
irrespective of race or colour, of every British subject, to security to person and 
property, access to justice…[and the] right to petition,’ and political rights, which 
were ‘a race privilege…[and] product of civilisation…among the Anglo-Saxon races’.869 
Invoking what Uday Singh Mehta refers to as a ‘strategy of civilizational infantilism’, 
officials sought to emphasise a perpetual cultural difference between white and 
black.870 Doing so intended to demonstrate the latter’s unsuitability, and thus 
legitimised their exclusion from, the practices and protections of British liberty 
enjoyed by settler and metropolitan populations.871 As the introduction noted, 
colonists instead turned towards traditional authorities and customary law as the 
best means to govern their African subjects.  
The coercive consequences of this attempted instrumentalisation are well 
known. Crawford Young, for example, invokes the image of “Bula Matari” – a name 
meaning “he who crushes rocks”, given to Henry Morton Stanley by the Congolese – 
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to signify the brutality and omnipotence of the African colonial state.872 Mamdani 
likewise emphasises the totalising embrace of a ‘world of the customary from which 
there was no escape’, whilst Crais speaks of those impersonal ‘rationalities of rule’ 
that were central to its cultivation.873 Each of these expositions, however, imply a top-
down system of domination that is complicated by the story of Sigcau’s arrest and 
subsequent release. Not only does the paramount’s detention suggest the state’s 
limitations in successfully co-opting traditional authorities for its own ends. His 
invocation of those protections afforded through imperial membership also 
demonstrates an ability to utilise those rights usually reserved for colonial “citizens”.   
Of course, these studies usefully highlight the typical features of colonial 
state-formation and how its institutions (often violently) structured the everyday 
existence of the colonised. To that end, both Young and Mamdani construct analyses 
that function as exemplars of how colonial rule unfolded across the continent.874 Yet 
as Boone notes, those traditional elites labelled ‘despots’ are generally viewed as 
mere ‘creations of the center [sic]’ – as impositions upon unwilling communities.875 
In many instances this was indeed the case. But the frequency with which this 
occurred, as well its coercive impact, was better facilitated by the advent of what 
Redding terms ‘a more pseudoscientific brand of administration’.876 Arguably a 
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prominent feature of colonial statecraft from the 1920s onwards, it was less 
prominent in the 1890s.  
This acknowledgement crucially foregrounds the centrality of historical 
specificity when considering the ‘basic ways in which colonial states reconstituted 
their forms of governance and their reigning ideologies in interaction with their 
subjects’.877 The transformation of traditional authorities as an extension of the state 
in rural areas was undoubtedly an aim of state officials. So too was the hardening of 
those cultural and institutional barriers that prevented African subjects from claiming 
the privileges and protections of legally recognised citizens. But this process was 
neither inevitable nor constant; the colonial legacy of the twentieth century should 
not preclude an awareness of the possibilities afforded to the colonised in the 
nineteenth. 
This is particularly relevant in the case of Pondoland. As chapters 2 and 3 
demonstrated, the protracted process of incorporation meant that intra-Mpondo 
disputes concerning the exercise of authority and subjecthood both facilitated and 
shaped the increasing imbrication of paramountcy and state. Moreover, the barrier 
separating these otherwise inimical institutions was at its most permeable precisely 
at the moment of annexation. This formal transfer of power may have confirmed the 
asymmetrical nature of this exchange, but as the Cooks’ trial illustrated, it did not 
terminate it. Sigcau’s own judicial encounter suggests exactly the same. His arrest 
reflected a conflict between the two roles he now held – as Mpondo paramount and 
newfound colonial subject. But his successful release also implied a third – as member 
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of the British Empire. In the immediate post-annexation period, the paramount thus 
occupied a highly particularised space that sat at the intersection between Mpondo, 
colonial and imperial jurisdictions. Exploring how Sigcau was able to invoke a notion 
of imperial membership does not therefore simply underline the inevitability of 
colonial state-formation. Rather, it highlights the specific, if temporary, moment in 
which this process was simultaneously (re)qualified from below and above. With this 
in mind, it is to the former that this chapter now turns.  
 
The Mpondo Paramount: Functionary or Foe? 
That European empires required the incorporation of indigenous agents in order to 
legitimate their rule is well known. “Collaboration”, “subsidiary alliances”, and 
“clientelism”: as C. W. Newbury rightly notes, scholars have proffered numerous 
models for conceptualising the ‘modes of mutual dependency’ that were forged 
between rulers and subordinate societies.878 The cultivation of these local alliances 
did not necessarily imply a sympathy or affinity on the part of the colonised. But as 
the ‘non-European foundations of European imperialism’, they were nevertheless 
indispensable to its functioning.879 This was especially important given the relatively 
small number of metropolitan officials that comprised colonial bureaucracies.880 
Whilst the position of these (most likely) men were bolstered by superior political and 
military technologies, the employment of local potentates and their subjects 
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provided ‘empire on the cheap’.881 By helping to ensure the extraction of labour, 
revenue and resources for the state at relatively little cost, they were central to 
securing what Sara Berry terms ‘hegemony on a shoestring’.882 In doing so, officials 
were able to uphold what one historian has called ‘a great confidence-trick, a huge 
game of white man’s bluff’.883 
 Such bluff and trickery was further underlined by the inherent isolation of 
metropolitan “men on the spot” which often necessitated that British officials 
cultivate ‘an image of benign rule’ that underpinned, but also counteracted, the 
tendency towards overt authoritarianism.884 This need to strike a balance between 
the two suggests the potential timidity, or limited capability, to fully intrude into the 
daily lives of colonial subjects. As Redding argues, in the late-nineteenth century it 
provided Africans and Europeans ‘space to manoeuvre’ away from one another, 
ensuring relative peace and stability as both sought to negotiate their new political 
environment.885 This “awareness” arguably inflected the incorporation of local allies 
into the structures of the colonial state and ensured the partial preservation of 
indigenous hierarchies of rule as a central tenet of colonial governance. But in doing 
so, there thus existed an ambiguity around the role of paramount chiefs, for example, 
who were simultaneously ‘co-opted as both a public functionary and as a traditional 
patron with his own client network’.886  
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Sigcau’s trial illustrates this very point. His detention suggests that officials 
were eager to demonstrate the dominance implied by annexation. But they had 
trouble articulating the place of the paramount within this new political environment. 
When questioned by Sigcau’s attorney, Mr W. P. Leary, former magistrate in Mount 
Ayliff and Msikaba, claimed that the Paramount had once held absolute power – ‘the 
power of life and death’ – in Pondoland.887 Following the Deed of Cession, however, 
he had ‘handed his country over to the Government [and]… had no judicial 
authority…at all’ – a fact confirmed by the introduction of the Transkeian Penal Code 
on 27 September 1894.888 Leary thus expected Sigcau to assist him in the 
administration of the district, but challenged the assertion that this arrangement 
endowed the chief with a sort of ‘semi independence’.889 Yet when pressed, he 
struggled to define his exact role; he explained how Sigcau would settle disputes or 
arrest criminals because ‘people paid much more respect to a man who has power’, 
whilst simultaneously maintaining that he was ‘a servant of the Government and 
must do what his magistrate asks of him’.890 Nevertheless, he was also forced to 
concede that ‘his people think he has more power than any other headman’.891 
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Such confused comments arguably typify Karen Fields’ conceptualisation of 
‘indirect rule’ as ‘doubly articulated: one articulation made the African masses subject 
to customary rulers; the other made customary rulers subject to the Crown’s 
representatives’.892 For Fields, it is this first articulation that was most important; 
given the precarious position of colonial officials, and the institutional limitations that 
this engendered within the state, ‘real power’, she suggests, ‘issued from the 
ruled’.893 This perspective is perhaps as overly-simplistic as those studies that solely 
emphasise the violent capabilities of the state are over-deterministic. Yet the tension 
that Fields identities was undoubtedly real. As Thomas McClendon states, 
‘colonialism was a relation that depended on [both] the co-operation and 
participation of dominated colonial subjects…directives, exactions and punishments 
of colonial states [were] mediated by people who were at once part of the state and 
had the status of subjects’.894 Traditional leaders thus had to strike a balance between 
acquiescence to the state and the maintenance of credibility amongst their own 
followers.  
Consider, for example, the following statements. Prior to Sigcau’s arrest, Leary 
was adamant that ‘until [the Paramount]…is banished and his kraals broken up, the 
country cannot be satisfactorily governed. The policy of treating a savage autocrat 
with diplomacy, instead of firmly giving him to understand what his position is…only 
causes delay in bringing him under subjection’.895  Yet the report produced by the 
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Commission of Enquiry into his behaviour was more sympathetic: ‘it is only natural 
than a man so lately Paramount Chief…should be appealed to by his people when in 
difficulty, and should try to intervene on their behalf’. It was therefore ‘probable that 
[his crimes] were an attempt to deal with [cases] which, when Pondoland was 
independent, fell peculiarly within the province of the Chief, but which [are] now 
specially reserved for magisterial action’.896  
Taken together, these somewhat contradictory arguments illustrate the 
extent to which Sigcau was viewed as simultaneously essential to, and obstructive of, 
the governance of Pondoland. Whilst Leary’s complaints suggest the antithetical 
nature of chiefly rule to colonial authority, the Commission report highlights the 
obligations owed by the paramount to Mpondo subjects. The difficulty in maintaining 
this balance not only underlined the potential for Sigcau to fall foul of the state. It 
also meant that his personal authority amongst his own followers was likely to be 
called into question. This was especially possible given the fissures – recently agitated 
by the Cooks’ trial – that comprised the country following its civil war.  
Indeed, an examination of the specific charges levied against Sigcau 
encapsulate this very dilemma. Common to many of the allegations raised during his 
trial was the claim that the paramount had actively engaged to undermine the 
authority of numerous officials across the country. One such instance involved a civil 
dispute between two men, Mpenge and Mbemi, in the Bizana district of Eastern 
Pondoland. In settling the matter, the Resident Magistrate, Major Sprigg, had found 
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in favour of the former and had therefore ordered the latter to pay a fine of cattle – 
a judgement Mbemi duly accepted but could not meet. He explained that he owned 
no property and ‘could only satisfy the judgement by collecting dowry cattle, which, 
owing to the mourning of Mqikela, were not collectable…until the mourning was 
officially declared at an end’.897 Adamant that he comply, Sprigg instructed Mbemi to 
seek permission from Sigcau. In response, the paramount wrote to the official, 
‘requesting [him] to suspend [any] action on the plea that no cattle could be moved 
from one place to another…until the season for the mourning of Mqikela’ was over.898 
Yet further inquiries revealed this to be more than just a clash between 
competing legal orders. As Sprigg discovered, the dispute between Mbemi and 
Mpenge had been cultivated during the civil war, in which the former had supported 
Sigcau and the latter had backed Mhlangaso. This division was in part a product of 
political geography. Mbemi belonged to a tribe under a chief named Jama, who was 
related to the imiZizi – those who had offered sanctuary to Sigcau’s rival in the 
impregnable Isisele Valley.899 Jama’s community was settled nearby, but was split in 
two by the Mtentu Gorge ‘in one of the ruggedest [sic] parts of Pondoland’; whilst 
Mpenge lived on its eastern banks under his chief, Mbemi resided to the East, in area 
that was governed by Jama’s uncle, Totwana, ‘under the direct influence of Sigcau’.900 
With this in mind, the paramount’s instruction not to pay the fine demanded of him 
was less a resistance of colonial law and more demonstrative of Sigcau’s willingness 
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to ‘favour an ex-royal over an ex-rebel’.901 Indeed, rumours began to circulate that 
Sigcau had commanded the community to resist any attempt to extract the fine with 
force.902 What began as an otherwise minor dispute was thus soon enveloped and 
escalated by the post-war politics of Pondoland.  
In order to enforce the judgement, Sprigg mobilised a patrol of thirty Cape 
Mounted Riflemen (CMR) on 8 March 1895. As soon as they approached Mbemi’s 
residence, ‘the war-cry sounded, and armed Pondos [began] swarming from every 
side…evidently prepar[ing] to attack us if [they] attempted to seize the cattle’.903 
Whilst Mbemi was ‘perfectly civil’, those around him were less so as two men 
attempted to stab a “native” constable. More seriously, when the Chief Constable 
inadvertently identified the Resident Magistrate, ‘a man sprang forward, laid hold of 
[his] bridle and threatened [him] with his assegai’. As Sprigg recalls: ‘I told him to let 
go…but after a minute, he…repeated the action…[and as] I passed through them, a 
number of Pondos ran alongside me, using threatening words and gestures’. For the 
official, such behaviour constituted ‘armed rebellion, pure and simple’. Writing to 
Stanford shortly afterwards, he asked permission to assemble ‘not less than 150 men’ 
and to instruct them ‘to secure all their cattle…[and] destroy their houses and crops’. 
‘There would not be much bloodshed’, he maintained, ‘but even if…many lives were 
lost it would…be the most merciful course’. Concluding his correspondence, he 
warned that ‘unless this outbreak is quickly and heavily punished…the spirit of 
rebellion will spread and a general Pondo war will be the result’. 
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Such drastic comments arguably betrayed the vulnerability of the Cape’s 
newfound claim to rule in Pondoland. Officials were, perhaps understandably, 
concerned that such incidents would inspire a wider movement of anti-colonial 
resistance across the country. Consequently, whilst the armed conflict had been 
organised by Totwana, Sprigg held Sigcau ultimately responsible: ‘it all arises from his 
impertinence and disloyalty in claiming to be the Supreme Power in Pondoland and 
to have the right to reverse the decision of the courts’.904 His choice of language is 
important since it highlights the tensions that circumscribed the possibilities of rule 
in these early years. On the one hand, Sprigg underlined a post-annexation 
perception of the paramount solely as a functionary of the state; on the other, he 
suggested the potential of the royal house to orchestrate a broader mobilisation of 
Mpondo subjects against the Cape. This fear, however, mistakenly assumed a political 
consensus necessary to support the Great Place that was non-existent. Indeed, the 
dispute between Mbemi and Mpenge clearly demonstrates the fractures and fissures 
within Mpondo society. Moreover, it also recalls Redding’s assertion regarding the 
encounters of Zulu and colonial authorities in the nineteenth century, that 
interactions between the paramountcy and state were often derivative of political 
rivalries internal to the polity itself.905 Whilst Sprigg spoke of the royal house and 
colonial government in oppositional terms, his remarks thus obscured the fact that 
intra-Mpondo instability had precipitated a vulnerability that was mutually shared by 
both. 
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As a result, both Sigcau and the state appeared to maintain a rhetorical 
hostility that masked an increasing interdependence necessitated by the unsettled 
condition of the country. This paradox not only prevented the peaceful resolution of 
particular judicial disputes; more seriously, it constrained the Cape’s capability to 
establish one of the most basic mechanisms of colonial rule – taxation. The ability to 
extract revenue from African subjects did more than just contribute to the solvency 
of the state; it encapsulated the wider project of colonial hegemony itself. As Young 
notes, it was ‘a multi-pronged instrument’ designed to force adult males onto the 
wage-labour market and to harness the village economy for cash-crop production.906 
It served a ‘morally developmental role’ that justified attempts to “reach down” into 
the homestead, thereby requiring the successful subordination of indigenous 
intermediaries through whom this could be achieved.907 It was, in short, ‘the mortar 
with which, block by block, the colonial state was built’.908  
Other historians have, however, looked beyond the predatory requirements 
of colonial statecraft. Indeed, the payment of taxation has been posited as an annual 
‘ritual of rule’ and the ‘sacrament of subordination’.909 Such quasi-religious language 
suggests that this fiscal transaction doubled as an important symbolic interaction 
between rulers and ruled. As Redding argues, it provided a chance for resident 
magistrates to cultivate personal contacts with African subjects as they made their 
yearly journey to their office to offer their income. Doing so ritualised what was an 
                                                          
906 Young, African Colonial State, p. 126. 
907 Young, African Colonial State, p. 127. 
908 Young, African Colonial State, p. 127. 
909 Redding, Sorcery and Sovereignty, p. 14; John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, ‘Coping With the 
Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-1914’, Journal of African 
Studies, 20:4 (1979), p. 497. 
286 
 
explicit demonstration of dominance that deliberately appropriated the pre-colonial 
practice of paying tribute to chiefs and elders.910 Embodying what Crais has termed, 
‘state-formation…as a cross-cultural encounter’, officials often blended European 
practices and ideologies of rule with African norms and environments as a form of 
self-legitimisation.911 Likewise, chiefs could employ the idioms and institutions 
wielded by their “Other” in negotiating their interactions with both the state and their 
own followers.912 Taxation arguably provided an opportune moment through which 
this could be achieved, not least because the registration and mobilisation of tax-
payers required the employment of African intermediaries in lieu of an otherwise 
skeletal colonial infrastructure.913 In this sense, the revenue-raising process could fall 
captive to particular intra-African interests. 
 Indeed, the deliberate prevention of hut-tax registration was one of the more 
serious accusations facing Sigcau during his trial. The levy itself was to be paid by all 
married, adult males on each inhabited dwelling under their charge; to that end, it 
was both a direct tax on the number of wives and, given the gendered division of 
labour within the homestead, an indirect tax on rural production.914 In order to 
explain its implementation to Mpondo communities, Sigcau had offered to call a 
meeting at the Great Place so as ‘to avoid any misunderstanding by those who had 
never experienced regular taxation’.915 Instead, he used the occasion to accuse the 
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government of breaking its promise to help remove those rebels that had remained 
in the country since the conclusion of the civil war.916 
In particular, the paramount referred to the followers of Mhlangaso and his 
imiZizi ally, Patekile, all of whom had refused to leave their defensive stronghold in 
the Isisele Valley. As one official noted: ‘those rebels unwilling to remove or submit 
are in no danger of their lives: they know that very well, and the reluctance to 
move…is due, not to fear, but to their desire to keep together as a separate 
community’.917 Whilst Mhlangaso had been escorted to Mount Ayliff on 31 March 
1894, and Sigcau’s authority had been recognised by colonial officials, annexation had 
clearly done little to resolve the rivalries within the country.918 In order to ease the 
potential for conflict, the Cape informed the imiZizi that they now occupied land 
which belonged to, and would be protected by, the government; to appease Sigcau, 
they also requested that they pay a fine of 200 head of cattle.919  Their efforts, 
however, proved unsuccessful. Patekile delayed paying the full amount and when he 
eventually sent a deputation to the Great Place, Sigcau demanded that the chief 
submit in person.920 Frustrated by the paramount’s intransigence, Sprigg was ordered 
to fix a boundary around the Isisele Valley.921  In conjunction with the proposed 
registration of homesteads for hut-tax payment, these measures suggested the 
government’s willingness to acknowledge the rebel’s right to land. It was for this 
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reason that Sigcau so publicly criticised the Cape; as the report noted, ‘the effect on 
the people would be an impression that they were to delay registration till [sic] the 
Patekile and Isisele matters were settled’.922  
Yet it is worth considering precisely who was likely to have either heard, let 
alone obeyed, his instructions. The evidence compiled during Sigcau’s trial reveals 
little about who was in attendance at the Great Place - although residents from the 
Isisele unsurprisingly refused to attend.923 Separate correspondence also confirms 
that the Cwera had already been registered by their chief, Siyoyo, thereby forcing 
Sigcau to implore them not to pay.924 Representatives from the Bala and Kwetshube 
clans were probably present; as the previous chapter explained, these principal 
branches of the Nyawuza royal clan were always involved in discussions of major 
importance. Aside from the addition of Sigcau’s personal following, however, it is 
highly unlikely that the meeting reflected the heterogeneity of the Mpondo polity 
itself – especially given the fractious environment of the immediate post-annexation 
period. This is important because, as Michael Mahoney notes, African responses to 
tax varied enormously depending on the nature of the forums in which they were 
acting.925 Viewed in this way, Sigcau’s call to refuse hut-tax registration may be read 
as an insular appeal to those already affiliated to the Great Place. Whilst his behaviour 
again demonstrated a willingness to utilise his intermediary position towards his own 
ends, his ability to do so was circumscribed by the configuration of intra-Mpondo 
loyalties and rivalries. 
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His attempted prevention of hut-tax registration therefore stands in marked 
contrast to the more famous episode of African resistance to colonial taxation – the 
so-called Bhambatha Rebellion in Natal (1906-8). Indeed, it did not signal a growing 
ethnic consciousness amongst the Mpondo; it was not a ‘reluctant’ act of defiance 
born from an undermining of the homestead economy; and it was not the result of 
an inter-generational conflict precipitated by the collusion of African and colonial 
patriarchies.926 Rather, Sigcau’s stand-off against the state revealed the vulnerability 
of a paramount, who, having been recognised as such by colonial officials, perhaps 
not unreasonably assumed their support in ensuring the subordination of those that 
refused to acquiesce. In this sense, his actions typified what Shula Marks has termed 
the ‘ambiguities of dependence’ - a clash between institutions and expectations 
which revealed the wholly disproportionate power relations inherent in the colonial 
situation.927 But his behaviour was also bound up in the factions and fissures that 
comprised Mpondo society. As a result, his actions were arguably intended as a show 
of strength which was twofold: to remind the Cape of his indispensability and to 
encourage Mpondo subjects to rally behind his position.  
Yet for the Cape, such behaviour could only mean one thing. Sigcau’s 
interference in the judicial determinations of the state, his refusal to register 
homesteads for hut-tax payment, and his attempt to seemingly intimidate the Chief 
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Magistrate: all of this was viewed as ‘obstructive to the...peaceable and orderly 
administration of the country’.928 Ironically, officials contrasted his actions with the 
‘praiseworthy’ conduct of his people, who, in spite of Sigcau, had acted ‘civilly 
towards the officials…stationed’ in Pondoland; conversely, they lamented the 
paramount’s reluctance to use his apparently ‘great personal influence’ in support of 
the government.929 Such condemnation clearly missed the point that Sigcau’s 
transgressions were born precisely from the insecurity of his position amongst his 
own followers. His dual role as public functionary and traditional leader meant that 
his obligations to the state were intimately tied to, but fundamentally at odds with, 
the maintenance of his authority as paramount. It was the difficulty in managing this 
paradox that ultimately underlined the call for his arrest. But as the following section 
will demonstrate, this was not Sigcau’s problem alone; the Cape likewise faced its 
own dilemma: how to effect the detention of the paramount without undermining 
the integrity of its own claim to rule in Pondoland.  
 
 
Repugnant to Whom? The Colonial State in Pondoland: 
As this thesis has demonstrated throughout, annexation was not simply an act of 
territorial acquisition. Rather, it was part of a protracted process of incorporation 
that, from 1878, was especially shaped by intra-Mpondo debates concerning the 
exercise of authority and subjecthood. These often contentious conversations not 
only re-qualified the competing claims made on the country by the Cape and Natal; 
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they also helped to facilitate an increasing, if reluctant, imbrication between Mpondo 
paramountcy and colonial state. As I argued in chapter 2, acknowledging this dynamic 
helps avoid ‘the all too easy assumption that conquest was an historical moment 
rather than movement’.930 Nevertheless, it is worth revisiting the relationship 
between historical movement and moment in light of Sigcau’s behaviour. After all, 
annexation was supposed to have marked the moment in which the state moved 
‘from co-existence to control…from just another power to the power’ in the 
country.931  
This qualitative shift in colonial-Mpondo relations had clearly created 
problems for the paramount. But Sigcau’s arrest also presented a particular challenge 
to the Cape, not least because the incarceration of the country’s most prominent 
chief entailed the removal of an intermediary that was indispensable to the 
facilitation of colonial rule. Administrators were thus faced with the dilemma of 
having to justify his detention whilst maintaining an authority that had required his 
active participation. Caught between a commitment to the rule of law and the 
reliance on traditional institutions, this predicament arguably revealed the tensions 
inherent within the system of Transkeian governance. To fully explore these thus 
requires, as Keith Shear rightly notes, an analysis that looks ‘inside the…state as it was 
being constructed’; it demands an acknowledgement of how officials both  
understood and defended what was their precarious claim to rule in Pondoland.932  
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As the Cooks’ trial demonstrated, Transkeian administrators presented their 
magisterial mode of governance as the best embodiment of British rule in Pondoland. 
This position not only intended to preclude those contrary claims made by extra-
colonial Britons. It was also born from an inter-colonial rivalry between the Cape and 
Natal, which, as chapter 3 illustrated, was barely resolved by the act of annexation. 
These twin aims were interrelated; both were rooted in an earlier tradition of Cape 
liberalism and its concomitant attachment to the notion of the “civilising mission”. 
With the promised (if ultimately impractical) assimilation of African subjects at its 
heart, this commitment deliberately differed from the so-called “Shepstonian” 
system advocated by its sister colony.933  
Indeed, historians have long emphasised the divergence in “native” policy 
between these British colonies. For David Welsh, Natal’s legal-dualism was not 
needed in the Cape; white society was larger and better entrenched, the physical 
borders separating European and African were more stable, and the ‘cultural gap’ 
between the two was less pronounced owing to the longer history of colonial 
contact.934 Drawing on these distinctions, Mamdani has argued that a ‘spirited tug of 
war’ waged between what were two competing ‘legal and administrative 
philosophies’ – direct and indirect rule.935  
In the context of the Transkei, however, these differences were less 
meaningful. As A. A. Costa rightly states, ‘Mamdani conflates the Cape systems of the 
colony and the Territories, in order to contrast this hybrid to Natal; in fact the 
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Transkeian and Natal systems were remarkably similar, and quite distinct from the 
Cape system’.936 Sandwiched between these settler societies, and confronted by a 
potentially ungovernable, alien indigenous population, ‘the strictures of liberal 
legality were [deemed] insufficient’.937 Whilst the exercise of colonial law was 
intended as a civilising influence, it could also provoke political unrest and anti-
colonial rebellion. As a result, Transkeian officials opted to temper the promises of 
British rule with the practicalities of local governance. Like Natal, this entailed the 
instrumentalisation of indigenous institutions and customary law in order to minimise 
the disruption precipitated by colonial rule. But it did not negate the overarching 
liberal ethos of Cape policy. The major difference – and indeed, tension - thus lay in 
the ultimate aim of “native” governance: the eventual destruction of the chieftaincy 
and the assimilation of African subjects. At the same time, however, colonial control 
had to be translated into ‘a legitimate authority accepted by Africans…[and] mediated 
through their own pre-existing or emergent relations of power’.938  
 In Pondoland, these relations were inherently fractured. Regional and sub-
chiefs enjoyed an autonomy that automatically lent itself to factional disputes, but 
these were exacerbated by, and remained unresolved after, the Mpondo civil war. It 
was this that underpinned Sigcau’s own insecurity, which, as shown above, arguably 
forced him into action that provoked the Cape to call for his arrest. Yet the mutual 
precariousness of colonial rule in the immediate post-annexation period meant that 
this could not be achieved through the threat or use of force alone. As Lonsdale again 
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notes, it required a ‘complimentary appropriation of…local political resources’ that 
had the potential to further agitate the already unstable condition of the country.939 
This was made particularly clear following the Prime Minister’s call for Sigcau’s 
arrest on 5 June 1895.940 Naturally, the authorities discussed the most effective, yet 
least disruptive means of removing the paramount from power. Stanford proposed 
assembling a force of Cape and East Griqualand Rifleman supported by, crucially, a 
huge contingent of “native” volunteers. The mobilisation of local levies in the 
administration of law and order was hardly unique.941 But official correspondence 
arguably reflected a willingness to manipulate the divisions within Mpondo society. 
Indeed, Major Sprigg proposed the conscription of Mhlangaso and Patekile’s 
followers - those who had actively fought against Sigcau prior to annexation.942 
Others reported that Siyoyo, the Cwera chief and long-term opponent of the 
paramount, had likewise affirmed his loyalty to the state should any military action 
take place.943 In addition, the Nci – ‘the best fighting tribe’ – and Bala clans refused 
to aid Sigcau in any possible resistance, most likely because their chiefs, Gonyolo and 
Nonkonyana, had recently testified against the paramount during the Cooks’ trial.944  
These disputes, which reflected an ongoing debate amongst Mpondo chiefs 
about the exercise of authority and subjecthood, were crucial in rendering the threat 
of colonial force effective. Certainly, it was this waning of internal support for Sigcau 
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that compelled the chief to hand himself in to the authorities at Kokstad on 18 June. 
In this sense, his surrender did not necessarily signal the subordination of his 
paramountcy to the state; rather, it illustrated the increasing imbrication of the two, 
as officials sought to manipulate intra-Mpondo relations in order to secure Sigcau’s 
arrest. Stanford revealed as much when, writing to the Prime Minister, he stressed 
the need to ‘strengthen our friends’ in order to ‘remove Sigcau and effect a 
permanent settlement of Pondoland’.945 Rhodes likewise reciprocated; he suggested 
that the now vacant Great Place should be occupied by a CMR patrol and ‘be made 
[into] the seat of [a resident] magistracy’.946 What was meant as a display of colonial 
supremacy was thus dependent on the instrumentalisation of local political resources 
and rivalries.  
In this way, both the reasons for, as well as the realisation of, Sigcau’s 
incarceration were rooted in a process of mutual borrowing across the colonial divide. 
The paramount had sought to utilise the mechanisms of colonial rule in order to re-
assert his authority over recalcitrant rebel communities; likewise, the state mobilised 
those same factions within Mpondo politics to secure his detention. This blurring of 
the boundaries between ruler and ruled was further embodied by the proclamation, 
issued by Governor Loch on 11 June 1895, authorising the paramount’s capture. ‘By 
virtue of the powers vested in [him] by…the Acts annexing the [Transkeian] 
territories,’ the Governor sought to ‘make known that…Sigcau has, by his…disregard 
and defiance of the law, rendered himself to arrest’.947 The declaration underlined 
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the concentration of power possessed by the Governor; ‘as the sole custodian of 
authority’, he sat at the apex of a hierarchical system of government that intended to 
both replicate a pre-colonial patriarchy whilst limiting the powers of traditional 
leaders themselves.948 In this way, his position bore remarkable similarity to his 
Natalian counterpart, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, who, as Governor, enjoyed the title 
of ‘Supreme Chief’.949 Unlike the latter, however, Loch did not draw explicitly on 
traditional imagery – a reflection, perhaps, of the overarching differences between 
the “native” policies of the two colonies. 
 The proclamation not only implored Sigcau to either surrender himself or face 
arrest; the Governor also proceeded to ‘ratify and confirm all acts done or authorised, 
or to be done or authorised…for the execution of criminal warrants’ against the 
paramount.950 Going further, he sanctioned his detention at Kokstad for a ‘time 
determined by [him] to be necessary and expedient’, after which an enquiry, to be 
‘instituted by [his] direction’ would judge Sigcau on his behaviour and decide the most 
appropriate punishment. Speculating, Loch envisaged appointing ‘a place within 
the…[Transkeian] territories for the residence of…Sigcau, with pecuniary 
allowances…but under such terms and conditions as may be determined by further 
proclamation’.951 To be clear, it was the Governor who held the power to detain him 
for as long as he deemed necessary, during which a commission justifying his arrest 
would be called, and its judgement enforced by the same official. This entire “judicial” 
process arguably intended to underline ‘the totality of subjection’ implied by 
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annexation.952 As if to prove the point, the commission was established on the 22 
June and only held its first meeting on the 1 July 1895 – thirteen days after Sigcau was 
detained. 
 This asymmetry was further underlined by the court hearing itself; installed as 
President of the Commission was Stanford, to whom the power of arrest had also 
been conferred by the Governor. Such was his authority, that a request by Sigcau’s 
attorney that he be allowed to record the evidence submitted by witnesses, was 
deemed ‘premature’. ‘You can watch the proceedings,’ Stanford explained, ‘[and] in 
conducting your defence of Sigcau you can decide on what points you desire my 
evidence. The commission will then decide whether it is absolutely necessary for me 
to give [it]’.953 Moreover, when Sigcau came to appeal against his detention in the 
Supreme Court, the government deliberately scheduled his hearing for 30 July – one 
day after the commission had reported to Loch. Given no forewarning, his attorney 
made it clear that the defence was legally entitled to at least forty-eight hours’ notice 
before the beginning of these proceedings; as far as he was concerned, ‘the sudden 
necessity and urgency of this present application [was] not apparent’ at all.954  
 These underhand tactics were not the sole preserve of the Cape. The Cooks 
had likewise enjoyed such treatment; colonial officials were instructed to track the 
concessionaries’ attorney as he made his way through Pondoland. Attempts to 
restrict an appellant’s ability to mount a judicial challenge against the colonial state 
were thus not new. But whereas the brothers had received an open trial predicated 
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on the solicitation of testimonies and the cross-examination of witnesses, Sigcau was 
not. Indeed, it was this that ultimately swayed the determination of the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court, Sir J. A. de Villiers, to order the paramount’s release: ‘can it be 
doubted that a [proclamation] passed in a time of peace, for the arrest, 
condemnation and sentence of a [native] by order of the Governor, without the 
instructions of any judicial officer or tribunal and without giving him the opportunity 
of being heard by counsel or witnesses, could be repugnant to the laws of 
England?’955 
To be sure, the arrest and trial of the paramount had been designed, in part 
at least, as a show of strength; the issuing of the proclamation and the manipulation 
of judicial procedure: both were intended to underscore a subordination to the 
colonial state that was meant to have been confirmed by the very act of annexation. 
But as the previous chapter made clear, it was not just the colony into which 
Pondoland was incorporated; it was the Empire too. Owing to his peaceful cession of 
the country, the Chief Justice was convinced that Sigcau ‘[was] a British subject. After 
the annexation of his territory, he elected to remain in the country, and, according to 
the recent decision of [the Supreme] Court, he must be presumed to have accepted 
allegiance to the British Crown’.956 Given his detention by the state, he was thus 
endowed with the ‘right to [the] assistance of the Supreme Court’ in order to 
challenge the ‘illegal infringement of his personal liberty’.957 
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Whilst de Villiers ordered Sigcau’s release on the 30 July, the Prime Minister 
and Attorney-General immediately lodged their own with the Privy Council in London 
a week later.958 Usually, episodes of imperial appeal served to highlight the increasing 
conflict over issues such as status, self-government and judicial sovereignty between 
a colonial dependency and the imperial power.959 Such issues were clearly at stake 
here, although, in this instance, it was Rhodes and Schreiner who lobbied London in 
an attempt to challenge the ruling of the Cape’s own Chief Justice. This conflict 
between the colonial executive and judiciary was incredibly important. Prompted by 
Sigcau’s arrest, it pivoted on the issue of his potential rights as a newly incorporated 
member of the empire; as such, it thus called into question the precise meaning of 
the Cape’s own claim to rule.  
 Indeed, Rhodes and Schreiner made clear that the Governor’s authority had 
been conferred by the Act of Annexation through which ‘the Pondo territories [had] 
become subject to the laws, statutes and ordinances proclaimed by the Governor’.960 
Seeking to overturn the decision of the Supreme Court, they argued that the 
proclamation had been ‘illegally and unconstitutionally overruled.’961 In doing so, the 
Chief Justice’s determination thus placed at serious risk the ‘peace, order and good 
government’ of the country.962  Indeed, they argued that the decision of the Supreme 
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Court had ‘detrimentally interfered with…the lawful administration’ of a region 
‘mainly composed of barbarous aboriginal tribes’ who required ‘firm and prompt 
action.’963 Their choice of language arguably revealed a legal positivism that 
underscored the necessity of rule by gubernatorial decree throughout the Native 
Territories. As Ivan Evans notes, such centralised authority was the most striking 
aspect of “native” administration. Set apart from “white South Africa, Africans were 
subjected to ‘forms of state power that whites would never have tolerated’; as such, 
this judicial authority reinforced a series of white prejudices that ranged from a belief 
in the gulf separating white and black “cultures”’ to a genuine belief that the 
‘benevolent work’ of the government ‘required this extraordinary arrangement’.964  
In this sense, Rhodes and Schreiner arguably viewed Sigcau’s crimes in terms 
of the potential for a broader black defiance of colonial rule; the proclamation was 
intended to serve as both the punishment of a specific offence and as a general 
deterrence against African rebelliousness. This ability to conflate the actions of an 
indicted individual with the behaviour of the black majority was typical of a criminal 
legal system that, as Martin Chanock notes, supposed ‘the moral culpability and social 
dangerousness of all who were not white.’965 Whilst criminal law usually operated on 
the notion of personal responsibility, the political culture of the Transkei took for 
granted the general broader barbarity of African society. By nullifying the 
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proclamation in Pondoland, the judiciary had thus potentially undermined the Cape’s 
ability to govern the entire Transkeian Territories. 
As the Chief Justice explained, however, the ‘state of the country should not 
be a factor to influence any decision of [the Supreme Court]’; rather, ‘its first and 
most sacred duty is to administer justice to those who seek it and not to preserve the 
peace…the civil courts have…one duty to perform, and that is to administer the laws 
of the country without fear, favour or prejudice, independently of the consequences 
that may ensue’.966 In explaining his decision to release Sigcau, de Villiers thus 
highlighted an important disagreement between the colonial executive and the 
judiciary that was likely born in part from the different institutional universes they 
inhabited. As Chanock again notes, judges were unlikely to place themselves 
alongside the prison warder or colonial magistrate, preferring instead to relate to the 
Renaissance European jurist or the judges in the House of Lords in ‘a feat of self-
imagining’; ‘this legal identity helped [the] evasion of South African actualities but 
constructed a philosophical, juristic, correct and formal self which could be opposed 
totally to the barbarian other’.967 
In this way, de Villiers’ judgement not only overturned a gubernatorial decree; 
more seriously, he arguably questioned the imperial efficacy of the Transkeian 
administration itself. His determination, rooted in and reflective of an imperial legal 
universalism, clearly clashed with local administrative practices that were based on 
the belief in native difference.968 Indeed, officials sought to temper the liberal 
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promises of empire with the practicalities of local governance in part by replicating 
the personalism and paternalism of the chiefly authority they sought to supplant. 
Designed to stabilise the transition to colonial rule, for the Chief Justice this 
concentration of power in the hands of the Governor was thoroughly at odds with 
the proper praxis of civilised government; as he stated: the proclamation issued to 
sanction the arrest of Sigcau ‘purports to proclaim a law but in reality it issues a 
decree which is partly executive, partly judicial, and wholly arbitrary’.969  
For de Villiers, this was especially serious not least because the Governor’s 
authority was defined by the terms of the commission granted to him by the Crown. 
One of its instructions, he explained, ‘is that he shall not assent to any bill WHICH IS 
REPUGNANT TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND’.970 This was a rule applied across the expanse 
of empire. As Bonny Ibhawoh makes clear, it reflected a basic principle that all 
colonial legislatures were subordinate to the imperial parliament, although, in British 
Africa, it acquired renewed relevance given the centrality of customary law to colonial 
legal systems.971 Indeed, its employment marked one of the defining characteristics 
of “native” administration across the Transkei, serving as a tacit acknowledgement of 
the limited application of a Cape ‘liberal legality’.972  
Yet at the same time, ‘one of the first acts of conquest’ was the introduction 
of colonial criminal law. This not only shifted the power over property and person 
from chief to magistrate; it also outlawed those ‘practices deemed by officials to be 
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repugnant and “barbarous”’.973 In Pondoland, this formal division between criminal 
and civil law occurred following the introduction of the Transkeian Penal Code on 27 
September 1894.974 Whilst the instrumentalisation of customary law marked an 
important concession to the practicalities of local governance and the demands for 
political stability, the ‘doctrine of repugnancy’ nevertheless provided a judicial and 
cultural boundary between coloniser and colonised; as Ibhawoh again notes, ‘the test 
of repugnancy could not be the conscience of the native community practising a 
custom. Repugnancy had to be measured against ‘higher’ and more universal 
standards of British justice’.975 
With this in mind, de Villiers’ use of the term is highly significant; it arguably 
underlines Lauren Benton’s contention ‘that the ways in which the politics of 
jurisdictional disputes played out were crucial to changing notions of cultural 
boundaries, in part because “jurisdiction” itself implied a certain sharing of identities 
and values among subjects’.976 By overturning the Governor’s proclamation on the 
basis of its violation of the doctrine of repugnancy, the Chief Justice clearly implied 
that Transkeian administrators did not share those same standards. As he made clear, 
‘it is impossible to ascertain from the Proclamation what specific law the petitioner 
has “disregarded and defied”…if it was legal to sentence Sigcau to perpetual exile for 
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his alleged “obstructive” conduct, [then] it would have been equally legal to sentence 
him to death’.977 Such arbitrary power, rooted in the colonial appropriation of a 
presumed pre-colonial paternalism, thus facilitated a “repugnant” act against a chief 
who had, by contrast, sought ‘by peaceful methods to obtain redress instead of 
arousing his clan to rebellion against the constituted authorities’.978 Indeed, it was his 
recourse to judicial appeal, lodged by his attorney, which had constituted a ‘hopeful 
sign’ in the face of an otherwise ‘arbitrary punishment’.979 Given his successful 
release, it was arguably the paramount himself who could therefore lay better claim 
to the universal standards of British justice. 
 
Conclusion: 
In this sense, accusations of repugnancy arguably served a similar function to those 
debates over despotism precipitated by the Cooks’ trial. In concluding that particular 
case, both the Cape and the concessionaries sought to monopolise the meaning of 
what precisely constituted “British rule” in a colonial context by positing the actions 
of each other as inimical to the praxis of civilised government. Such contestations 
masked a very real jurisdictional dispute over the right to control local land and 
resources, as well as the power and position of the paramount in a post-annexation 
Pondoland. Those issues were at stake here too; by criticising the Cape’s custodial 
treatment of Sigcau on the basis of his newly conferred British subjecthood, the state 
once again found itself vulnerable to challenges predicated on the invocation of 
imperial membership. Moreover, by overturning the Governor’s proclamation and 
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ordering his release, the Chief Justice thus confirmed Sigcau’s trial as a significant 
jurisdictional challenge to the Cape’s claim to rule.  
 Despite their appeal to London, both Rhodes and Schreiner were to remain 
disappointed. On 26 February 1897, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
published the final determination on the matter. In similar terms to de Villiers, their 
report referred to the Governor’s proclamation as a ‘dictatorial edict’ that ‘was simply 
an invasion of the individual rights and liberty of a British subject’.980 Whatever the 
authority vested in him as a result of the act of annexation, they made it clear that it 
was not ‘intended to make [him] a Dictator, or even clothe him with the full legislative 
powers of the Cape Parliament’.  
Such criticism, coupled with the confirmation of Sigcau’s status as a British 
subject, arguably demonstrates Ibhawoh’s argument that ‘it is not enough to 
recognise that the politics of the rule of difference lay at the heart of the colonial 
enterprise; it is also imperative to appreciate that the meanings of difference were 
inherently unstable’.981 So too, were the boundaries – whether jurisdictional, judicial 
or cultural – that were designed to maintain it. As has been shown, the barriers 
separating paramountcy and state were at their most permeable precisely at the 
moment of annexation. Intra-Mpondo debates concerning the exercise of authority 
and subjecthood had, prior to political incorporation, rendered these otherwise 
inimical institutions increasingly interdependent. In the post-annexation period, 
Sigcau had struggled to reconcile his dual role as public functionary and traditional 
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leader; mediating the imperatives of the state was intimately tied to, but 
fundamentally at odds with, the maintenance of his authority as paramount. Such 
insecurity was likewise paralleled by the Cape, as it sought to exercise its authority 
through African agencies whilst maintaining the integrity of its own claim to rule.   
From the Supreme Court’s perspective, the government had clearly failed in 
its objective. Whilst the appropriation of pre-colonial idioms of power undoubtedly 
allowed Transkeian administrators to stabilise the transition to colonial rule, the 
exigencies of local governance nevertheless compromised the liberal promise of 
empire. As de Villiers’ made clear, the proclamation demonstrated the ‘exercising 
[of] arbitrary executive functions directed against [an] individual’; what it should 
have been establishing was ‘a rule of moral conduct obliging what is right’.982 This 
judgement was hardly abstract; it entailed a significant jurisdictional intervention 
designed to counter what was perceived as the potential tyranny of the colonial 
government. In doing so, de Villiers’ arguably drew attention to an important 
contradiction that structured imperial-colonial relations; that is, the need to uphold 
the basic standards of British liberty across a decentralised empire that necessarily 
allowed for the maintenance of racial inequality within its colonial constituencies.983  
It was this paradox that, crucially, allowed various actors to take up the cause 
of British liberalism against the colonial government – even if African chiefs or 
commoners themselves hardly invested in such ideals. Notions of ‘rights’ or ‘justice’ 
were spoken as if they were universally understood, whilst their application was 
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‘configured in ways that spoke to the specificities of different colonial sites’.984 With 
regards to Sigcau, the ability of these notions to effect colonial events is thus 
important, not least because such motivations are usually associated with the 
humanitarian influence on colonial policy at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.985 Even in 1895, however, they could be effectively deployed to highlight 
both the limits of colonial coercion and the contradictions that characterised a 
dependency on African intermediaries as the best means through which to stabilise 
colonial rule.  
In this way, Sigcau’s trial arguably crystallised a tension that often marked the 
acquisition of new colonial territories. As John Comaroff notes, ‘imperial regimes 
abroad were always caught up in a ‘doubling’, a contradiction: at the…same time they 
spoke of transforming colonised peoples into civilised…free, rights-bearing citizens, 
they dealt in heterogeneity by naturalising ethnic difference, and essentialising racial 
inequality’.986 The Transkei encapsulated this very duality – legally and politically 
separate from, but subordinate to the colony proper. Caught between the interstices 
of empire and colony, Sigcau was thus able to benefit from this paradox, despite 
hardly being a convert to such liberal imperatives himself. Indeed, his trial 
demonstrates the extent to which notions of imperial rights could intersect with, and 
potentially undermine, the attempted consolidation of colonial subjecthood; like the 
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very process of state-formation, the boundaries separating these otherwise 
antithetical realms of rule could often be rendered increasingly permeable.987 
 Whilst the disagreements between the colonial executive and judiciary thus 
centred on debating the imperial efficacy of colonial rule, such disputes were once 
again intimately tied to the practical issues of governance within Pondoland. Like the 
Cooks’ case, Sigcau’s trial and arrest demonstrated the state’s vulnerability to 
challenges predicated on the invocation of empire; similarly, it highlighted the Cape’s 
inability to monopolise precisely what the exercise of “British rule” meant in a colonial 
context. Yet both also served as the vehicle for a swathe of intra-Mpondo interests: 
the former used the concessionaries’ trial in the pursuit of the fissures and factions 
exacerbated by civil conflict; the latter was a direct product of those very same 
tensions. Likewise, whilst they were instrumental in deciding the outcome of the 
Cooks’ case, in this instance they were central in actually facilitating the arrest of the 
Mpondo paramount. Taken together, these judicial encounters thus demonstrate the 
extension of those conversations concerning the exercise of authority and 
subjecthood precipitated by imperial intervention in 1878. As such, they again mark 
an important moment in the intersection of those African and European jurisdictional 
disputes, which, as the following chapter will demonstrate, fundamentally shaped the 
administrative and institutional character of the early colonial state itself. 
                                                          
987 Bijita Majumdar, ‘Citizen or Subject?’, p. 480. 
309 
 
Chapter 6: Loyalties, Rivalries and the Creation of a Colonial State in 
Pondoland, 1894-1913: 
 
Introduction: 
On 8 February 1898, Sigcau was called to the office of the Assistant Chief Magistrate 
of Pondoland, Robert Stanford.988 Stood before the official, the paramount was 
informed of a secret meeting that had taken place between himself and three 
messengers sent to him by the prominent Griqua leader, A. A. S. Le Fleur. Sigcau 
listened as Stanford read the contents of their supposedly confidential 
correspondence, which stated that Le Fleur and his followers were on their way to 
Pondoland. His instructions were clear: as ‘soon as they entered the county, it was 
his duty to have them apprehended and brought to this office’. Reminded of the one-
thousand-pound subsidy he personally received, Sigcau was warned ‘that the 
Government expect[ed] him to assist officials in carrying out the law’. Should he fail 
to do so, ‘then serious notice would be taken of his conduct’. 
Le Fleur cut a controversial figure within the Transkei. A strong proponent for 
the restoration of Griqua land rights, his politics provided an outlet for a wider 
discontent shared amongst once loyal African leaders, who similarly felt the burdens 
of increased colonial settlement at the end of the nineteenth century.989 Officials and 
settlers observed this rising rebellious mood with unease; in January 1897, Le Fleur 
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was detained for ten months for conspiring to openly rebel against the Cape.990 A 
second warrant for his arrest was issued just one year later; following an aborted 
attack on Kokstad and the assault of a white farmer in the Mount Currie district of 
East Griqualand, Le Fleur fled the country a wanted rebel.991 On 11 February 1898, 
he entered Pondoland. His hopes that the paramount would provide shelter for him 
and his men were to be disappointed; upon his arrival at Sigcau’s Great Place, he was 
apprehended by a cohort of Cape Mounted Riflemen and escorted back to 
Kokstad.992 ‘It must have been a wrench’, remarked Stanford, ‘to arrest his old friend 
[but] his doing so shows clearly that he has thoroughly determined to do better in 
the future’ to show his goodwill towards the Government. Writing to the Chief 
Magistrate of the Transkei, the official made clear that he ‘was very pleased with his 
action’ and suggested that ‘the circumstances connected with [Le Fleur’s] arrest 
should be brought to the knowledge of…the Premier’.993 
This was not the first time that Sigcau had been implicated in a post-
annexation plot against the Cape. As his own detention illustrated, despite 
supporting Sigcau during the Mpondo civil war, officials had trouble articulating the 
place of the paramount within the institutional structures of the newly inaugurated 
state. To be sure, the paramount could look the part (see Fig. 4.1) and was necessarily 
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co-opted as an important functionary in the establishment of colonial rule. Yet Sigcau 
also had to balance an acquiescence to the Cape alongside a need to maintain his 
personal credibility within an already fractured Mpondo polity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Viewed as simultaneously essential to, yet obstructive of, the governance of 
Pondoland, the arrest of Le Fleur thus typified the uncertain interdependence of 
these otherwise inimical institutions. Stanford’s threat to withdraw Sigcau’s personal 
salary certainly reflected the financial constraints now placed on the personal 
fortunes of Mpondo chiefs. Yet this had little immediate impact on their potential for 
Fig. 4.1: (CL) ‘Full Length Seated Portrait of Chief Sigcau, 1900’, PIC/M-338 
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political disruption. As the previous chapter demonstrated, alleged acts of rebellion 
were designed as a show of strength that were arguably twofold: to remind the Cape 
of the continued influence of the paramountcy, whilst trying to cultivate it amongst 
Mpondo subjects themselves.  
In this instance, however, senior officials doubted Sigcau’s involvement, 
especially given the active encouragement proffered by Mhlangaso. Numerous 
testimonies solicited during the Griqua leader’s trial confirmed how Sigcau’s recently 
exiled rival had sought to implicate the Mpondo paramount in this urge for war in 
order to present himself as a more credible government ally.994 His duplicity was 
further revealed when it was discovered that, despite supporting Le Fleur, Mhlangaso 
had immediately reported his whereabouts to the authorities in Kokstad following 
the failed attack in November 1897.995 As such, his behaviour constituted an attempt 
to externally instrumentalise those factions and fissures within Pondoland upon 
which Sigcau’s own position depended.  
Despite the failed machinations of Mhlangaso, officials were nevertheless 
aware that their recently formalised authority relied on an ability to manage intra-
Mpondo relations. Whilst it had clearly been expedient to support the incumbent 
during the civil conflict, the Resident Magistrate of Bizana, Major Sprigg, now sought 
to question the efficacy of ‘Sigcau’s so-called government’.996 Castigated as 
‘oppressive’, he pondered whether the outbreak of rebellion ‘could be looked upon 
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as a crime at all’; unable to return to their homesteads, the land of these ‘so-called 
rebels’ had since been occupied by ‘pro-Sigcau tribes’ whilst their former occupants 
had been crammed onto a small piece of non-arable veld. Such conditions were only 
likely to precipitate further instability whilst empowering a paramount who, as the 
previous two chapters demonstrated, was clearly not yet reconciled to colonial rule. 
As Sprigg noted: ‘we have been doing our best to alienate the only people in 
Pondoland on whose loyalty we can rely in the event of a rupture with Sigcau’. A 
switch in support would thus ‘render an attack on this magistracy very difficult’; ‘it 
places’, he explained, ‘several loyal tribes…in a very awkward position should they 
wish to assist Sigcau and his partisans at any time against the Government, for these 
“rebels” would be in their rear and would assuredly capture their stock’. 
In many respects, the plasticity of terms such as “loyal” and “rebel” simply 
reflected the realpolitik of colonial rule, where the turnover of allies and affiliates 
was often high.997 Prompted by the transition from Mpondo independence to 
annexation, Sprigg’s comments revealed the concerns that confronted the 
establishment of his own magisterial authority in Bizana. After all, his was the district 
in which resided the majority of those communities who had supported Mhlangaso 
during the recent conflict. He thus demonstrated a willingness to cultivate profitable 
political alliances with willing local participants, who, in this instance, may well have 
been enticed by the ‘allure’ of collaboration through the potential promise of stock 
and land.998  
                                                          
997 Robinson, ‘Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism’, p. 122. 
998 Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, p. 26; Robinson, ‘Non-European Foundations of European 
Imperialism’, p. 121. 
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Such considerations clearly presumed an ability to instrumentalise the 
loyalties and rivalries that existed between multiple Mpondo constituencies through 
the offer of socio-economic security. To that end, Sprigg’s actions thus echoed those 
undertaken by imperial administrators in 1878, who had similarly sought to certain 
Mpondo actors with the prospect of political sovereignty and extra-territorial 
subjecthood. Yet as chapter 2 demonstrated, they instead precipitated a series of 
contentious conversations regarding the exercise of authority and subjecthood 
amongst numerous Mpondo communities. These notions were hardly abstract; 
rather, they were actualised in the everyday affinities and enmities that existed 
between them – cleavages which themselves reflected the country’s jurisdictionally 
heterogeneous and politically decentralised nature. The institutional arrangements 
that underpinned these relations were further reinforced by the physical location of 
these multiple constituencies; communal divisions and solidarities were largely 
fostered by the constraints imposed, as well as the opportunities provided by, the 
political geography of Pondoland.999 Attempts to introduce alternative political 
boundaries thus failed to correspond to indigenous perceptions of space and 
sovereignty.  
This chapter seeks to make a similar point by exploring how the jurisdictional 
heterogeneity of the Mpondo polity shaped the institutional and administrative 
character of the early colonial state. Sprigg’s concerns provide a useful starting point. 
In advocating the marginalisation of the paramount, the official clearly sought to 
better establish his own authority in Bizana. Yet as he made clear, the pressures 
                                                          
999 Boone, Political Topographies, p. 5. 
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placed on those under his charge were born from Sigcau’s post-war attempts to 
extend his authority over what had long been a difficult and distant region. In doing 
so, his actions ironically paralleled those of his rival, who, in 1886 had undertaken a 
similar initiative in the Rode Valley. As chapter 3 demonstrated, such initiatives 
contradicted a longer tradition of Mpondo political decentralisation; many chiefs 
turned to an array of extra-local actors in order to avoid the reach of the royal house. 
In the immediate post-annexation period, epithets such as “rebel” and “loyal” thus 
did more than describe a change in the short-term affiliations between coloniser and 
colonised. Crucially, they also embodied the latest reconfiguration of intra-Mpondo 
political relations as various chiefs and their followers sought to maintain their own 
autonomy in the post-annexation period. 
 The resilience of Mpondo chiefly structures and their impact in shaping the 
processes of colonial state-formation has been acknowledged by other historians.1000 
As Beinart argues, the protracted absorption of the polity into the wider colonial 
economy modified, rather than undermined, the patterns of production and 
exchange upon which chiefly authority depended. Despite a broad post-annexation 
assault on the customary powers and privileges of the chieftaincy, by the beginning 
of the twentieth century Mpondo chiefs remained in a far stronger position than 
others across the Transkei to influence the actions of colonial administrators.1001 By 
1897, officials had divided the country into seven magisterial districts: Bizana, 
Flagstaff, Lusikisiki and Tabankulu in the East; Libode, Ngqeleni and Port St. John in 
                                                          
1000 Lungisile Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in South Africa, 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 36. 
1001 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 38; Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised, p. 37, 56. 
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the West. Yet as these were further subdivided into countless locations, many chiefs 
were either nominated as, or were able to influence the appointment of, those 
headmen employed by the government to administer them.1002 As the 
representatives and regulators of local populations, headmen proved indispensable 
to the maintenance of magisterial rule; they carried out police and judicial duties, 
ensured hut-tax registration and collection, enforced stock regulations, and 
influenced levels of production and labour migrancy in part by controlling the 
allocation and settlement of land.1003 
Such appointments served as an important means through which to cultivate 
colonial support. In order to undermine the purchase of Sigcau’s paramountcy, 
officials were particularly keen to employ either those chiefs who were sympathetic 
to colonial rule or local notables who would necessarily rely on the state for their 
patronage. For both, headmanships guaranteed a salaried income at a time when the 
sources of independent wealth usually enjoyed by Mpondo chiefs had been 
restricted.1004 It also provided incumbents with an opportunity to build or expand a 
local power base by virtue of their intermediary position; moreover, it placed them 
in prime position to collect those customary dues – whether death duties (isizi), court 
and immigration fees, or cattle fines – still sanctioned by the state.1005 Little wonder 
                                                          
1002 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 37. 
1003 Colin Bundy, ‘A Voice in the Big House: The Career of Headman Enoch Mamba’, in William 
Beinart and Colin Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics & Popular Movements in the 
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then, that the ‘competition for control over headmen and dues’ became a central 
feature of intra-Mpondo politics in the post-annexation period.1006  
In many respects, the demarcation of locations arguably complimented the 
pre-colonial pattern of decentralisation by providing regional chiefs with their own 
(now-limited) local spheres of autonomy.1007 Such developments were deliberately 
designed to discriminate against Sigcau; contrary to the colonial support he 
presumed he possessed, the Cape refused to grant him the right to nominate the 
headmen in Mhlangaso’s former chiefdom.1008 Such tensions persisted until his death 
in 1905 and abated only after the succession of his son, Marelane, in 1909, when 
officials began to revise their antipathy towards the royal house. Eager to better 
accommodate him towards colonial rule, they began to look more favourably upon 
traditional authorities as the best means to control their rural populations. Reflective 
of the wider impact of segregationist ideologies upon ‘Native policy’ from 1910, in 
Pondoland this entailed the maintenance of certain social relations which themselves 
oriented around continued access to communal land and the preservation of 
communal tenure. 
Symbolised by the powers of the chieftaincy, this shift in favour of communal 
land-holding was supported by the paramount himself, who sought the restoration 
of some of the powers once removed from his father.1009 This turn towards 
“tradition” served multiple purposes. For officials, it could confer legitimacy upon 
                                                          
1006 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 39. 
1007 As in other contexts, the delimitation of these locations more often than not reflected existing 
realities on the ground. Keegan, Colonial South Africa, p. 208.  
1008 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 38. 
1009 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 126, 111. 
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particular policies and interventions; for chiefs and headmen, it lent an important 
justification for the maintenance of their preferential positions within Mpondo 
society; and for commoners too, it provided the language with which to fight for the 
continued access to essential rural resources.1010 This confluence of interests was 
perhaps best embodied by the support proffered by the paramountcy following the 
promulgation of the 1913 Natives Land Act. The South African Native National 
Congress (SANNC) unequivocally opposed the establishment of African rural 
reserves. Yet many Mpondo councillors supported what they saw as the legislative 
protection of communal tenure – from which their own authority derived - from 
alienation and colonial expropriation.1011  
The importance of the Act, in laying the legislative foundations for the legal 
structure of apartheid, is well-established.1012 In noting the qualitative shift in 
colonial policy from 1909, Beinart’s argument speaks to the now familiar themes of 
twentieth century South African state-formation; principally, the incorporation of 
chiefs and headmen as agents of the colonial state, bolstered by the development of 
specific spatial and administrative units – reserves, districts and locations – alongside 
the concomitant embracing of tradition and custom.1013 Those studies concerned 
                                                          
1010 Beinart, Political Economy, p.  113; Beinart, ‘Chieftaincy and the Concept of Articulation’, p. 95.  
1011 For a detailed example of the defence of the 1913 Natives Land Act proffered by prominent 
Mpondo councillor W. D. Cingo, see Beinart, Political Economy, pp. 123-24. The support for some of 
the major provisions of the Act thus constituted an important means by which to protect certain 
pre-colonial social relations. In other contexts, opposition to the Act also served to maintain the 
internal integrity of particular polities and the preferential access of certain royal families to key 
natural resources. See Fred Morton, ‘Land, Cattle and Ethnicity: Creating Linchwe’s BakKgatla, 1875-
1920’, South African Historical Journal, 33:1 (1995), pp. 131-54, especially, p. 152, 153.  
1012 Harvey M. Feinberg, ‘The 1913 Natives Land Act in South Africa: Politics, Race and Segregation in 
the Early 20th Century’, International Journal of African Studies, 26:1 (1993), p. 66. 
1013 Indeed, Beinart notes the relative success of both Western and Eastern Mpondo paramounts in 
securing additional rights, usually at the expense of local chiefs and headmen, on the basis of 
appeals to tradition – as evidenced by the books published on Mpondo history and custom by W. D. 
Cingo (1925) and Victor Poto-Ndamase (1927),. See Beinart, Political Economy, p. 121. 
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with the increasing immiseration of rural populations, and the implications for their 
governance in the post-apartheid period, have understandably emphasised the 
steady transformation of the chieftaincy into an appendage of the state as a principal 
factor.1014 From this perspective, the certainty of these developments appear 
obvious. Yet as this thesis has argued throughout, they emerged from a larger 
imperial climate defined by its jurisdictional ambiguity – one that provided Mpondo 
actors with broad scope to negotiate and shape what was a protracted process of 
political incorporation. Such engagement did not simply cease upon annexation. As 
Beinart demonstrates, colonial interventions were mutually re-qualified by older 
forms of socio-economic organisation that bolstered the productive capacity of 
already autonomous homesteads whilst feeding into longer-established patterns of 
rural differentiation.1015 In doing so, he calls attention to the limits of social 
transformation within Pondoland whilst highlighting how local power relations could 
shape the broader articulation of national policies such as the Natives Land Act.1016 
As such, its immediate impact was limited – partially qualified as a response to, rather 
than a unidirectional imposition upon, pre-existing social relations.1017   
This chapter builds on this argument by demonstrating how intra-Mpondo 
political relations similarly shaped the processes of state-formation in the early 
colonial period. Specifically, it explores how local loyalties and rivalries were crucial 
                                                          
1014 Hendricks, Pillars of Apartheid; Hendricks, ‘’Tribalism, Chiefs and Apartheid’; Ntsebeza, 
Democracy Compromised; Ntsebeza, ‘The More Things Change’. 
1015 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 128. 
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in determining the demarcation of magisterial districts and locations, as well as the 
ability of resident magistrates and headmen to “broadcast” their authority within 
them.1018 In order to demonstrate this, I argue that these interventions served to 
once again precipitate a reconfiguration of intra-Mpondo political relations; they 
were necessarily interpreted according to long-existing understandings concerning 
the exercise of authority and subjecthood. Underscoring a chiefly desire to maintain 
their long-held autonomy, they also continued to animate Mpondo actors well 
beyond the promulgation of the Natives Land Act - despite the apparent consensus 
of support proffered by the paramountcy.  
In a confidential despatch to Pietermaritzburg in May 1918, the Resident 
Magistrate in Harding recalled the ‘antagonistic feeling’ that pervaded Pondoland; 
gathered at Marelane’s Great Place, numerous chiefs emphasised their opposition to 
the Act, ‘by force of arms if necessary’.1019 Such discontent likely reflected a growing 
resentment towards colonial intervention prompted by a new levy to tackle East 
Coast Fever between 1913 and 1917.1020 Whatever its cause, it caught the attention 
of officials in Pretoria, who were informed that Mpondo chiefs had warned that 
                                                          
1018 The term is borrowed from, and exemplified by Herbst, States and Power, p. 49, 61, 88 and 174. 
1019 (PA) CNC-325: Resident Magistrate, Harding to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 10 
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‘should the Government carry out the proposals to separate Europeans from Natives, 
the Europeans would be driven overseas from where they came’.1021 
This gathering underlines Beinart’s argument that the political processes 
surrounding the chieftaincy remained deeply embedded in the twentieth century.1022 
The forming of mass meetings at the Great Place was indicative both of ‘internal 
conflict and reactions to successive acts of state intervention’ and were ‘often 
translated into battles for local authority in disputes over headmanships or 
competition between different branches of chiefly families’.1023 This chapter explores 
these very issues and highlights how various Mpondo actors sought to negotiate the 
fractures and fissures within Mpondo society as well as the new political climate of 
colonial rule. In order to do so, if focuses on the following: the practicalities of 
establishing magisterial authority and the broad attack on the preferential position of 
Mpondo chiefs; the demarcation of magisterial districts and locations; and the 
opportunities such divisions provided for certain Europeans to expand and 
consolidate their own land holdings. Whilst the potency of these issues extended 
beyond the 1913 Natives Land Act, this chapter nevertheless focuses on the pre-1913 
period. As Lindsay Braun notes, it was during this time that ‘hard boundaries and clear 
notions of proprietorship’ came to be formally articulated. As such, its passing serves 
as a useful moment from which to assess the impact of longer-existing jurisdictional 
disputes on the early evolution of the colonial state.1024   
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1022 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 151. 
1023 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 151. 
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Chiefly Politics and the Practicalities of Colonial Rule: 
Reflecting on the first ten months of colonial rule, the Resident Magistrate of 
Ngqeleni could report: ‘The common people throughout the whole of Pondoland are 
delighted at the change of administration; they feel that both life and property are 
now safe; they have a fair trial in our courts and in civil cases they recover what they 
obtain justice for instead of the whole being appropriated by the Chief’.1025 His 
thoughts were echoed by the magistrate in Tabankulu, who similarly exclaimed: ‘I 
think it can be safely stated that the petty chiefs and people are glad to be under a 
civilised government. It is only natural that some of the chiefs should feel the loss of 
the despotic power they once held…but the majority of the people appear content 
and happy’. For him, ‘the settlement of Pondoland may now be looked upon as 
accomplished’.1026 
Such comments reveal a self-confidence held by many Transkeian officials. As 
chapter 4 discussed, many viewed their role as central in shepherding local 
populations towards the hallmarks of civilised government. These broad attacks on 
the preferential position of Mpondo chiefs provided the ideological and moral 
justification for their interventions in African society. Whilst emancipating individual 
inhabitants from the depredations of traditional leaders, it was up to the resident 
magistrate to ensure the stable subordination of local populations as the best means 
to achieve the civilising potential of empire. Such responsibility replicated the 
personalism and proximity of the chiefly rule they sought to supplant. As the Resident 
                                                          
1025 (CA) CMT-3/141: Resident Magistrate, Ngqeleni to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 14 December 
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1026 *CA) CMK-1/139: Resident Magistrate, Tabankulu to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 31 December 
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Magistrate of Flagstaff argued, it was ‘part of the Magistrate’s duty to know his 
district [and to be] more in touch with his people’.1027 Likewise, the magistrate of 
Lusikisiki – in which Sigcau’s Great Place was now located – similarly sought a 
personal introduction with those under his charge. At a huge meeting of residents, 
the official had Sigcau ‘introduce him to the people’, where they discussed a range 
of issues from the forced removals of lepers, the preservation of forest land and the 
construction of a railway line. Having met them, there was ‘no doubt’, he thought, 
‘that everything will go smoothly’.1028  
 His confidence arguably revealed an ‘anti-rationalist streak’ that was typical 
of Transkeian officials; less concerned with the operations and methods of 
governance, they instead valued discretion and experience.1029 As Ivan Evan notes, 
the accumulation ‘of detailed knowledge about their respective districts…through 
“personal contact” [was an] article of administrative faith’ for many magistrates’.1030 
Yet whilst ‘this approach emphasized [sic] the salience and internal complexity of 
specific local events’, this was often ‘at the cost of a wider and deeper picture’.1031 
Of course, officials were broadly aware of the immediate impact of their presence in 
Pondoland. Many noted how ‘petty chiefs’ sought ‘to quickly settle down peaceably’ 
to the prospect of colonial rule since it afforded them an opportunity to act ‘on their 
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dissatisfaction’ with their seniors.1032 Another noted how ‘the old loyalty and 
reverence for the paramount’ had since ‘been weakened by the rapacity of 
councillors’ and that ‘internal dissention had played a part in paving the way for 
annexation’ which had been ‘hailed with delight by the mass of the people’.1033 ‘The 
chiefs’, by contrast, ‘[were] alive to the fact that their power is on the wane and are 
naturally using their best endeavours to retain as much power as possible’.1034 
Yet officials were arguably unaware of the extent to which the establishment 
of magisterial authority could perpetuate and even strengthen the potency of chiefly 
politics. When a prominent trader in Bizana, for example, complained about the 
numerous attacks on his trading stores, messengers were immediately despatched 
to Sigcau in order to secure some redress. Yet the paramount did little to resolve the 
issue. As he explained, ‘I have given up my country and do not know why I am being 
bothered’. This, he said, was a ‘problem for the white man’. In certain contexts, the 
royal house arguably sought to instrumentalise the transfer of power implied by 
annexation in order to eschew any responsibility for the actions of other Mpondo 
inhabitants. As such, he warned the messengers that if they were sent again, then 
they would ‘either be beaten or killed’.1035  
Following the murder of a local resident in Tabankulu, local chief Xididi 
similarly claimed that whilst Sigcau had acceded to annexation, ‘I have not come 
                                                          
1032 (CA) CMT-1/139: Resident Magistrate, Umsikaba to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 1 January 1895. 
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under the Government…I act independently of him’.1036 Their responses thus 
demonstrate the limitations placed on the practicalities of colonial rule, which 
depended – on the first instance at least - on its visibility and proximity to the newly 
colonised. Whilst officials sought to establish their authority through the cultivation 
of personal contact, such power was likely to dissipate with distance beyond the 
confines of the resident magistracy.  
Yet even within the very confines of their own courts, resident magistrates 
were largely unaware of the machinations of certain Mpondo chiefs. In one breath, 
the magistrate at Flagstaff could comment on the ‘extremely helpful’ behaviour of 
local chief – and prominent ally of Sigcau – Langa, for aiding the official in the 
demarcation of a commonage on land within which his father had been buried.1037 
However, when the same chief was arrested following an alleged assault, the official 
could only comment that his actions typified those of all chiefs in Pondoland, who 
were likely ‘feeling sore at their loss of power…[nevertheless], so far as I can judge, 
the people themselves show no sign of restlessness and appear to be satisfied’.1038 
Such a view was based on the number of people that had come to witness his trial. 
But a statement by one man, Ntlanga, recalled how ‘they were not happy as they 
were not independent anymore’.1039 ‘Many of them attended with short stabbing 
assegais, axes and guns concealed under their blankets as they were determined to 
                                                          
1036 (CA) CML-1/139: Resident Magistrate, Tabankulu to Assistant Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand, 
4 July 1894. 
1037 (CA) CMT-3/52: Resident Magistrate, Flagstaff to Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland, 9 
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resist the apprehension of Langa…they are waiting for an opportunity when the 
magistrate will go out of camp…that they will capture and kill him then attack the 
camp’. What the official mistook as enthusiasm for the judicial procedures of colonial 
justice in fact served as an opportunity for Mpondo inhabitants to enact their very 
own.  
Such actions underscore the acute vulnerability of officials as they attempted 
to establish their authority within their respective districts. The saliency of their 
claims to govern particular spaces was mitigated by the practicalities of geography, 
as well as the loyalties and enmities that characterised the Mpondo polity in the post-
annexation period. Indeed, in certain instances these issues were even conflated. 
Again in Flagstaff, the Resident Magistrate was charged with investigating the 
murder of Nogwanya, a former follower of Mhlangaso.1040 When the official had 
earlier toured his location, he was informed that the now-deceased had moved to 
seek work on ‘the Gold Fields’, whereas in fact, he had been murdered at the kraal 
of Sigcau’s brother, Masipula. For the magistrate, it was clear that the paramount 
was involved: ‘it appears that cases of this kind are a new development. In former 
times, victims were put to death in broad daylight…Pondo chiefs undoubtedly 
received a check in these brutal murders by the introduction of the Colonial 
Government, but now they are learning that our law does not accept the evidence 
except of eye witnesses’. As such, chiefs had developed a new innovation: ‘the 
Paramount’s consent is obtained to the…death of some unfortunate. Those set apart 
to perform the cold blooded tragedy are duly nominated and all plans made for the 
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execution of the dead with as little fuss as possible after nightfall’. In this way, pro-
Sigcau chiefs sought to influence those headmen who were subordinate to them, 
‘thereby making the administration of the country a rather difficult matter’. 
 
Demarcations and Contestations: 
If the loyalties and rivalries that existed between Mpondo chiefs qualified the 
establishment of magisterial rule across the country, it was even more central in 
shaping the very boundaries in which it was to be exercised. This was made 
particularly evident following the establishment of a Boundary Commission, 
designed to demarcate administrative districts and locations, that was commissioned 
between December 1896 and July 1898. As chapter 2 demonstrated, colonial officials 
sought to rationalise intra-Mpondo relations through the construction of 
jurisdictional borders based on a “tribal” conception of African society that viewed 
local chiefdoms as internally coherent, culturally cohesive and politically centralised. 
Yet such interventions did not occur in a political vacuum; they were necessarily to 
be inscribed upon a landscape that had long been defined by it jurisdictional 
heterogeneity and political decentralisation – characteristics which were reflected by 
Pondoland’s political geography and inflected with potent understandings 
concerning the exercise of authority and subjecthood. 
 The Resident Magistrate temporarily placed at the Isisele, for example, had 
sought to keep those who had rebelled against Sigcau entirely separate from those 
who had supported him. This was particularly important; whilst it had long served as 
a difficult area that had resisted the jurisdictional reach of the royal house, many of 
those who had fought against Mhlangaso had since occupied the lands left by fleeing 
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rebels. Despite the desire of the paramountcy to retain what were often vast and 
arable land-holdings, the colonial government was nevertheless eager to settle 
returning rebels on their former sites in the pursuit of administrative exigency. To 
that end, officials made clear to Sigcau that they intended to divide the region into 
relatively equal locations in order to ensure that all inhabitants had ‘sufficient land 
for the sustenance of the people’.1041 Such action nevertheless inspired certain 
residents to call for the return of Sigcau’s former rival. On 21 February 1898, six clans 
from the Isisele petitioned the government to advance this very cause; ‘they pointed 
out that he had not been guilty of any real crime and had now been in exile for four 
years. They also added that there was no need to talk about the power of any chief, 
as Government now firmly established itself as the only Chief in the country, but that 
at the same time they regarded Umhlangaso as their father and his continued 
absence caused them great sorrow’.1042 
 As Beinart notes, this request was not realised until 1909 – long-after the 
death of Sigcau in 1905. But the support he clearly still fostered did not dissipate with 
time; whilst he was ordered to settle in Bizana, rather than his former stronghold in 
Nthlenzi, the chief nevertheless set about collecting death duties from his former 
followers in that very region.1043 Such an act demonstrated the increasing importance 
of customary dues in the maintenance of their personal and political pre-eminence 
following the severe restrictions placed on the accumulation of private sources of 
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1042 1042 (CA) CMT-3/50: Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 22 
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wealth.1044 But it also points to the fragmented nature of authority within the region 
itself. Whilst Sigcau had immediately sought to claim the region in the aftermath of 
annexation, he was especially eager to avoid the land being divided into various 
locations so that he could place his son and successor, Marelane, over the entire 
district. For officials, such demands were utterly ‘preposterous and [could not] be 
entertained’ – although, the settlement of the future paramount would provide an 
opportunity for the government ‘to get a hold on the lad’.1045 
Whilst agreeing to the establishment of a royal house in the region, the issue 
nevertheless had far-reaching consequences. During Marelane’s regency, Sigcau’s 
brother, Masipula – who had occupied Mhlangaso’s old kraal - was nominated to act 
as headmen to maintain a royal presence in this rebel stronghold. As such, he was 
likely imbued with much authority. Indeed, when the time came to select a site for 
Marelane to occupy upon, Masipula refused to attend the meeting organised 
between himself, Sigcau and the Resident Magistrate to decide the issue. When he 
eventually did arrive, he was accompanied by a large number of followers, ‘who were 
singing war songs, evidently with the intention of aggravating Sigcau’s people’.1046 
When questioned over the incident, Masipula was alleged to have claimed an 
‘indifference as to whether he might die or be killed’, thereby seemingly confirming 
                                                          
1044 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 114. 
1045 (CA) CMT-3/50: Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 24 
December 1898. 
1046 (CA) CM-3/52: Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 15 May 
1901. 
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reports that the chief and his men had come to the meeting with ‘guns concealed 
under their clothes’.1047  
Such hostility thus necessitated the removal of Sigcau’s brother to the 
neighbouring Qasa location. Seeking to maintain an autonomy that was his by birth, 
but which had arguably been bolstered by his initial placement at the Nthlenzi, the 
maligned chief requested that a parcel of his former location now be added to his 
current site.1048 Yet doing so served to exacerbate the tensions that had been 
precipitated by his removal to the Qasa location in the first place. Seeking to 
consolidate his position, his request brought him into conflict with a prominent 
support of Sigcau, Langasiki. Numerous skirmishes broke out between the two. 
Consequently, Sigcau was called to arbitrate the dispute. Such were the messy and 
complex configurations of power that the very chief whom officials had sought to 
undermine through their actions at the Nthlenzi, had thus become central to the 
establishment of peace in the neighbouring district.1049 
To be sure, Sigcau was not the only royal whose strategic attempts to place 
family members in potentially profitable sites were thwarted by the colonial 
government. In 1909, the Western Mpondo paramount, Bokleni, had similarly sought 
to establish his own son, Parafine, in a location in Ngqeleni. Whilst the chief had sent 
another son to propose the claim to the local population, he nevertheless proceeded 
to impose the royal family member regardless of their decision. Such action 
                                                          
1047 (CA) CM-3/52: Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 22 May 
1901. 
1048 (CA) CM-3/52: Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 30 
November 1901. 
1049 (CA) CM-3/52: Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 2 April 1902. 
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precipitated huge discontent in the region. Whilst two minor clans, the Ncote and 
Nqayiya, favoured Parafine’s appointment, the larger Nqanda were resolutely 
opposed. Such division reflected the competition for power that already existed 
between these composite communities; the former two clearly saw the royal house 
as a potentially profitable ally in the maintenance of their own claims against their 
larger rival. But as one Nqanda resident made clear to the resident magistrate, ‘we 
ama-Nqanda are a distinct set from the Pondos…We undergo certain ceremonies 
which are not performed by the Pondos such as circumscion...the opposition of 
which by Bokleni’s son will cause endless friction and threaten the welfare of our 
people and that of Bokleni’ himself.1050 
The types of contestations that erupted across the country as colonial officials 
sought to rationalise Mpondo land arguably demonstrates the complex intersection 
of multiple and often contradictory claims in the shaping of state’s administrative 
character. Indeed, such disputes serve as a useful reminder of the jurisdictional 
heterogeneity and regional autonomy enjoyed by various Mpondo inhabitants since 
the mid-nineteenth century. Attempts to establish magisterial authority across the 
country thus intensified long-existing claims and counter-claims to the same space. 
On 21 March 1904, for example, Nicholas Lochenberg lodged a complaint against 
Manundu – a prominent local chief of the Isikelo House – in Bizana. The resident 
argued that Manundu’s father, Bekemva, had absorbed a large portion of land that 
had been granted to Lochenberg’s grandfather by Faku following his assistance in 
repelling Zulu marauders in the late 1820s. Such encroachment had continued under 
                                                          
1050 (CA) 1/NQL-3/1: Resident Magistrate, Ngqeleni to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 1909. 
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Manundu himself, causing greater intermingling between these otherwise hostile 
communities. In articulating his complaint, Lochenberg made clear that he did not 
‘claim the land as my personal property, but I hold that I and my people have a right 
to the location which was defined for us by Faku and Mqikela.’ Whilst he was ‘never 
informed that a boundary commission was sent some time back to arrange the 
several locations in Pondoland’, its efficacy was nevertheless re-qualified by a claim 
that had long preceded annexation in 1894.1051 
Such disputes could have the opposite effect too; the nascent attempts by 
officials to establish their authority provided numerous Mpondo actors with the 
opportunity to falsify claims that imbued them with a regional autonomy that could 
last for decades into the twentieth century. In 1925, officials were called to Lusikisiki 
to investigate another complaint against the Isikelo House.1052 This time attempting 
to encroach upon local headmen Hlamandana’s location, interviews with local 
residents questioned the claims made by the senior Mpondo chief that his settlement 
had likewise been granted to him by Faku. Whilst the Isikelo claimed that they had 
been placed there by the then paramount as a royal representative between the 
Mtentu Gorge and Natal border, it transpired that their location had in fact been 
determined by Manundu’s desire to avoid the displeasure of his brother and former 
paramount, Mqikela. It was only after the former’s support for Sigcau during the civil 
                                                          
1051 (CA) CMT-3/49: Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 21 March 
1904; (CA) CMT-3/49: Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 20 March 
1900. 
1052 The following is taken from (CL) Resident Magistrate, Bizana to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 23 
July 1925, 
McLoughlin Papers, MS. 14. 304, File 2. 
333 
 
conflict that he was reinstated to his senior position; ‘therefore, prior to annexation 
they did not derive any rights or privileges’ by virtue of their royal relation. 
Such contestations arguably demonstrate the centrality of intra-Mpondo 
political relations in determining both the administrative character and institutional 
viability of colonial rule in Pondoland. Whilst these provided opportunities to 
instrumentalise colonial interventions for a swathe of often contradictory ends, they 
also provided encouragement to local administrators. As the Assistant Chief 
Magistrate in Pondoland made clear, ‘such disputes…simply go to show that the 
Pondos are now in favour of the location boundaries to which they so strongly 
objected a few years ago’.1053 In many respects the delimitation of new 
administrative borders arguably complimented longer-existing patterns of political 
decentralisation and the jurisdictional heterogeneity that underwrote the autonomy 
of multiple Mpondo chiefs. Little wonder, then, that when a second boundary 
commission was established in 1914, the Mpondo paramount, Marelane, sought to 
amalgamate several locations under the authority of the royal house. Indeed, two 
years’ prior the paramount had written to the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei to 
inform him that the appointment of headmen was to proceed on the basis of two 
distinct classes: headmen and commoners. As he proposed, ‘commoners appointed 
headmen should be informed that they are merely acting for my children who will 
replace them when they attain manhood’; furthermore, ‘whenever a headman dies, 
I should be given an opportunity of recommending a successor’.1054  
                                                          
1053 (CA) CMT-3/52: Assistant Chief Magistrate, Pondoland to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 28 
September 1901.  
1054 (CL) Marelane Sigcau to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 25 March 1911, McLoughlin Papers, MS. 14. 
304, File 2.  
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As Beinart notes, from 1909 onwards officials became far more likely to 
accommodate the demands of the Mpondo paramountcy. If popular, the 
appointment of royal nominees provided stability to the exigencies of local 
administration whilst further imbricating the royal house into the institutional 
structures of the colonial state.1055 Yet as the above examples demonstrate, there 
existed a swathe of completing claims to various sites across Pondoland that were 
reflective of the continued potency of those factions and fissures that comprised the 
polity at the time of annexation. Whilst a turn towards the royal house was no doubt 
important, the saliency of local conflicts and disputes remained.1056 
 
Loyalties and Land: 
Intra-Mpondo disputes were not, however, the only contestations that revealed the 
continued potency of contested notions of authority and subjecthood. In the wake 
of annexation, numerous Mpondo-European contestations over land surfaced to 
reveal the importance of older affiliations and loyalties. Ironically, it was the Cape’s 
legal victory over the Cook Brothers that precipitated these disagreements. As 
chapter 4 demonstrated, the judicial determination of the Cape Supreme Court had 
upheld the government’s decision to overturn their commercial concessions on the 
basis that to have recognised them would have been to maintain the despotic 
authority of a paramount they hoped to supplant. As the Secretary for Native Affairs 
noted in 1903, however, the consequences of its decision was to make all ‘European 
occupiers of land in the Pondoland Locations mere squatters in the eye of the law 
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1056 Beinart, Political Economy, p. 126. 
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without any rightful authority’; indeed, he lamented how this was ‘unsatisfactory… 
for Europeans who urged that some measure of relief should in fairness be afforded 
them…[whilst] it was still more unsatisfactory from the point of view of the natives 
who observed on all sides the “grabbing of land” by unscrupulous Europeans’.1057  
 With this in mind, the colonial government sought to establish a Pondoland 
Land Commission in 1899. Headed by Robert and Arthur Stanford – the Assistant 
Chief Magistrates of Tembuland and East Pondoland – the commission was informed 
to deal liberally with all European claims involving ‘land under the plough’. As they 
reported, ‘the material point in these cases is whether or not [European] occupiers 
should have the right to transfer their holdings to others. Sigcau and the Pondos are 
much against their doing so, alleging that they Europeans, in regards to land tenure, 
are on exactly the same footing as their Pondo neighbours, who, on removing from 
a location, hand their gardens to the chief or headmen for allotment to others’.1058 
The resistance evidenced by many Mpondo actors was undoubtedly rooted in the 
nature of the allocation of land to European cultivators in the pre-colonial period. 
Operating on the sufferance of Mpondo chiefs, they received no title to land but 
instead annually validated their allotments through the payment of tax. When the 
Commission sought to formally establish a legal right to possession, numerous 
statements were thus provoked that underscored the authority of Mpondo chiefs 
rather than the proprietorial claims of European residents themselves. 
                                                          
1057 (CA) NA-537: Memorandum by the Secretary for Native Affairs, 17 October 1903.  
1058 (CA) NA-535 (Part I): Land Commissioners to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 2 May 1901.  
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 Two examples are worthy of note, not least because they highlight the 
complex negotiations of authority that characterised the validation of pre-colonial 
claims in the post-annexation period. One man, Mr Wirth, sought to have his land at 
the Ntafufu location validated by the Commission, in order to prevent local Mpondo 
inhabitants from continually trespassing on his land.1059 Wirth was a chemist and had 
at one point been asked to serve as a physician at Mqikela’s Great Place until his 
death. His relationship with the royal house stood him in good stead. During a quarrel 
with a local resident over the right to cultivate a particular allotment, Wirth ‘took a 
loaded revolver and to frighten the man fired over his head. Unfortunately, the man 
had an axe in his hand with which he was gesticulating and the bullet struck the blade, 
glancing downwards and inflicting a somewhat serious flesh wound on the man’s 
back’. Immediately, the war cry was raised and numerous Mpondo inhabitants 
gathered at Wirth’s property and began to burn it down. His only sanctuary was the 
Great Place itself. Despite the German’s attempt to sell his land to another European 
without permission, he was nevertheless recognised by the royal house by virtue of 
the services he had rendered to Sigcau’s father. As such, the practice of property 
transferral, much abhorred by the paramount, was sanctioned as a result of the 
loyalty he had shown to Mqikela.  
 An equally contentious dispute emerged in Port St. John. The claim involved 
a resident farmer, Charles Frederickson, who sought to have his sixty acres of land 
legally acknowledged by the Commission. His case provoked local outrage, not least 
because the original grant consisted of only six acres. In addition, the farmer had also 
                                                          
1059 The following is taken from (CA) NA-535 (Part II): Land Claim 50: E Wirth, 31 August 1901. 
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enclosed another tract of land upon an important wagon route in order to build a 
pig-run for his animals.1060 The chief Hlamvana, upon whose land Frederickson’s plots 
were located, stated that when he tried to resolve the issue with Frederickson, the 
European told him he ‘had nothing to do with the land…[he] says that I and Nqwiliso 
are nothing more than a couple of baboons’.1061 Yet further testimonies revealed that 
it was the Mpondo paramount who had originally granted the land. Frederick’s own 
evidence, however, suggested that the issue was more complex. He argued that the 
land had been offered as a reward for the services he had rendered to the chief 
during the outbreak of the 1880-1 Mpondomise war. Following the murder of 
Resident Magistrate Hope, ‘Nqwiliso had stated that he wanted to help but his 
people were against it…our informant stated that Nqwiliso would go…but would not 
fight himself, and we came to the conclusion that we could render…very valuable 
service, the best proof of which is by what Nqwiliso himself said in thanking us when 
we got control over the rebels’.1062 Viewed in this way, the contestations precipitated 
by Frederickson’s claims, whilst rooted in the extension of the original grant he had 
received, reflected the messy negotiation of authority in Pondoland. For the 
European, his title was thus born from the loyalty he had shown to the Mpondo 
paramount, at a time when his own followers refused to support him.  
 
Conclusion: 
The wide array of contestations explored in this chapter suggest that the attempted 
establishment of colonial rule in Pondoland continued to be re-qualified by intra-
                                                          
1060 (CA) NA-536-A647: Arthur Stanford to Chief Magistrate, Transkei, 12 January 1901.  
1061 (CA) NA-536-A647: Statement by Hlamvana at Big Mgazi, 29 November 1899. 
1062 (CA) NA-536-A647 Statement by Charles Frederickson at Port St. John, 15 October 1900.  
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Mpondo loyalties and rivalries, the jurisdictional disputes these embodied, and 
longer-existing notions of authority and subjecthood. These issues not only survived 
the transition from independence to annexation. Crucially, they helped to determine 
both the institutional viability and administrative character of the early colonial state. 
Such an acknowledgement is incredibly important, since it suggests that those 
constitutional moments – whether annexation in 1894, unification in 1910, or the 
passing of the Natives Land Act in 1913 – brought any end to the contentious 
conversations that had pervaded Pondoland since 1878. This argument is reflected 
by the archival material itself, which unsurprisingly catalogues a continuing array of 
competitions over land and local resources throughout this period. The paradigmatic 
shifts implied by these moments were thus requalified by a constant threat of intra-
Mpondo political reconfiguration that reveals the complex and messy negotiation of 
power and its ability to shape the structures that emerged in the post-annexation 
period.  
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Conclusion: Back to the Future? The Nhlapo Commission (2010) and the 
Mpondo Past: 
 
On the 29 July 2010, South African President Jacob Zuma confirmed the findings of 
the Nhlapo Commission, established by former President Thabo Mbeki in 2004 to 
examine and resolve traditional leadership disputes amongst the many kingships that 
comprise the country. The determinations of the Commission broadly concerned two 
areas: the legitimate existence of particular paramountcies, and the settling of 
genealogical disputes over the rightful heir of certain royal houses.1063  
Two of its judgements concerned the Mpondo polity. The first referenced the 
rightful heir of the Eastern Mpondo royal house. The Commission supported the 
removing of the then incumbent, King Justice Mpondobini Sigcau (1978-2013), and 
his replacement by his nephew, Zanozuko, who was installed as paramount in April 
2011. This decision was based on the alleged illegality surrounding the nomination 
of Mpondobini’s father, Botha Sigcau, to the Eastern paramountcy in 1939. This 
ruling was subsequently overturned by the South African Constitutional Court, but 
was further complicated by the death of the incumbent on 25 March 2013 and his 
replacement by current regent, Queen Lombekiso MaSobhuza Sigcau. The dispute 
remains unresolved and its controversy is likely linked to the potential profit of huge 
infrastructural and mining projects intended for the Wild Coast region of the Eastern 
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Cape.1064 The second determination concerned the non-recognition of the Western 
Mpondo kingship; the authority of the Western paramountcy is to revert back under 
the royal house in the East following the death of the current king, Ndamase 
Ndamase. This decision is predicated on an understanding of customary law, which 
states that there can only be one Mpondo king. 
 These determinations have unsrurprisingly caused huge controversy within 
Pondoland itself. Yet the establishment of the Nhlapo Commission also highlights the 
broader tensions surrounding the accommodation of traditional authorities within 
the institutional structures of the post-apartheid state. Recognised by Chapter 12 of 
the Constitution (1996), its patriarchal principles and the primacy of lineage 
succession rather than election means that the role of the chieftaincy clearly conflicts 
with the principle of universal rights established in a democratic South Africa. As Fred 
Hendricks and Lungisile Ntsebeza argue, their recognition has ‘far-reaching 
implications for gender equality, for control over land allocation, for the universal 
franchise and for democratic local governance’.1065 A raft of recent legislation – the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2003), the Communal Land 
Rights Act (2004) and Traditional Courts Bill (2008) – have enshrined the 
establishment of traditional authorities and their right to determine access to land 
and judicial council. To that end, ‘the ANC-led government has given power to 
traditional leaders on basically the same lines as the apartheid state’.1066 
                                                          
1064 For an overview of the developmental aspects of the ruling, see ‘In Pondoland, confusion will 
reign till Kingdom come’, Mail & Guardian, 21 June 2013, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-21-00-in-
pondoland-confusion-will-reign-till-kingdom-come [accessed 1 March 2014]. 
1065 Hendricks and Ntsebeza, ‘Chiefs and Local Governance’, p. 100.  
1066 Henk Smith, ‘An Overview of the Communal Lands Right Act 11 of 2004’, in Aninka Claassens and 
Ben Cousins (eds), Land, Power & Custom: Controversies Generated by South Africa’s Communal 
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Such issues are not solely confined to contemporary South Africa.1067 Yet in 
attempting to resolve traditional leadership disputes generally, and in seeking to re-
unite Eastern and Western Pondoland in particular, the Nhlapo Commission 
demonstrates how presumptions about pre-colonial power and jurisdictional 
boundaries have informed this attempted reconstitution of traditional authorities in 
the post-apartheid present. Nevertheless, challenges against the Commission’s 
determinations have, as Jeff Peires notes, been largely based on technical questions 
of legal procedure; very little legal argument has turned on the issue of historical 
evidence.1068 Having sat on the Commission himself, Peires is highly critical of its 
decision to base its judgements on customary law; such an approach, he argues, is 
highly inappropriate and utterly invalid – especially when considering the legitimacy 
of those chieftaincies established prior to colonial intervention.1069  
 The underlying basis of the claim to Western Mpondo sovereignty concerns 
events explored in chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis; following Faku’s re-crossing of the 
Mzimvubu River in the mid-1840s, the then paramount established his Right-Hand 
son, Ndamase, on its western banks in order to avoid a potential civil conflict with his 
Great son, and subsequent paramount, Mqikela. The authority invested in Ndamase 
by Faku was claimed by the Eastern paramountcy to have been personal and 
uninheritable; there was to be no legitimate transfer of power to Nqwiliso following 
                                                          
Lands Right Act, (Athens, OH: Legal Resources Centre, 2008), p. 39; Lungisile Ntsebeza, ‘Chiefs and 
the ANC in South Africa: The Reconstruction of Tradition?’, in Aninka Claassens and Ben Cousins 
(eds), Land, Power & Custom: Controversies Generated by South Africa’s Communal Lands Right Act, 
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1067 See Carolyn Logan, ‘The Roots of Resilience: Exploring Popular Support for African Traditional 
Authorities’, African Affairs, 112:448 (2013), pp. 353-76.  
1068 Peires, ‘History Versus Customary Law’, p. 2. 
1069 Peires, ‘History Versus Customary Law’, p. 2. 
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the death of his father in 1876. Yet Peires questions the viability of this interpretation 
of Mpondo custom. Far more important for him is the subsequent action of Nqwiliso, 
who subsequently sought recognition of his sovereignty by British administrators in 
1878 in exchange for the sale of Port St. John and the sole rights to the navigation of 
the Mzimvubu River. As Peires argues, ‘the Commission [should have] proceeded on 
the basis that the Western Mpondo kingship was nothing more than the payoff made 
to a colonial puppet’. Had it decried the illegitimacy of the Western paramountcy on 
this basis, ‘it would have been difficult to fault its reasoning’.1070 
 The criticism of the Commission to draw on customary law clearly reflects 
concerns that any such determination would simply reflect the mutation of a 
traditional institution employed in the service of colonialism and apartheid. Yet 
Peires’ own conclusion is no less problematic; castigating Nqwiliso as a ‘puppet’ 
evokes a familiar history of collaboration between chief and state and the imbrication 
of the former into the administrative structures of the latter. Articulated in the post-
apartheid present, such broad claims about the historical trajectory of indigenous 
institutions may seem self-evident. Yet this sense of certainty should not preclude an 
exploration of the idiosyncratic uncertainties that this relationship precipitated in 
particular geographical and temporal contexts.1071 Nor should it exclude an 
awareness of the ways in which local understandings of jurisdiction, authority and 
subjecthood served to determine the institutional articulation of this dynamic. To do 
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otherwise risks anachronism. As Frederick Cooper suggests, often what is more 
important is ‘what one does not see: the paths not taken, the dead ends of historical 
processes, the alternatives that appeared to people in their time’.1072   
Indeed, this thesis has sought to highlight the myriad alternatives and political 
possibilities that faced various Mpondo actors as they negotiated the protracted 
process of political incorporation into the Cape. Such an approach has avoided an 
assumption about the teleological trajectory of Pondoland’s historical development; 
rather, it has actively underscored the contingency of colonial claims to rule the 
country. This argument rests, in the first instance, on an acknowledgement of the 
particularities of Pondoland’s geographical location. Situated on the margins of 
empire and far away from established centres of power in Cape Town or 
Pietermaritzburg, projections of imperial power and the subsequent – though not 
synonymous – processes of colonial state-formation played themselves out very 
differently here. Of course, the country was not immune to wider economic shifts or 
the conflagrations that erupted along an ever expanding eastern frontier. But these 
broader patterns of change modified, rather than undermined the existing 
foundations of Mpondo political authority.   
As chapter 1 made clear, the geo-political imperatives of the early-to-mid 
nineteenth century meant that officials paid little attention to the internal dynamics 
of Mpondo society. This earlier period had first witnessed a defensive turn towards 
closed settlement and the incorporation of multiple migrating chiefdoms eager to 
flee the instability and upheaval of Zulu expansionism. Such political 
                                                          
1072 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, p. 18. 
344 
 
entrepreneurism ensured the re-accumulation of stock and the consolidation of the 
boundaries of the Mpondo kingdom; in turn, this helped re-cast the then paramount, 
Faku, into a potentially important ally in an otherwise volatile region. Officials were, 
however, clearly unfamiliar with how power was practically wielded in Pondoland. 
Attempts to demarcate the boundaries of the polity – through treaty and territorial 
acquisition prior to 1870 – reflected a colonial conception of the kingdom as 
internally centralised, culturally cohesive and essentially bounded. Yet such 
initiatives ran counter to the twin processes of economic atomisation and political 
decentralisations that underpinned chiefly rule in Pondoland from the mid-
nineteenth century. 
This particular argument is not new; William Beinart has underlined the 
importance of these developments in terms of the changing material basis of 
Mpondo chieftainship, the increased independence of the Mpondo homestead and 
the centrality of long-established social relations in shaping the country’s absorption 
into the wider colonial economy. Yet the settlement and subsequent dispersal of 
numerous chiefdoms from the mid-nineteenth century precipitated a fundamental 
transformation in the way that political authority was both practiced and perceived. 
Indeed, this thesis has argued that the polity became characterised by its 
jurisdictional heterogeneity and a differential process of incorporation that bound its 
composite communities in various ways and degrees to the Eastern royal house. 
These institutional arrangements were further reinforced by the physical location of 
these multiple constituencies; the power relations, communal solidarities and 
divisions that comprised the kingdom were largely fostered by the political 
geography of Pondoland. As a result, all Mpondo chiefs enjoyed an autonomy that 
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was born from the political decentralisation of the mid-nineteenth century. But intra-
Mpondo relations were themselves highly variegated, influenced both by the 
jurisdictional reach of the royal house and the loyalties and rivalries it inspired. 
This shift from political economy to political geography thus foregrounds the 
continual reconfiguration of this network of affiliations and animosities in a way that 
necessarily underlines the importance of Mpondo understandings of authority and 
subjecthood. In doing so, this thesis has advanced three interconnected arguments: 
firstly, that these notions were formative in shaping the protracted process of 
incorporation into the Cape; secondly, given the limited colonial presence in 
Pondoland, their political potency can only best be understood by exploring their 
articulation within a wider imperial context. And thirdly, that these intra-Mpondo 
shifts were facilitated by, and foundational to, the intersection of indigenous, 
colonial and imperial jurisdictional disputes in ways that fundamentally shaped the 
administrative and institutional character of the early colonial state. 
Indeed, as chapter 2 illustrated, the first significant political intervention 
within Mpondo society was precipitated by imperial proclamation in 1878 rather 
than through colonial action. Frere’s edict intended to better regulate intra-Mpondo 
relations and governance through the introduction of new political boundaries 
formalised by the partition and partial annexation of the country. Yet doing so 
precipitated a swathe of contentious conversations amongst Mpondo actors about 
the exercise of authority and subjecthood in Pondoland. These notions were hardly 
abstract; rather, they reflected a real ontological uncertainty about political order, 
the welfare of particular communities, the right to territory and the demarcation of 
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space. In certain circumstances, chiefs and their followers also sought to police the 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion into the polity; these were not just arguments 
over who did and did not belong – many were also forced to articulate how they 
belonged as well. These contentious conversations were, first and foremost, rooted 
in claims to particular tracts of land and local resources. But they likewise evoked the 
differential process of incorporation that bound chiefly communities in various ways 
to the Eastern royal house; to that end, they also revealed much about the variegated 
structures of Mpondo political authority itself.  
By exploring this political dialogue, chapter 2 demonstrated that European 
intervention prior to annexation in 1894 was more than just material in nature; in 
1878, it prompted Mpondo actors to articulate and defend their claims to autonomy 
in ways that underscored the country’s jurisdictional heterogeneity. Such a focus 
enriches the history of the Eastern Cape by highlighting how political authority was 
practical perceived and negotiated within one of its principal chiefdoms. But it also 
better integrates the polity – usually only incorporated into regional studies of the 
Transkei – into a broader history of imperial governance. Indeed, the impact of 
Frere’s proclamation demonstrates a crucial point about the extension of British 
sovereignty; more often than not it served to highlight either pre-existing or counter 
claims to govern the same space by various indigenous, colonial or extra-colonial 
historical actors. Whilst intra-Mpondo disputes were local in effect, in this instance 
they were clearly precipitated by supra-local attempts at intervention. 
This argument is important, not least because it highlights how the more 
familiar processes of colonial state-formation were often born from the intersecting 
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interests of multiple actors across various contexts. The conflicts between Nci and 
Xesibe protagonists, for example, served largely to underline the limited 
jurisdictional reach of the Eastern royal house. Yet its inability to contain the 
continual outbreaks of violence in the country’s north-east ultimately prompted the 
Cape to formalise the Xesibe border in 1883. In doing so, colonial officials arguably 
provided some relief to a much maligned Mqikela, even if leading chiefs and 
councillors maintained their opposition to this intervention. Indeed, there existed 
much antipathy between the government and Great Place. Yet these initiatives 
paradoxically facilitated the implicit interdependence between these otherwise 
inimical institutions.  
As chapter 3 demonstrated, the Cape increased its own efforts at intervention 
from the mid-1880s. The formal annexation of Port St. John (1884), the entire 
Mpondo coastline (1885), Xesibeland and Rode Valley (1886): each attested to a 
colonial desire to stabilise the jurisdictional boundaries of the polity. Doing so, 
however, instead fragmented the country into a multi-jurisdictional space comprised 
of increasingly exclusive imperial, colonial, Eastern and Western Mpondo arenas of 
rule. Colonial pretensions to power thus remained limited to certain regions whilst 
centralising specific areas in which the royal house could better assert its own 
authority. Such developments bolstered the hostility between the two and increased 
the likelihood for greater instability, whilst simultaneously fostering a greater 
ambiguity over who precisely governed Pondoland. As a result, numerous Mpondo, 
European and extra-local actors sought to take advantage of this jurisdictional 
impasse; chiefs, commoners, traders, Natalian settlers and officials: each attempted 
to advance their own claims to the country.  
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Exploring these pretensions to power demonstrated how the introduction of 
new jurisdictional boundaries served as important resources to be used by various 
actors. They were able to switch between, simultaneously treat with, or avoid 
altogether the multiple authorities that now comprised the country. Negotiating the 
increasing antipathy between royal house and state, many engaged in the constant 
swapping of affiliations between the two, thereby harnessing colonial intervention 
towards a myriad of diverging ends. For Mpondo chiefs, this jurisdictional ambiguity 
provided an opportunity to maintain an autonomy that had long been enjoyed and 
which was increasingly threatened by the centralising tendencies of the Eastern 
paramountcy. For Natalian actors, the inability of the Cape to consolidate its own 
claim to rule offered the promise of potential annexation and the extension of the 
country’s southernmost border. Of course, there existed no conscious collaboration 
between these largely unconnected agendas; nevertheless, chapter 3 demonstrated 
how these could meaningfully intersect to render the Cape and paramountcy 
mutually circumscribed. Indeed, both seemed to share in the struggle to command 
the loyalty of those they sought to rule. It was in this context of increasing imbrication 
that annexation therefore occurred. Far from signalling the subordination of the 
royal house to the Cape, it provided a temporary boon to these otherwise inimical 
authorities. For the former, it served to reaffirm an authority that had fractured 
following the outbreak of civil war. For the latter, it allowed officials to lay claim to a 
country that was simultaneously sought by its sister colony.  
In making this argument, this thesis has illustrated how the institutional 
boundaries separating chief and state were arguably at their most permeable at 
precisely the moment when colonial authority was, legislatively at least, proclaimed. 
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As I have argued throughout, this process of increasing interdependence was 
principally born from the shifting configuration of intra-Mpondo political relations 
precipitated by imperial intervention in 1878. As chiefs and commoners sought to 
maintain their long-held autonomy, they engaged in contentious conversations 
concerning the exercise of authority and subjecthood that in turn requalified multiple 
attempts at intervention in Mpondo society. The moment of annexation was no 
different. As chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated, the formalisation of colonial did little 
to settle to question of who ruled Pondoland. Quite the opposite, since incorporation 
also entailed the country’s inauguration into empire, those same jurisdictional 
disputes became imbued with an imperial inflection that only increased their political 
potency.   
As the judicial challenges mounted by the Cooks’ and Sigcau revealed, those 
on either side of the colonial divide could share in a mutual invocation of imperial 
membership to challenge the efficacy of the Cape’s claim to rule. The former aimed 
to prove the ‘despotism’ of the colonial state; the latter was eager to highlight the 
‘repugnant’ practices of its Transkeian administration. These debates were largely 
symbolic; as officials began to replicate the practices and personalism of those chiefs 
they sought to supplant, extra-colonial, colonial and indigenous actors 
simultaneously sought to monopolise the meaning of what British rule meant in a 
colonial context.  
Nevertheless, they also revealed a very real dispute over the state’s right to 
govern that was readily exploitable by various Mpondo actors. In the first instance, 
they used the occasion of the Cooks’ trial to advance factions and fissures that had 
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been exacerbated by civil conflict. These loyalties and rivalries were also the cause of 
Sigcau’s own incarceration, as the paramount struggled to affirm an authority below 
that was doubly intended as a show of strength to colonial officials, who similarly 
sought to consolidate their claim to rule. Taken together, these judicial disputes thus 
marked an important moment in the intersection of indigenous, colonial and imperial 
jurisdictional disputes that – as chapter 6 demonstrated – served to shape the 
administrative character and institutional viability of the colonial state itself.  
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